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TWO ROMES.

THIS year United Italy is holding in its capital city an exposition to commemorate the fiftieth year of the proclamation of the kingdom. What music, art and commerce can contribute to the triumphant display will be brought into requisition for the occasion—military reviews, the reception of foreign bodies, banquets and pompous speeches are to form part of the programme of proceedings, and as an old Italian chronicler would say in his quaint, grandiose way of such a celebration in his day: There shall be *molte belle feste e grandi eventi!*

And then the public inauguration of the new Palazzo di Giustizia —built where it can be well seen from the Vatican—will take place; the imposing monument to Victor Emmanuel, "Pater Patriæ," finished after fifteen years labor and after impoverished Italy has been three times entreated for the necessary funds, will be opened; the Piazza Colonna is to be renovated, and so are the baths of Caracalla—or rather the ruins of them; these and divers other projects are to be ready for the exposition—for we are not going to see "many grand feasts and high doings!"

And now that the temporal power of the Roman Pontiffs belongs to the past, that the head of the Church must under heaven depend for its maintenance upon the generosity of his spiritual children throughout the world, that a usurper holds the throne from which the Pope ruled for a thousand years, while its rightful owner is a prisoner in his own city, it will be of interest from many points of view to review what Roman people and Rome were like before 1870 and what they are to-day.

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Long ages ago, when Rome through the neglect of the Western emperors was left to the mercy of barbarous hordes, Romans turned to one figure for aid and protection and asked him to rule them; and thus in this simple manner, the best title of all to kingly right, commenced the temporal sovereignty of the Popes. And meekly stepping to the throne of Cæsar, the Vicar of Christ took up the sceptre to which the emperors and kings of Europe were to bow in reverence through so many ages, from sentiments of respect for the dignity of his office and because he was the only mediator whom they recognized in their almost interminable wars.

Ages went by and Rome began to recover some of her old grandeur under Papal rule. The turbulent Roman barons fought with one another, and the most powerful of them crossed swords with the Pope—for every noble family of worth had its fortress, and the narrow, winding streets of the city made a battleground only too well suited to their fierce brawls. And then a change occurred. Tired of internal dissension and external intrigue, believing he could rule his spiritual dominions with more liberty and success in France than in Italy, the Pope-King quietly packed his luggage and took up his abode in Avignon, where a warm welcome and tranquillity awaited him, though perfect freedom of action was tempered, indeed, by less independence. Then the Romans had their eyes opened. Their head was absent and had no intention of returning; their city crumbled and its population dwindled, and a day came when the populace of Rome sent a cry up to Avignon beseeching the return of "Il Papa-Re," for they were in a grievous plight. But the Pope had got a sharp lesson by his experience, or rather the experience of his predecessors, and refused to come back. And then saints knelt at his feet and begged him to go southwards and take up again his residence in the city where Peter and Paul sleep, and deputations of Rome's foremost men came to the steps of the Papal throne and besought Christ's Vicar to come among them and abide with them again as their father and king. And the Pope returned after an absence of seventy years. But what a woeful sight met the Pontiff's eyes as he entered his city! A miserable population that dwindled week by week welcomed him; a woe-begone look overspread what was once Imperial Rome; ruins and signs of decay stared him on every side, so that he asked himself: what had become of the brave and sturdy Rome he had left a few generations back, and how he should best undertake the task of regenerating it?

As the verdure bursts forth in springtime under the influence of showers and genial sunshine, as the drooping flower raises its head and opens its petals at the warm rays of the morning sun, as the

little child grows up happy and strong under the gentle influence of a good parent's care, so did the city of Rome begin to change as soon as she got back her "Pope-King." With that slow energy, that programme of *festina lente* by which everything seems to be done in Rome, the Vicar of Christ commenced the rebuilding of his capital, and soon the city began to be worthy of her old name and her people once more took the ancient pride in being called Romans.

Years and years went by, each year seeing some vast achievement commenced or completed; Pope succeeded Pope, each seeming to vie with his predecessor in beautifying his beloved Rome, so much so indeed that when we have come through the long vista of ages down to the pontificate of Pius IX. we find a beautiful, dignified old Rome, in which the stately grandeur of the middle ages had a solitary home.

And what a noble, fearless life was that lived by those Popes! Naturally they made many and powerful enemies, for their office was to restrain unworthy ambition and combat vice. But that mattered little to them; each Pontiff's attitude in peace or war was that embodied in the reply given in 1848 by Cardinal Toste to the revolutionists, who, when Pius IX. and the Sacred College had fled from Rome after the attack upon the Quirinal Palace, came to tender their congratulations to the aged Cardinal for the courage displayed by him in remaining at his post:

"Sirs," replied the white-haired prelate, with dignity, "I am no more afraid of you than were any of my colleagues who are gone away. It was through love and obedience to the Holy Father that they followed him into exile. The same motives prevent my leaving this establishment (San Michele), for he has desired me not to abandon so many unfortunate persons sheltered here. Besides, I am a Roman and you are not. I shall remain at Rome without fear. If you give me a blow of a stiletto, it will only shorten my life two or three years, for I am already seventy-two."

And thus it was that in 1870, before the cannon of Victor Emmanuel II., "the loyal son of the Holy Church"—as His Majesty was pleased to style himself at the very dethronement of Pius IX.—were leveled at the Aurelian Walls, you had Rome an ideal city by reason of the happiness and contentment of her population, on account of her comparative freedom from vice and extreme poverty, because of the noble institution where the unfortunate one, whether culpable or not, was treated kindly and led gently back to the straight path; where the widow and the orphan were tenderly cared for; where the dowerless girl was honorably provided for; where the quiet, dignified old manners of men and women existed as yet untroubled with the idiotic fopperies, the feverish scramble for gold, the mad

struggle of godless societies in the unending chain of political intrigues that are so much in evidence in the metropolis of "United Italy" to-day.

Let us take up each of the foregoing points in which Rome prior to 1870 was distinguished, for they will perhaps open the eyes of some of our monern tourists whose chief source of information on everything that concerns the capital of Christendom—save and except the explanation regarding museums, churches, catacombs, hotels, etc., which are found in Murray or Baedeker—is the obsequious porter at their hotel door or the guide whom they hire at so much per day to pilot them through the streets.

It is probable that the matters spoken of in the following pages will be treated in a more partial manner than they usually are by the hotel porter or the sly Italian guide, both of whom are quite ready to tell the foreigner anything and everything under the sun, provided they think he will swallow it and increase their *mancia* on the morning of his departure.

Under Papal rule Romans were happy and contented. One occasionally comes across an old Roman, viz., member of a family resident in Rome before 1870, who will freely tell of the tranquil life of the 200,000 souls or so that Rome counted within her walls before Victor Emmanuel arrived. He will tell you that the people were content, because all their needs were satisfied: the cost of the necessaries of life was only about one-sixth of what it presently is; the rule of the Papal Government was gentle but firm; abuses were stamped out before there was time for them to take root; the people loved their Pope-King, who walked through their narrow streets almost as a simple priest, and they fell on their knees and asked his blessing with the faith and simplicity of happy children as he passed along.

But is there the same degree of happiness and contentment among the people of Rome to-day? Ask your old Roman, and he will turn his dark, flashing eyes over the city and speak with contempt of the motley population that is made up by the 600,000 persons that fill the Eternal City at this moment. For when Victor Emmanuel's army entered Rome in 1870 after battering down the Porta Pia six thousand camp followers followed in the soldiers' wake and settled down in Rome. And then on Rome being declared the capital of "United Italy," the riffraff from the Hundred Cities of the Peninsula flocked in and have lived here since. It is not always the best that leave their native city and emigrate to another on the mere chance of "something turning up," even though they have got all the sanguineness of Dickens' hero. And so in a short time the motley population of Tuscans, Lombardians, Venetians, Um-

brians, Sicilians and Neapolitans, though fused together under the generic appellation of "Italians," showed their distinctive characteristics and broke up into parties, the doctrines of which were suggested by the habits peculiar to their native soil and to that something which every one finds in his blood. To-day Monarchists, Socialists, Anarchists, Radicals and all their sub-divisions keep Rome in a state of ferment and help to show what a world of contrast there is between the Rome of to-day and that of forty years ago, for in the latter happiness and contentment reigned, but in the former we can find (that is, among most of the newcomers) only low living and party strife that never rests.

I have said that in Rome of the Papal days there was comparative freedom from vice and from extreme poverty. When the Pope had his own a degree of virtue made the people of Rome stand as examples for those of every city in Italy. Suicides were almost unknown; the event of taking away one's life usually kept the population in gossip for weeks. Now no day passes without a deserter from life. The theatre was pure; now, although several theatres in Rome are above reproach, others are of the most lurid French type. A high standard of morality reigned unsullied; to-day the descendants of Victor Emmanuel's camp followers make their presence only too keenly felt in the Eternal City, and if the present increase in population goes on, bid fair to raise the criminal record to a total that few ever dreamt of.

With regard to the state of comparative freedom from poverty that existed in Papal Rome, I must not be understood to state that all abounded in this world's goods. Doubtless a lira meant as much and more to the Roman of the Papal regime than to his brother of the present day. But there was none of that black, despairing want that haunts the poorer classes in Rome at this hour. Men were poor, but they were certain of sufficient food each day and a covering by night; at this hour there are hundreds who, if fortunate enough to obtain a dinner, do not know whence supper will come unless as alms, while for many the doorsteps of a church or the recesses of the Coloseum or of the aqueducts have to serve as a couch for the night. But it is chiefly in her public institutions that Papal Rome surpassed Rome of after 1870. In no single particular have English readers been so cruelly led astray by unscrupulous writers than in the question of the prisons in which the Popes retained political offenders. Bigots who, either through lust of money or through hatred of the Catholic Church, published in England accounts of "Papal dungeons," seem to have lost all respect for truth and honesty in their desire to please.

On the question of "Papal dungeons" let us hear what a foreign

visitor found on a personal investigation. "Passing over the prison for women," says Maguire in his "Rome," written, be it noted, in 1857, "which forms part of the vast collection of buildings, I may refer to that in which persons convicted or accused of political offenses were then confined. To this department of the building I turned with considerable anxiety, being desirous of judging, by what I myself should see, how far the statements of certain classes of the English journals, with respect to the treatment of political prisoners, were true or false. I expected, at the least, to behold gloomy and noisome cells; to see the victims of Papal tyranny lying on scanty bundles of straw flung on stone couches and to hear the clanking of the falling fetter and the ponderous chain. In fact, to realize the picture of a 'Roman dungeon' which English writers had made familiar to my mind, the prison into which I was about to be admitted should, as nearly as possible, resemble those fearful dungeons that are shown to the stranger in Venice and which, in their horrid gloom and tomblike aspect, speak with terrible eloquence of the mysterious tyranny of its departed Republic. But as the guardian turned the key and flung open the door of the great hall of the prison my thick-coming fancies and dark associations were at once dispelled, for instead of gloom and horror and noisome dungeons I beheld a large well-lighted, well-ventilated and—could such a word be properly applied to any place of confinement—cheerful-looking hall. The bright sun streams in through several windows, placed rather high from the ground, on one side of this vast hall, and on the other side and facing the light the cells were constructed, row above row, their doors and windows opening into this large enclosure. There was no clanking of chains to be heard, but, instead, the hum of conversation as some twenty or twenty-five men were at that moment either walking up and down or engaged in a game of dominoes. They all wore their ordinary clothes and might have passed for a number of persons who had been confined for debt, and a glance into the interior of the cells of this 'Roman dungeon' was quite sufficient to show that not only had they ample light and air, but that they differed from the ordinary cells in the great superiority of their size and arrangement. In size alone they were considerably larger than the cells of an ordinary prison. They also differed from the ordinary cell in a much more remarkable manner; for in those into which I looked there were drinking glasses of different kinds, some ornaments and other articles not to be expected in such places. So far as a sense of delicacy would permit my doing so, I saw enough to discredit the statements which I had been accustomed to read and to convince me that, at least in this prison—the only prison in Rome

in which political prisoners were then detained—there was no feature, whether of degradation or of cruelty, which in any way could justify those descriptions of 'Italian dungeons' so familiar to the public of the United Kingdom. I passed through a room or ward of considerable size, in which there were several men, the greater number of whom were sitting on their beds, which beds appeared to be of the description usually found in a public hospital. Light and air were fully supplied to this as to the other compartment which I have described."

Now compare this description of an independent Catholic layman, who was certainly decided to paint the "Roman dungeons" just as he should find them, with the descriptions served up for consumption in England and America by men who wrote merely what they believed to be marketable there. Then go a step further and compare the political dungeons—dungeons in the true sense of the word—of England, Austria and the Republic of Venice with the "Roman dungeons" found in use by Maguire. Davitt, Boyle O'Reilly and John Mitchell could tell from sad experience what treatment the English "lambs" meted out to political prisoners and how much light, air and space characterized their coffinlike abodes during their years of martyrdom at the hands of Bible-quoting hypocrites!

But perhaps it was in the hospitals that the humanity and generosity of the Pope-Kings were particularly remarkable. Here tenderness and the best treatment that the science of the time could afford were lavished on rich and poor alike in private hospitals as well as in the great public hospital of Santo Spirito, in the Borgo Vecchio, founded in 1198 by Innocent III. and rebuilt in 1471 by Sixtus V. I will confine my attention to only one branch of this great hospital and again allow the author of "Rome" to express an opinion on what he saw there in 1857:

"I was most anxious to judge for myself of the condition of the Foundling Hospital, which, as I have stated, forms an important branch of this vast institution, for I had heard different opinions as to its management. A kindly, cheerful-looking Sister was directed to act as our guide, and she at once led the way through many courts and corridors to that part of the building. The average number of children received during the year is about 900, but of these not more than 600, or two-thirds, are illegitimate—the remaining 300 are the offspring of poor and needy, perhaps in some instances of heartless parents who adopt this ready mode of providing for them or getting rid of them. . . . The number of 900 may seem very great, as representing the annual average; however, it should be remembered that the hospital of St. Spirito affords an asylum

not only to the foundlings of Rome, but to those of the provinces of Sabina, Frosinine, Velletri and the Comarca and also districts on the borders of the Kingdom of Naples. . . .

"The nurses are kept with great care and never leave their young charge. They are well fed and well paid and every inducement is held out to them to discharge their duty honestly and faithfully. The constant presence of one of the Sisters is a guarantee for as much care and attention as can be expected from such a class to such a class—from the mercenary to the offspring of shame, or at best the child of poverty.

"Particular care is taken in noting down everything connected with the reception of the child. Of course, the day of the year and month are noted as well as the very hour, and, if the person bringing the child has no difficulty in telling them, also the name and origin. The official in charge makes a slight incision in the shape of the cross of Santo Spirito on the right foot and introduces into it a dark dye, in order to render the mark indelible. The child is then carried to the nursery, where it is taken charge of by the superior, who examines the clothes to ascertain if there be any mark, such as a coin, medal or ribbon; if there be any such, she makes a note of it, which she fastens to the clothes. In fine, every particular by which the identity of the child can be described is carefully put aside and registered. If there be no certificate of baptism, the little one is carried to the church and there baptized conditionally. The nurseries consist of three rooms, capable of containing fifty beds for the nurses, and each bed has two cradles near it. Two of the rooms are for healthy children and one for the sick."

And those children were reared tenderly, educated and given a start in life, in such a manner as a rich empire might feel justly proud, not to speak of a little kingdom in Italy.

With regard to those about to become mothers, every inducement was afforded them to enter this hospital, lest the offspring should come to grief through malice. The female might enter wearing a veil and without giving her name. She was not obliged to make known her identity; her sad secret was safe with herself and was guaranteed to die with her in case it were her will. For even if she should die in hospital, the veil was left unremoved from her face, if such had been her expressed wish.

Needless to say, struggling widows and orphans were assisted by the Vatican itself from the earliest days: "Every Monday and Friday," says a pilgrim to Rome in 1630, writing of an ancient hospital that stood on the site of the present sacristy of St. Peter's, "some 2,000 poor persons here receive a dole of bread and a flask

of wine; every week 1,000 large loaves and fourteen barrels of wine are thus distributed."

But it is of the dowerless girl that special care was taken under Papal regime, and large sums were given by ecclesiastics and wealthy Roman seculars to provide a certain number of doweries every year for poor but virtuous girls who wished to enter the matrimonial state. Each year applications for marriage doweries were received, the chief conditions being the presentation of a baptismal certificate and a letter from the girl's parish priest testifying to her good conduct. How sad it is to have to recall here that only last year these two conditions have been dispensed with by the Syndic and municipality of Rome! When Victor Emmanuel seized Rome he also seized the control of all pious foundations in the Eternal City, among which are the funds destined for poor girls' doweries. Until the advent of Ernest Nathan, the Anglo-Jewish Mayor of Rome, ex-Grand Master of Italian Freemasonry and late disciple of Mazzini, apostle of secret assassination, to the chair of the municipality, none of the wicked men who had risen to power by fawning on the usurper living in the stolen Quirinal Palace had ever dared to violate the wishes of the dead regarding these funds. However, to Sig. Nathan and the Socialist City Councillors the idea of a baptismal certificate and a priest's letter testifying to the honorable lives of applicants proved distasteful! And now the good Catholic girl for whose benefit those funds were provided by charitable co-religionists of days gone by has as competitors for these doweries the daughter of the strolling Jew, the offspring of the Socialist, of the fire-eating Anarchist, of the member of the Giordano Bruno or the "No-God-nor-Master-Society," or mayhap the nameless creature that paces the streets after dark!

I have said that with the fall of Rome passed away the quiet, dignified old manners that were so characteristic of the middle ages. The saying is but too true; as the rush for gold, that hard grind that makes life a drudgery has taken away the halo of peace and quietness which one would like to see existing in the capital of Christendom.

Foreign residents in Rome speak with enthusiasm of the politeness and polish that were to be found among all classes of Romans a half century ago. "Even the very street-sweeper was almost a Chesterfield in his manner," one aged resident belonging to the English-speaking world once declared to the writer. Truly indeed, Rome in this respect as well as in many others has come down to the level of an ordinary European capital!

"Under Papal rule," said Bishop Chatard, "it is well known that not only in Rome did good order prevail, as the immense multitude

present at the Œcumenical Council can attest, but that also on the frontiers of the territories governed by the Pope, after the withdrawal of the French troops from Veroli and Anagni, the energy displayed by the Roman delegate was such as to liberate completely the provinces from the bands sprung from the civil strifes of Southern Italy. The city of Rome itself was a model of good order and of personal safety." But the same cannot be said of Rome at all times nowadays, for the city on the Tiber, with her half million or so of souls, imitates only too faithfully her bigger sister on the Seine in her number of Apaches. And on days consecrated to socialistic and irreligious celebrations modern Rome can make as imposing a display as can the most pagan of cities of Europe in deeds of violence and utter disregard for all human and divine law.

We have wider streets and larger squares to-day than Rome could boast of forty years ago, but we have not the grand old Rome that monarchs loved to gaze upon, nor the romantic scenes that inspired the pen and brush of so many masters.

Following the declaration of Rome as the capital of Italy, a vast movement betraying something of that megalomania which marked the Romans of old, came to be initiated by the new masters of the Eternal City. New streets were hastily mapped out and speedily lined with huge, cheaply built tenement houses, nearly every one of which was dignified by the title of "palazzo," for the influx to Rome from all over the peninsula was expected to be very great. The quarter of the historic Villa Ludovisi—in which are included the site of Sallust's gardens—was despoiled of its beauty and covered with those edifices; so also were the Prati di Castelli, the district between St. John Lateran's (the Pope's cathedral) and S. Croce in Gerusalemme, and not even the Campo Marzo, the Fields of Mars, where Cæsar trained his legions twenty-one centuries ago, was spared, for a large part of it is now turned into back yards. As to the destruction of mediæval monuments for the sake of sites, "that subject is so wide that volumes could not record it," says a foreigner who has lived in Rome since 1869. No monument was too sacred for those modern vandals if its site proved suitable for the rearing of a tenement house, wine shop or hotel. And perhaps the beauties of nature were never more disregarded in any single instance as when the personal intervention of Queen Margherita of Italy failed to dissuade the municipality from felling a line of ilex trees that for centuries had been regarded so ornamental to the Eternal City on the slope of the Janiculum Hill.

"In the wild range of speculation which culminated in 1889," says Marion Crawford, who perhaps knew more about Rome than any foreigner of his day, "its desolate open lands (i. e., the regions

near the Quirinal, Monte Mario, etc.), its ancient villas and its strange old houses were the natural prey of a foolish greediness, the like of which has never been seen before. Progress ate up romance and hundreds of wretched, cheaply built, hideous, unsafe buildings sprang up, like the unhealthy growth of a foul disease, between the Lateran Gate and the old inhabited districts. They are destined to a graceless and ignoble ruin. Ugly cracks in the miserable stucco show where the masonry is already parting as the hollow foundations subside, and walls in which the paint is still almost fresh are covered up with dirty beams, lest they should fall and crush the few paupers who dwell within. Filthy, half-washed clothes of beggars hang down from the windows drying in the sun as they flap and flutter against pretentious molded masks of empty plaster. Miserable children loiter in the high-arched gates, under which smart carriages were meant to drive, and gnaw their dirty fingers or fight for a cold boiled chestnut one of them has saved. Squalor, misery, ruin and vile stucco, with a sprinkling of half-desperate humanity—those are the elements of the modern picture—that is what the 'great development of modern Rome' brought forth and left behind it. Peace to the past and to its ashes of romance and beauty."

There is a huge building on the Quirinal Hill, famous in the history of the Universal Church and of Italy. *"Eccoci qua, e qua resterremo!"* "Here we are, and here we shall remain!" cried the first of the usurping line on taking possession of it. But Victor Emmanuel II. lived only eight years to enjoy his ill-gotten spoil, for in the midst of a brilliant fête in 1878 he dropped like a log while smoking a cigar, and the huge body was borne to the royal bedchamber, and no man knows yet whether a priestly hand had been raised over the excommunicated monarch before he breathed his last. His son, Humbert, succeeded him and reigned for twenty-two years until the Anarchist's dagger ended his bad life in 1900 at Monza. And Humbert's place was taken by Victor Emmanuel III., whom you never see outside his palace except in the midst of armed men; for those who killed his father have sworn to dye their hands in the son's blood, and well he knows their oath is terrible. As King of Italy, Victor Emmanuel is the living personification of the Italian Constitution, which says: "The Roman Catholic religion is the religion of the kingdom of Italy."

Leaving aside for the moment the political hostility of the King of Italy to the head of the Church while the present circumstances exist, one would imagine that the head of the State that acknowledges such an article ought to be at least a loyal Catholic. However, a condition of things quite the opposite obtains, for in contrast to his saintly mother, Victor Emmanuel III. is said to be one of the

bitterest anti-clericals in Italy. It is commonly said that he belongs to the sect of Freemasons; but for the present this assertion, though it is believed by many, cannot be clearly proved. Men may to some extent dispose of their own souls, but with their own their efforts must cease; and hence it is that no little ferment has been occasioned in Catholic ranks this past year or two on hearing it whispered about that the young Princesses of the house reigning over Catholic Italy are being reared without any definite religious training, with the view of their being able to embrace the faith of their future husbands. If this is true—and reference to a Protestant training being imparted to the little Princesses, though made in the press, has not been officially denied—to what a sorry pass has come the House of Savoy, one of the most ancient in Europe, which, as Pius IX. reminded Victor Emmanuel II., prior to the Piedmontese invasion, can count canonized saints on its annals! However, the Methodist minister who made the statement contrived to shuffle out of it, and Italy is yet at sea on the matter.

It is sometimes stated that on the taking of the Eternal City by Emmanuel II. the outraged Pontiff, Pius IX., said:

"Three generations of the House of Savoy will reign in Rome."

The grandson of the usurper is the third and perhaps shall be the last of these, seeing that many signs of a revolution are apparent in Italy. But nobody knows the year or the day on which the fire will burst forth, for the Socialist and Anarchist leaders keep cool heads, even though their dupes get themselves daily into trouble with the powers that be. To the trend of events Victor Emmanuel is keenly alive, so much so, indeed, that millions of his money are invested outside Italy, especially in England, lest the evil day might come and find him unprepared for exile.

But, happily, the advent of Victor Emmanuel's troops and the thousands of riffraff gentry, whom Theodore Roosevelt would term "undesirable citizens," have been able to change only one part of Rome; for there is another side to Rome which has retained all that was good and grand in the City of the Popes.

The most powerful of the old Roman aristocrats and patricians have staunchly adhered to the Papal cause and have continued to look with equal disdain on the usurper and those of the body who welcomed his advent. Amid weal and woe the Prisoner of the Vatican can count on the warlike Orsini, from which Benedict XII. sprang; the Patrizi-Montoros, the head of which house is hereditary standard-bearer to the Sovereign Pontiff; the Borghesi, who gave Pope Paul V. to the Church; the Lancellotti; the Aldobrandini, who gave Clement VIII. to Peter's throne, and who as a sign of mourning have not opened the front door of their palace since 1870; the

Lavaggi; the Rospighiliosi, the head of which house is Prince Assistant at the Papal throne and from which Clement IV. sprang; the Vitelleschi; the Colonna, from which house came Pope Martin V.; the Massimo, that traces back its descent to Fabius the Cunctator, who saved the honor of pagan Rome at a critical hour; the Ruspoli and several others.

Some of these gave saints to the Church, and as has been seen, many gave Popes; but all of them have suffered for having embraced the side of him who, though ruling 250,000,000 loyal subjects, has only a few acres of garden that he dare call his own. These nobles, so many of the borghesia and of the lower classes have preserved that genuine love for religion, for the fine arts, for culture, elevated surroundings and methods of life that has never died, and, let us hope, never will. With the families which they have assimilated and the foreign Catholics whose long period of residence in Rome has taught them to consider the Eternal City as their home, they have kept up all the grand traditions of a great and holy past. And thanks to the struggle for the coming generation carried on against the infidel schools by the Holy Father, the ranks of the good are being constantly refilled with devoted, self-respecting young men and women to balance the future efforts of the disciples of Government godless institutes.

To counteract the Government educational institutes where no mention of God is made, the Pope supports no less than forty-six schools, male and female, throughout the city, where at the present day upwards of 27,500 pupils are educated at an annual cost to Pius X. of 256,000 lire. God-fearing, well-educated young men and women leave these schools where they have been saved through Papal zeal and sacrifice from the fate of so many thousands of their kind in Rome who grow up pagan and cruel and carnal—the very type of the stripling tyrants of ancient Rome whose vicious lives and incapacity to govern when their time came did so much to hasten the dissolution of the great empire. Many of these make spiritual retreats each year for eight days, and all devote the last three days of Holy Week in one form or another to the care of their souls. What influence this number of the rising generation must have on the future of Rome and Italy will be easily comprehensible to American fathers and mothers who are placed in almost the same position as Roman parents in the necessity to strive for a Christian education for their boys and girls.

It would be a long recital to convey an adequate idea of the patience and persevering labors with which the religious of both sexes coöperate in the work so dear to the heart of the Sovereign Pontiff. Though rarely able to support themselves, they make a

gallant fight, and the few loaves and fishes seem to multiply in their hands. I know for a fact that the Irish Christian Brothers, who came to Rome some ten years ago for the special purpose of battling against the efforts of the Methodist proselytizers among children induced to attend their schools, lived cheerfully for the first year or two in great necessity. Now they own one of the most magnificent educational institutes in Rome, with seven hundred boys passing through their hands, many of whom are the sons of Freemasons and other enemies of the Church, who are attracted there by reason of the thorough training they see others receiving.

And thus shall stand as of yore the palace of a thousand years, the beacon-light of Christianity, in which the patient Prisoner of the Vatican sits teaching nations and showing men the way to higher things. Representatives of many cities and men serve beside his throne, and millions come from the four winds of heaven to kneel at his feet and offer him proof of affection and homage. After looking on all we come away convinced that although the war of 1870 defined two Romes—the Rome of Papal rule, which passed away, and that if Victor Emmanuel, by which it was replaced —still we have two Romes on the Tiber to-day, the Rome of Religion and that of Mammon, reared by the followers of Victor Emmanuel. The latter is always evident, sparkling in the sunlight and dancing on the surface like froth upon the surface of a wind-swept lake; the former remains silent, tranquil, undisturbed, like the still, deep waters below, reminding one of the truth of the declaration of an English Protestant journal made a half score of years ago:

"The Pope is alone in the Vatican, without a friend in the governments of the world, without treasure, without an army, without power, without a voice in the senate of nations, a prisoner in his own palace, surrounded by the troops of a hostile king. His visible power is indeed gone. Nevertheless, his invisible power was perhaps never stronger than to-day. . . . With all the forces of the world against him, he has fought well and drawn tighter the bonds of respect, love and obedience which knit the Roman Church into one harmonious whole, its unity never more absolute, its purity never more apparent, its authority never more loyally recognized." . . . Perhaps it is true to say that the bitterest and most unrelenting enemies the Papacy has on earth to-day are in Rome itself. Ever on the alert where the Church is concerned, sworn to pursue her with that patient, quiet rage which seems almost demoniacal, the irreligious societies, secret and open, wage a ceaseless war against everything savoring of Catholicity.

Like a daring general who boldly pushes the war into the enemy's stronghold, so they have commanded their ablest men to come to Rome and battle against "the Vatican." "Give me a hundred able men," said a Masonic leader at a public celebration held by the fraternity some twenty years ago, "and in ten years you will see the Vatican walls falling."

Night and day their emissaries are said to exercise surveillance over the Apostolic Palace, lest the body of the late Pope might be transferred to his chosen resting place on the Lateran Basilica, his own cathedral church. Calumny and a pornographic press, well endowed from home and foreign sources, are the chief weapons employed by those apostles of free thought in their unholy work; and when these fail in their ends, bribery, cunning, intrigue and open violence are resorted to. Freemasonry, which has honeycombed the city and country and is making of itself a State within a State, plots unceasingly for the destruction of the Catholic Church; Socialism has converted tens of thousands of the workingmen into enemies of the true faith, and the Giordano Brunoite will die, as he has promised on legally stamped paper to the blasphemous society to which he belongs, refusing the ministrations of a priest. These are the men who make Rome, only too often turbulent and occasion the head of the Church deep pain and sorrow.

"Thirty Popes," said Cardinal Vaughan, "have been martyred and one-fifth of the whole line has been exiled or imprisoned, but the Popes have always regained their liberty. The life of the Papacy is like that of Christ Himself, checkered by sufferings and peaceful times; to-day hosannas, to-morrow the passion and crucifixion, but these followed by the resurrection. The Vicar of Christ and His Church are necessarily in conflict with the false maxims of the world, and sufferings and persecutions are the inevitable consequences."

But notwithstanding all the trials which Christ's Vicar has to suffer in his own city, he may safely say that there are as many saints living within the Aurelian Walls to-day as at any period in history.

"Avete il vecchio e il nuovo Testamento
E il Pastor della Chiesa che vi guida
Questa vi basta a vostro Salvamento,"

Said Beatrice in "Il Paradiso." The formula is brief and clear and is one which guides those thousand of holy ones of Rome who so closely imitate the lines of Francesca Romana, Filippo Neri and Vincenzo Pallotti, their fellow-citizens of days gone by; for in no city have I witnessed such scenes of deep, abiding faith and unostentatious piety as in that in which Peter and Paul shed their blood.

One often hears criticisms of a harsh and censorious nature passed by foreigners on shortcomings they have witnessed in Rome and of the violence sometimes shown against the Church by a portion of the city press and by public men. Forgetting that a good general sends his best men into the enemy's stronghold to strike telling blows, such critics should remember that the emissaries of Satan are to be found in Rome in stronger numbers than in any other part of Italy. Italian Masonry has some of its keenest disciples living in Rome; all the atheistical bodies are governed by daring men, and now Methodism has for several years begun its campaign of hate against the Catholic Church and its terrible traffic in human souls. Why, then, should there be any wonder that one must often feel shocked at some of the products of modern Rome! "The worst Christians are found in Jerusalem, the worst Mahommedans in Mecca," is a saying common among the followers of Mahomet. If the Musselman added: "The worst and the best type of men are living in Rome," their adage would be more complete and not wanting in truth, for each day one encounters living saints in the streets as well as walking sons of the Evil One—men who would crucify Jesus Christ again, if it were in their power and who, not satisfied with fastening Him to the Cross with four nails, would, to gratify a fiendish, unreasoning hate for the supernatural, drive a nail through every pore of His body, were such a course possible.

To overthrow the kingdom of Christ on earth, to blot out every memory of His name, to bring back something of the old spirit of paganism which Peter and Paul crushed out in the City of the Cæsars twenty centuries ago, to drive the Pope from Rome and bring up the rising generation without ever hearing from his lips the divine message borne in the Appian Way by the Galilean Fisherman so long ago—these are the aims of wicked men in the interests of which a sleepless vigil is kept.

Qui mange du Pope en meurt! crief a French political leader of the Third Republic during a debate in the Chamber on the Papal possessions. The saying was true in connection with temporal questions; how much more is it so where attempts are made to destroy his spiritual sway, for did not somebody say on a memorable occasion: *Tu es Petrus et super hanc petram ædificabo ecclesiam meam, et portæ inferi non prævalebunt contra eam?*

James P. Conry.

Rome, Italy.

ANCIENT SCOTTISH FAIRS.

THE gatherings for the purpose of merchandise commonly known as fairs (as distinguished from markets, which are more frequent and of less importance) are rapidly decreasing in Great Britain, and will soon have become a relic of past ages; yet once they occupied a very important place in the social life of the people. The multiplication of larger centres of commerce, the facilities afforded by railways and other means of traffic and numerous changes of the kind have combined to render fairs less necessary; in districts where they have survived, pleasure and amusement preponderate over serious business. Yet there is much that is of interest in their history, especially to those who take delight in anything connected, even remotely, with the Church of past ages. That such connection exists in this case will be shown later.

The origin of fairs is of such remote antiquity that it cannot be ascertained with accuracy; we may note that the Prophet Ezechiel refers (chapter 27) to the markets of Tyre. Such gatherings must have come about as soon as the needs of social life increased in any nation. Primitive peoples had few wants, but the time would come when a division of labor would become essential in order to provide adequately for the daily requirements of a nation. Simple home needs—food, clothing, implements of husbandry and other appliances of life—would be carried to fixed centres and there disposed of to those who might wish to acquire them. Later on needs of a more important kind—cattle, horses and farm stock of every species—would have to be provided for and some particular meeting place designated for such sales and purchases. Hence the growth of fairs among civilized nations.

The localities fixed upon for these gatherings would be settled by circumstances; a convenient position near converging lines of roads, an important town, a much frequented ford and the like would suggest the choice. But in order to render them really beneficial to the people concerned it was necessary to safeguard their procedure by legal approbation, since, as is apparent, mere private arrangement could never secure stability of place or freedom from confusion. Consequently we find at an early date in European history the accepted principle that no fair or market could be established in any particular locality without royal license. The oldest charter of the kind known is that of Dagobert, King of the Franks; he had founded the Abbey of St. Denis in the year 638 and granted to the abbot and monks of that monastery an annual fair on the patronal feast, "for the glory of God and honor of St. Denis."

The grant of a fair made in favor of any particular person or community secured to those thus distinguished the sole right to trade; all others who wished to make use of the fair for the purpose of buying or selling were therefore bound to acknowledge the claim of the superior to exact certain dues in return for the privilege afforded them. In some cases all business of the kind was prohibited within a certain specified radiuc of the place where the fair was being held. At Winchester, for example, where William the Conqueror had granted to the Bishop the right of an annual fair on the feast of St. Giles, the Magistrates were accustomed to deliver up the keys of the city to the prelate, who appointed his own officials for the sixteen days of the fair; Winchester and Southampton were forbidden to trade elsewhere than at the fair, and officers of the Bishop were posted along the highway to seize any goods purchased within seven miles of the site of the assembly.

To come more immediately to the subject of Scottish fairs, their chief interest, as already hinted, is their connection with ancient festivals of the Church. The commonly accepted derivation of the word "fair" is from the Latin *feria*—"holiday," the latter term being, as is evident, but a popularized form of "holy day." A modern survival of ancient usage is seen in the word used in Germany for both Mass and fair—*messen*; a like instance is the term "kermis," still bearing the same double signification among the country people of Flanders. The history of the middle ages shows clearly that many fairs originated with the observance of solemn festivals. The assembling of the faithful for the offices of the Church was found a convenient occasion for the transaction of business after spiritual duties had been fulfilled. By degrees such informal meetings in the churchyard would develop into more public assemblies in the town itself or before the gate of the monastery to whose church the people had gathered; then in due course would come the application for royal approval, and a legal fair was the result. The other components—vendors of refreshments, trinkets, toys and the like, as well as itinerant actors and musicians—would naturally be attracted to the scene by the prospect of gain.

It may be imagined how important a part such fairs must have occupied in the ages of faith. No town of any considerable importance but had its two or three fairs at stated intervals; even smaller villages—some of them now extinct—had such a gathering on the titular feast of the parish church, should the situation of the place render it convenient.[1] In some localities fairs were not

[1] Apart from the list of Sir David Marwick, to be mentioned later, the chief sources of information regarding these fairs are the following: "New Statistical Account of Scotland" (15 vols.), 1845; Forbes, "Kalendar of Scottish Saints."

restricted to patronal feasts of the parish church and of the various chapels of the neighborhood; prominent days were chosen for the purpose—often some special Sunday of the ecclesiastical year. Thus Aberdeen obtained a charter in 1273 for a fair lasting for fourteen days from Trinity Sunday, and when some reason occurred in 1319 for a change of day, Low Sunday was chosen. Several other instances of Trinity fairs are to be found; that of Duns, in Berwickshire (granted 1489) lasted for eight days, as did also that held in Edinburgh (1447). There is record of two or three fairs having been held on Palm Sunday, which would not suggest itself at first sight as a very suitable occasion, yet that at Forgue, a small place in Aberdeenshire, lasted for five days. Maunday Thursday was still more popular. James IV., in 1492, granted a charter in favor of the Abbot of Coupar, by the terms of which a Burgh Cross (the sign of a legal market) might be erected before the gate of the monastery and an annual fair held *"in Cœna Domini."* The great fair at Melrose, another Cistercian abbey, "in the time of Popery," as Protestant evidence states, was that on Maunday Thursday, popularly styled "Skeir Thursday." Shrove Tuesday, or "Fastrens Eve," had its fair in some localities. Other prominent festivals were Ascension Day and Pentecost.

But far more numerous were the fairs held on festivals of our Lady. The feasts of her Purification, Annunciation, Assumption, Nativity and Immaculate Conception were celebrated in this fashion in various places in Scotland. The nomenclature of some of these days is worthy of note here. The Purification always appears in such records as Candlemas; other feasts were designated by titles less familiar to us in these days, but evidently in constant use in earlier centuries. The Annunciation is styled "Lady Day in Lentron" and "Our Lady's Day in Lent;" the Assumption often appears as "Fyrst Lady Day," "Lady Day in Autumn," "Marymas" (since it ranks as her chief feast), "St. Mary in Autumn" and the like. Some of the above terms are explained by those attributed to her Nativity; this is called "Latter Lady Day," "Latter Lady Day in Harvest" and "Latter Mary Day." The Immaculate Conception is styled "Lady Day" simply in the three instances which occur; one of these (in 1536)—the fair at Selkirk—lasted for eight days, and is a remarkable instance of the popular observance of what some might regard as a modern feast.

It is certain that more than forty fairs were held in Scotland on different feasts of our Lady, and it is possible that there were many more whose records have disappeared. Many of these lasted for eight days; others for three days. In many cases, though not all, the parish church of the town or district had our Lady for

its titular; in some instances votive chapels of the Blessed Virgin were the scenes of such assemblies. At Banff, as also at Fochabers, in Morayshire, fairs were held on all the five festivals of our Lady enumerated above; it is curious that the charter in favor of the former town was renewed after the Reformation, granting a fair "on all days formerly dedicated to the Virgin Mary" (1592).

Next after our Lady's fairs come those of St. Michael. At least twenty-two were held on his feast in various parts of Scotland. Although many churches bore his name as titular, it may not have been out of devotion, but rather from utility, that Michaelmas suggested itself as a suitable time for a fair. In many places the harvest would be over and in most others far advanced, and this may have had something to do with the choice. The four "term times" in Scotland were Candlemas, Pentecost, Lammas and Martinmas; Michaelmas was never a quarter-day in the northern kingdom as it is still in England, and this fact renders such fairs more striking. Those of Kilmichael in Ayrshire and Kilmichael-Glassary in Argyleshire were due to the dedication of their churches to the Archangel.

St. Peter was next in popularity to St. Michael as patron of fairs. At one time there were as many as twenty held on his feast in various parts of Scotland, and some of them still survive. The festival was known as "Petermas." Haddington Fair lasted for the octave; Fortrose in Ross-shire, Houston in Renfrewshire and Rathven in Banffshire, with possibly some others, claimed St. Peter as titular of their churches. The last-named place, a village of a fishing district, was appropriately placed under his patronage; it is one of the localities in which the annual fair is still held—not on the proper feast day, for Presbyterian Scotland ignores the saints—but on a fixed Friday about that date. "Peter Fair," as it is called, now takes place in a large meadow near the railway station, to which it was removed long ago from the vicinity of the church, where a chantry of the ancient Catholic building is still standing in the churchyard.

The most noteworthy of the fairs held in honor of the Prince of the Apostles, with whom in this instance is associated St. Paul, is that which still takes place annually in the city of Glasgow. Its origin is of great antiquity, for it was granted at the petition of the Bishop earlier than the year 1198. It is held for eight days from the octave day of the festival, a remarkable exception to the usual practice. "Glasgow Fair" is the chief public holiday time in the city, when the working classes are as far as possible released from their ordinary labors and every one is bent upon amusement.

"Lammas," or the feast of St. Peter's Chains (August 1), being

one of the term days, was a convenient time for fairs; there were as many as thirteen of them. Of these, Huntly (1488) and Newburgh in Aberdeenshire, Fettercairn in Kincardineshire, Maybole in Ayrshire and Merton in Berwickshire lasted through the octave; others extended to two and three days respectively.

Among fairs named after other Apostles are those of St. Matthew, St. Bartholomew, St. Jude, SS. Simon and Jude, SS. Philip and James, St. Luke (under the name of "Lukemas"), St. Barnabas, St. Andrew ("Andrewmas") and a goodly number called after St. James. Many of them lasted for eight days.

Midsummer fairs were numerous. That at Ayr, of which St. John Baptist was patron, lasted for fifteen days. Those of Dumbarton and Fraserburgh in Aberdeenshire were extended through the octave. Perth (another city dedicated to the Baptist and popularly known as "John's Town") had not only a midsummer fair, but one on August 29, the Beheading of St. John, called the "Harvest Fair."

"Roodmas" fairs were held in some instances on the May festival —Finding of the Cross; others, called "Rood Fair in Harvest," on the feast of the Exaltation, in September. Martinmas, a term time, was a favorite day for fairs; some of them evidently owed their origin to the business aspect of the day rather than the ecclesiastical. Hallowmas, or All Saints, had also some fairs.

To instance other fair days whose patron saints are familiar to Catholics we may mention those of St. Clement, St. Nicholas, St. Cuthbert, St. Denis, St. Leonard, St. Mauritius, M., St. Patrick, St. Thomas of Canterbury, St. Jerome (whose fair at Banff was of six days' duration), St. Magdalen, St. Helen and St. Margaret; the latter, being a prominent patron of the country—the saintly Queen, whose feast was called "Margaretmas"—is one whose name we might expect to find in such a connection, but scarcely St. Margaret the Virgin Martyr of Antioch, whose fair lasted for eight days at Kirkliston in Linlithgowshire. It is curious that at Kincardine there were two fairs of St. Catherine each year (1540); one in May, known as "St. Catharine in the Summer," was in honor of the Sienese saint; the other, "St. Catharine in the Winter," referred to the Virgin Martyr of Alexandria, and was held on November 25. St. Francis (for eight days, at Mauchline, Aryshire, 1510), St. Anne, St. Antony, St. Apollinaris are also to be found; the latter saint's fair at Inverury in Aberdeenshire was vulgarly known as "Rollnar's" and lasted eight days (1558).

All these saints are fairly familiar to us, but there are numerous others whose very names will strike some readers as utterly strange; these are the ancient saints of the country, whose cultus in many

instances has altogether ceased and in others has been restored of late years. The interest attaching to the fairs of such saints is this: they are frequently the only surviving trace of the patrons once so greatly honored; in some few cases the mere name is left and cannot be identified with that of any known saint. It was chiefly on account of the rapidly vanishing memory of many of these fairs and the prospect of the loss in many cases of all trace of the patron of many an ancient church or chapel in Scotland that it seemed to the writer desirable to give in this article a list of all Scottish fairs, arranged according to counties. With the help of a valuable compilation made by Sir David Marwick, Town Clerk of Glasgow,[2] of numerous grants made at various times and with the addition of fresh matter collected from other sources, such a list was drawn up and arranged; but as it treated of at least 320 fairs, it was found too lengthy to be printed in its entirety. It must, therefore, suffice if we notice these more obscure saints and the fairs called after them with a little more detail than space allowed us to do in the case of those better known.[3] When possible the date of the charter granting or recognizing the respective fairs will be given.

St. Aloyne.—All that is to be said about this saint is that a fair was held under his name at Clyne in Sutherlandshire.

St. Angus.—At Edinburgh and at one or two other places a fair was held on the feast of this saint. He is said to have been a disciple of St. Columba and to have preached the faith in Perthshire. Near the parish church of Balquhidder in that county are the ruins of a chapel dedicated to him; a fair called after him *"Feil Aenais"* ("Angus' Fair") was formerly held here in August, which was the month in which his feast fell. Another fair at Falkland in Fifeshire began on the eve of the festival and lasted for two days after it.

St. Barchan.—All that is known of this saint is that he was an Irish Bishop who labored in Scotland for some years near Stirling. A fair was formerly held in December and was called by his name at Kilbarchan in Renfrewshire, which was evidently dedicated to him, and another in August at Tain in Ross-shire.

St. Barr.—This is St. Finbar, Bishop of Cork in the sixth century. Many place names of Scotland evidence a devotion to him. The chief of these is the island of Barra. Two of his dedications were Dornoch in Sutherlandshire and Eddleston in Peebleshire; fairs were held at both places on his feast (September 25) every year.

[2] Appendix by Sir David J. Marwick to Blue Book, "Royal Commission on Market Rights and Tolls," Vol. VII., 1891.

[3] Those readers who may wish for more details concerning these ancient saints will find them in an article contributed by the writer to the *Dublin Review* (London), Vol. CXXIV. (1899), p. 348 seqq., and in the little "Kalendar of Scottish Saints" (Abbey Press, Fort Augustus, Scotland).

St. Boniface.—This patron of Fortrose in Ross-shire was also called Curitan. He was an Irish Bishop who labored for some time in the north of Scotland to establish the Roman computation of Easter. A fair was held at Fortrose on his feast (March 16). He flourished in the eighth century.

St. Brandan.—He was an Irish abbot, who founded many Scottish churches in the sixth century. Many dedications in Scotland speak of the great devotion in which he was held there. His numerous missionary journeys by sea gained for him the title of "Brandan the Voyager." In one of these journeys he is thought to have touched the American continent. Two fairs were held on his feast day (May 16) at Inverary in Argyleshire (1474) and at Kilbirnie ("Church of Brandan") Ayrshire.

St. Brioc.—This British disciple of St. Germanus had many dedications in Scotland. One of these was Rothesay in Bute, where his fair was held on St. "Brock's" Day. He became a Bishop and founded a church in Brittany at the place now called St. Brieuc. He died about the end of April, A. D. 500.

St. Callen.—An annual fair under this name was held at Roggart in Sutherlandshire as late as 1630. No particulars of the saint are extant. The fair took place on November 28 each year.

St. Caral.—Up to 1847 a fair was held in May under this title at Ruthven in Banffshire, but nothing is known about the saint.

St. Caran.—On December 23 an annual fair, called after this saint, was held at Anstruther in Fifeshire. No particulars are known of the saint, except that he seems to have been honored in the east of Scotland.

St. Carden.—As late as 1630 a fair was held at Loth in Sutherlandshire under this name. No particulars of the saint are extant.

St. Causnan.—This saint is thought to be identical with St. Constantine, a British King, who ended his days in penance in Scotland and is honored as a martyr. There were many dedications to him. Dunnichen in Forfarshire was one, and there his fair was annually held. Pope Leo XIII. restored his feast to the Scottish calendar (March 11) in 1898. He flourished in the sixth century.

St. Columba.—This famous abbot of Iona, one of the chief apostles of Scotland, is better known than many ancient saints of the country. He occupies a foremost rank among the saints of his age and the dedications to him both in Scotland and Ireland are too numerous to mention. At least fifty churches were founded by him in Scotland alone. Fairs were held on his feast (June 9) at Aberdour in Fifeshire (1500) and Dunkeld in Perthshire (1511), each for eight days; others were at Largs in Argyleshire and Fort Augustus in Inverness-shire—the latter ceased within the memory of the writer.

St. Congan.—This was an Irish prince who settled as a hermit in Argyleshire. Many churches and chapels bore his name in Scotland. Near that at Turriff in Banffshire a fair was formerly held on his feast (October 13) annually (1511). It was known as "Cowan Fair." A hospital for thirteen poor men, served by a collegiate body of clergy, was founded at Turriff in 1272 and called after the saint.

St. David.—Two fairs are noted under this name; at Ballegarno in Perthshire (June 13) and at Kennoway in Fifeshire (March 2). The latter is evidently in honor of the great Welsh saint whose feast falls on March 2; the other patron is not recognizable, for King David I., popularly styled "Saint" in Scotland, died on May 24.

St. Devenick.—A fair known as "St. Denick's" was held in November near the church of Methlick in Aberdeenshire, which is dedicated to a Scottish missionary named Devenick, who flourished in the sixth century. Another fair under the same title was at Milton of Glenesk in Forfarshire.

St. Donan.—At Auchterless in Aberdeenshire and at Kildonan in Sutherlandshire fairs were customary on the feast of this Irish abbot, who was martyred with fifty-two of his monks after the celebration of Mass on Easter Day on the island of Eigg in the Hebrides, April 17, 617. There was much devotion to these martyrs in Scotland. Leo XIII. restored their feast in 1898.

St. Drostan.—Fairs were held on the feast of this disciple of St. Columba (December 11) at some five localities in Scotland. The chief was that of Old Deer in Aberdeenshire, which lasted formerly for eight days. This fair was still in existence a few years ago. Deer took its name from the tears (*deara*) shed by Drostan on parting with his beloved master, Columba.[4] There was much devotion to St. Drostan in Scotland, where his dedications were many. He flourished in the sixth century. His feast, formerly kept in December, was fixed for July 11, when restored by Leo XIII.

St. Fergus.—Fairs were customary at "Fergusmas" (November 18) at Glammis in Forfarshire for five days (1491) and at Wick in Caithness. The saint was of Pictish race and founded many churches in the north of Scotland. He was probably present at a synod in St. Peter's, Rome, during the pontificate of Pope Gregory II. in 721. There was much devotion to him in Catholic ages. His feast was one of those restored by Leo XIII. in 1898.

St. Fillan.—This abbot of Irish birth helped in the eighth century to evangelize Perthshire, where Strathfillan is named after him. At Killellan (formerly Kilfillan) in Renfrewshire, a fair was held on his feast (February 3.) There were many dedications to him.

[4] "Book of Deer" (Spalding Club), p. 92.

His festival has been restored to the Scottish calendar. St. Fillan's crozier exists still in the National Museum, Edinburgh.

St. Fumac.—Botriphnie, in Banffshire, formerly known as "Fumac Kirk," had an annual fair in honor of its patron on May 3. An ancient wooden image of the saint existed until 1847, when it was burned by a fanatical Presbyterian minister. Other fairs were once held at Dunnet in Caithness and Watten, in the same county.

St. Fyndoc.—At Dunning in Perthshire a fair was held on October 13 annually in honor of this virgin saint. It lasted for eight days (1511). No particulars of her life are extant, but the Breviary of Aberdeen gives her festival on that day.

St. Gilbert.—At Dornoch in Sutherland a fair was held on April 1 in honor of the saintly Bishop who built the beautiful cathedral there in the thirteenth century; after his death, in 1245, the church began to be called by his name instead of that of the former titular, St. Barr. The fair lasted for three days.

St. Inan.—A fair was held up to a few years ago and probably continues on the feast of this patron saint of Beith in Ayrshire (August 30). Many place names recall his memory, but little is known of the saint's history.

St. Kessog.—An ancient fair at Auchterarder in Perthshire (1200) recalled the feast of this saint, once kept in Scotland (March 10). He was an Irish Bishop and is said to have suffered martyrdom in Dumbartonshire (A. D. 560). There were other fairs in his honor at Comrie and Callander, both in Perthshire, and on the island of Cumbrae. St. Machan.—At Kilmahoug in Perthshire, one of his dedications (in which the saint's name has probably become corrupted), a fair was held in honor of this Scottish Bishop, who flourished about the sixth century.

St. Magnus.—The great martyr of Kirkwall in Orkney, whose body rests in the fine cathedral there, had a fair at Watten-Wester in Caithness on "Magnusmas" (April 16); St. Magnus was martyred in 1116. His feast is one of those restored by Leo XIII.

St. Maluag.—This zealous Irish missionary (frequently designated Moluag) converted many to the faith in the western districts of Scotland and founded several churches. St. Bernard in his "Life of St. Malachy" refers to the tradition that St. Moluag (known also as Lua) founded no less than one hundred monasteries.[5] He was greatly honored in Scotland. Fairs were held on June 25, his feast day, at Clatt in Aberdeenshire for eight days (1501), at Tarland in the same county, Milton of Balveny in Banffshire, Ruthven in Forfarshire and Alyth in Perthshire. His feast is now restored to the Scottish calendar.

[5] Migne, Patrol. Lat., tom. 182, p. 1,082.

St. Maree.—This is one of the many forms of the name of a saint, properly called Maelrubha, an Irish abbot of the eighth century, who founded numerous churches in Scotland. More than twenty have been identified. More devotion was shown to this saint in the western districts of Scotland than to any other except St. Columba. He had fairs at Pitlessie in Fifeshire (1540) and at Dingwall in Ross-shire on August 27; his feast is now restored to the calendar.

St. Marnock.—A fair was held at Paisley (1488) for eight days on the feast of this Celtic Bishop of the seventh century. He was a zealous missionary of the faith and his relics were long honored in the church of Aberchirder in Banffshire, which he had founded. A fair, called "Marnock Fair," was held there also (March 1).

St. Marthom.—On September 20 a fair was annually held under this name at Ordiquhill in Banffshire for eight days. Nothing is known about the saint in question.

St. Methven.—A fair of great antiquity was formerly held at "Methvenmas" (November 6) at Foulis Wester in Perthshire. The church bore the saint's name, but nothing further is known of him. It is a curious fact that even in Protestant times the feast was kept as a parish holiday.

St. Mirin.—This was an Irish saint who helped to evangelize Scotland in the sixth century. He was buried at Paisley, where his shrine became a place of pilgrimage. When the Benedictine abbey was founded there in the twelfth century St. Mirin continued to be one of the titulars. A fair of eight days was held there annually (1488) on his feast (September 15). He had many Scottish dedications.

St. Mittan.—A fair was held under this name on January 31 at Kilmadock in Perthshire. Nothing is known of the saint.

St. Monoch.—From an old will of the sixteenth century it appears that the church of Stevenson in Ayrshire was dedicated to this saint. A fair called "Sam Maneuke's" and "St. Monk's" was formerly held there on October 30 each year. Up to 1845 a public procession was made on that day; it was evidently the surviving relic of a Catholic celebration of the patronal feast.

St. Mund.—On April 15 the fair of this saint, an Irish abbot of the seventh century was celebrated at the church of Kilmun in Argyleshire for eight days (1490). Besides this church, he founded a monastery in the neighborhood, famous in its time. He returned to Ireland in later years.

St. Mungo.—This was the famous St. Kentigern, founder and first Bishop of the church of Glasgow. His dedications were very numerous. At Alloa in Clackmannan an annual fair was held on

his feast under his more popular designation of Mungo ("Beloved"). The saint's feast, falling on the octave day of the Epiphany, but kept on the following day, had long been celebrated by the Benedictines and Passionists in Scotland when Leo XIII. restored it to the calendar.

St. Murie.—In 1630 a fair under this name was held annually at Lairg in Sutherlandshire, though on what day is not known.

St. Nathalan.—This was a holy Bishop of Scottish nationality, who labored much for the faith in Deeside, where he built many churches at his own cost. At Old Meldrum, one of these places, a fair was formerly held on or near his feast (January 8). Another took place at Cowie, Kincardineshire (1540), which was also one of his foundations.

St. Ninian.—He was one of the earliest apostles of the south of Scotland, a Briton by birth, consecrated in Rome in the early part of the fifth century and sent by Pope St. Siricius to preach to his countrymen. Whithern, his chief foundation and a home of sanctity and learning, became the seat of a bishopric, and his shrine in the cathedral was one of the famous pilgrimages of Scotland. A fair was held at Whithern on the vigil of his feast (September 15) and for three days after it. Another was held at Arbroath (1459).

St. Palladius.—This saint was a Roman deacon who was consecrated Bishop by Pope St. Celestine I. and sent to Ireland. He died, according to Scottish tradition, in the east of Scotland, where his relics were venerated at Fordun in Kincardineshire up to the Reformation. A fair of eight days ("Paldy Fair") was held there (1554) on his feast (July 7) and another for eight days at Glenfarquhar in Kincardineshire is recorded as "most ancient" in origin. Leo XIII., who restorted his feast, referred to the connection of this saint with Scotland in his Brief establishing the present Scottish hierarchy.

St. Regulus.—This saint, often designated St. Rule, was long believed to have brought the relics of St. Andrew from Patras to Scotland, but that can no longer be maintained in the light of modern research. He was probably an Irish monk, who lived near St. Andrews, where a cave is called by his name on the coast, which is said to have been his frequent retreat. The first cathedral there was dedicated to him, as also some other Scottish churches. At Kennethmont in Aberdeenshine "Trewel Fair" was held from ancient times in October, when his feast was formerly kept.

St. Serf.—This Bishop of the sixth century is often called Servanus. He died in extreme old age at Culross in Perthshire,

where a fair was annually held on his feast for many centuries. A custom prevailed there of walking through the streets in procession on that day (July 1); it was of ancient origin and lasted until the accession of Queen Victoria, although the day had been changed a century earlier. It seems reasonable to suppose that this was a relic of the honor shown to the titular of the town. Other fairs were held at Abercorn in Linlithgowshire and St. Sair's (or Serf's) in Aberdeenshire. The saint baptized and educated St. Kentigern (or Mungo), patron of Glasgow.

St. Talarican.—A fair of eight days (1499) was formerly held at Fordyce in Banffshire in honor of this saint, who was a Bishop of Scottish race and flourished in the seventh century. Many dedications to him are to be found in Scotland, of which Fordyce was one. His name appears in many localities in place names; Kiltarlity, a large district of Inverness-shire, is one of the most prominent. His feast (October 30) was restored by Leo XIII.

St. Ternan.—This Scottish Bishop has given the name to Banchory-Ternan in Aberdeenshire, where he was buried and where his head was venerated as a precious relic more than a thousand years later. A fair was held there on his feast until quite recent times, and probably continues still. He flourished about the fifth century, and his festival was formerly kept on June 12.

St. Triduana.—Though much that is legendary has become mixed up with the history of this virgin saint, there is sufficient evidence to prove that she was held in great devotion in Scotland. She lived for a time as a solitary at Rescobie in Forfarshire, and there a fair was wont to be held on her feast (October 8) until it was transferred to Forfar about a century ago. It was known as "St. Trodlin's;" for her name has passed through many curious changes. In the many dedications which testify to her extreme popularity in different districts, it appears as Traddles, Tredwell, Trallen and under other forms. It is worthy of note that the saint's holy well, famous for curing diseases of the eye, has been discovered at Restalrig, near Edinburgh, within the last few years and the building over it carefully restored.

St. Vigean.—Up to the eighteenth century a fair was held yearly at Arbroath in honor of the Irish abbot Fechin, who is said to have lived for some time as a hermit in that neighborhood and was known in Scotland as Vigean. He flourished in the seventh century and was honored on January 20.

St. Wynnin.—This patron of the Abbey of Kilwinning in Ayrshire has been identified by modern scholars as St. Finian, or Frigidian, an Irish abbot and master of St. Columba. In later years he became Bishop of Lucca, where his remains are still venerated

in the Church of St. Frigidian. At Kilwinning a fair was held on his feast, known as "Winning's Day."

St. Yrchard.—This Scottish Bishop is often known as Merchard (the prefix *mo,* in Gaelic, expressing affectionate reverence, being added); he was honored in many parts of the country as well as in his native place, Kincardine-O'Neil in Aberdeenshire, which he converted from paganism about the fifth century. His fair of eight days was formerly held there (1511). The ancient bell of this saint, to which interesting legends attached, was preserved in the churchyard of one of his foundations, Glenmoriston in Inverness-shire, until it was wantonly removed by Protestant strangers, to the great indignation of the whole neighborhood, less than fifty years ago. There remain still one or two interesting fairs to be noticed which could not be classified with the above. A few words must suffice for each.

At Barr in Ayrshire a fair was customary previous to the year 1845, under the title of "Kirk Dandy." The meaning of the name cannot now be explained, but it has been suggested that "Kirk Domini" may have been the original form. St. Barr, or Finbar, was the titular of the place.

A curious fair was once held at Kennethmont in Aberdeenshire. It was known as "Christ's Fair," and was held in May on the green near Christ Church. It is supposed to be referred to in a balled entitled "Christ's Kirk on the Green," ascribed to King James I. of Scotland (1406-37). The fair became popularly known as the "Sleepy Market," because it was held from sunset to sunrise next morning. About 1794 it was changed to the daytime, but the people were displeased at the innovation and it soon fell into disuse. It had disappeared before 1845.

At St. Andrews a fair was once called "Senzie Market;" it commenced on Monday after Low Sunday. Martine, the historian of St. Andrews, thus speaks of it: "The renowned faire of St. Andrews, called the 'Senzie Mercat,' held and kept for fifteen days, and beginning the second wek after Easter, whereunto resorted merchants from most of the then trading kingdomes in Europe; trade in this kingdom being then in its infancie."[6] The charter of 1581 ratifying this fair speaks of it as held "from time immemorial." There is a tradition that two or three hundred vessels might have been seen, laden with foreign merchandise for the fair, in the bay near the city.

Sir Walter Scott in "The Pirate" gives a graphic picture of a fair such as any of the above might have appeared to a visitor in his description of St. Olla's, or St. Olaf's, Fair, in the Orkney Islands.

[6] Marwick's Appendix to Blue Book.

It originally lasted for fourteen days, and, as he shows, was the great holiday of the year. To his pages we may refer the reader interested in such particulars. St. Olaf, it may be remarked, was a Norwegian king and martyr, who strove to spread Christianity in the Orkneys, which formery belonged to Norway.

We have given but a meagre account of some of the above saintly patrons of Scottish fairs, not because there was a dearth of information in regard to all, but rather from a fear of proving tedious to the reader. It would have been possible to add far more particulars about the lives of many of them.

It is cause for thankfulness that some at least of those who labored and prayed centuries ago for the spiritual enlightenment and best interests of Scotland are beginning to emerge from the obscurity into which the proud contempt of heretical teachers had condemned them, and that not a few have been restored to their former position as recognized saints of the Church Catholic.

We may well hope that the Masses and offices now celebrated on their respective festivals will move those holy ones to more ardent supplication for the land they still love and have never ceased (we may be sure) to intercede for before the throne of God. Their constant prayers cannot fail to bring down upon Scotland fresh supplies of grace which will result—we humbly pray—in the return of many souls to the unity of the Catholic faith.

MICHAEL BARRETT, O. S. B.

Buckie, Scotland.

MR. CHESTERTON ON THE IRISH.

EVERY great classic in our native language, said De Quincey in his essay on Pope, should from time to time be reviewed anew. A piece of literature that merits the appellation of classic has a deep foundation in human interest; and whatever may have been the passing conditions under which it was produced, as for instance the society and the language of its time, it has abiding qualities that give it the power of appeal to humanity centuries later, and indeed forever. And with quite the same reason we may say that every great race of men, especially if it is a race that plays a leading role in the world's drama, should be from time to time analyzed anew. For that one touch of nature which makes the whole world kin, being multiplied in the race, exists therein as a wide and deep grasp that takes hold of the attentive consideration of all men, though they live at opposite poles, geographically

and sociologically. It is not so much the one great bond, universal and identical in all men, that makes them interesting to the student of ethnology or to the general reader of history: rather is it the varied differences that the races exhibit in actual life, the lights and shadows made manifest not so much by behavior as by conduct —that special physiognomy, as Joseph de Maistre might say, which is evident in the whole history of a nation and which we call character. Interest will always accompany any investigation into the causes of this diversity in national character, into the ideals that actuated it and the works that it accomplished.

So ponderous a task, however, is not the purpose of the present paper; neither do we propose to hold a court of inquiry into the ideals and the achievements of one great world-race, the Irish, namely, a race that is universally conceded to be interesting to a very high degree. Our present consideration has to do with some statements that have been made about the Irish, a topic that affords a rich supply of thought to writers in various languages. Many a student in the realm of national character, believing himself to be possessed of the rare philosophical ability to analyze, has endeavored to discover the leading traits of the Irish race, to put his finger on the predominant passion of the truly typical Irishman and to state, oftentimes dogmatically, the motive that universally prevails in swaying the Irishman's temperament and in regulating his ideals. And as there are Irishmen who are poles apart in conduct and temperament, some few in the dark abysses of despicable meanness and others, in countless multitudes, upon the heights of personal grandeur, so the results of these attempted analyses, being the outcome of incomplete observations, are themselves marked with antipodism. *Ob uno disce omnes* is not a sure advice for the student of the Irish. The Irish character is not anarthropodus; to look at one of its temperamental segments is not to know it thoroughly. And such partial observations have, as a rule, been made, with the result that they are so widely variant.

What these numerous and different deductions are we do not propose to discuss here, nor even to enumerate them. We shall, however, make rather frequent mention of one, namely, of Matthew Arnold's analysis of Irish character, for the reason that by so doing we may the better appreciate some recent utterances on the Irish race by Mr. Gilbert K. Chesterton. For it is Chesterton's tribute to that race that chiefly concerns our present consideration.

Many reasons prompt us to take out Chesterton's testimony on the Irish from his books and repeat it here. First, though the books in which these passages occur are scattered broadcast, yet the very fascination which covers every page of Chesterton's work may cause

some special remark to be overlooked or at least slightly noticed, a remark, be it noted, that may have a high critical value, though to the average reader it may appear a mere *obiter dictum.* Chesterton's pen flows so freely that his gift of seeming facile writing may lead to the defect, on the part of the reader, of a too facile perusal, one that is hasty, and therefore superficial.

Yet this is not the principal reason for reiterating beyond the pages of his books his assertions about the Irish. If it were, the reader might tell us that he intends to review the entire text even to a tenth time—for of Chesterton, the old sentence out of Horace will be verified: *decies repetita placebit;* ten times repeated his work may be, to the average man, a pleasure and a gain. What urges most cogently this segregation of his Irish encomia is that they contain the sincere testimony of one who is rated at present among the very first of capable critics, who is one of the three men most talked of in the street and by many called a prophet of his times. How deserving he is of these academic and popular estimates we need not vote either way; it is sufficient to note the fact and let it weigh with what he has to say.

Again, let us observe that he is an Englishman, a person, therefore, who at the start may have glanced at his Irish neighbors through the national monocle, or when that bit of glass is not used, through spectacles colored by the animadversions of "travelers" from Edmund Spenser to Thackeray. An Englishman, especially if he be a non-Catholic, can never look rightly at the heart of Irish life.[1] He will belong always to that minority which is known as "The Garrison," and whatever advantages he may obtain from this

[1] Newman's words about the English Catholic visitor deserve note: "An English visitor to Ireland, if he happens to be a Catholic, . . . has turned his eyes to a country bound to him by the ties of a common faith; and, when he lands at Cork or Kingstown, he breathes more freely from the thought that he has left a Protestant people behind him and is among his co-religionists. He has but this one imagination before his mind, that he is in the midst of those who will not despise him for his faith's sake, who name the sacred names, and utter the same prayers, and use the same devotions as he does himself; whose churches are the houses of his God, and whose numerous clergy are the physicians of the soul. He penetrates into the heart of the country, and he recognizes an innocence in the young face and a piety and patience in the aged voice which strikingly and sadly contrast with the habits of his own rural population. . . . He finds the population as munificent as it is pious, and doing greater works for God out of their poverty than the rich and noble elsewhere accomplish in their abundance. . . . And he finds himself received with that warmth of hospitality which ever has been Ireland's boast, and, as far as he is personally concerned, his blood is forgotten in his baptism. How shall he not, under such circumstances, exult in his new friends and feel words deficient to express both his deep reverence for their virtues and his strong sympathies in their trials?" (Hist. Sketches, Vol. III.)

accoutred environment, he will be, like so-called Irishmen of the "Castle party," a stranger in a strange land; in Chesterton's phraseology,[2] "their curse is that they can only tread the flagstones of the courtyard or the cold rock of the ramparts; they have never so much as set foot upon their native soil." And where they venture out upon the high roads it was only to see, as Thackeray did,[3] the Hibernian looming large with grotesqueness and laughable idiosyncrasies. Even some Irish pens, for example, Lever's and Carleton's, devoted their energies too frequently to the elaboration of caricatures of their countrymen. The work was able to butter both sides of their bread, being marketable among the English journals; but it kept off from the British readers a sympathetic understanding of the Irish. In the words of Chesterton: "The Irishman of the English farce, with his brogue, his buoyancy and his tender-hearted irresponsibility, is a man who ought to have been thoroughly pampered with praise and sympathy, if he had only existed to receive them. But, unfortunately, all the time that we were creating a comic Irishman in fiction we were creating a tragic Irishman in fact."

Defective appreciation of the Irish character or its positive misappreciation did not, however, proceed only from adverse British or mercenary Irish pens. Estimates of Irish genius and talent have been made by men who posed as sympathetic and understanding analysts, who after a time came to be regarded with a great deal of seriousness, as something more than mere harmless doctrinaires. Of these the most noteworthy is, perhaps, Matthew Arnold, and here is he all the more noteworthy because Chesterton takes the opposite side of the debate. Arnold, we all know, kept a close ear to his own thoughts, and before uttering them he exercised his own keen censorship on them, smoothing their ultimate expression with much labor of the file. And therefore, when he wrote on "Celtic Literature"—though he called himself on that subject, as compared with the great Eugene O'Curry, "an unlearned, belletristic trifler"—he produced an essay that even to this day remains praiseworthy.

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[2] It will be sufficient to state that these citations from Chesterton are found in his "Orthodoxy" (p. 274) and in his "George Bernard Shaw" (*passim*). Similar sayings occur here and there in his other books.

[3] Thackeray, at the conclusion of his "Irish Sketch Book," very wisely says: "As for forming 'an opinion of Ireland,' such as is occasionally asked from a traveler on his return, that is as difficult an opinion to form as to express, and the puzzle which has perplexed the gravest and wisest may be confessed by a humble writer of light literature." But Thackeray had expressed his opinion in the preceding pages, not in a formal way, but by means of innuendo. He saw, as a general rule, only the caricatures that he wanted to behold; he leaves them on his pages.

To speak more knowingly of Celtic literature, Arnold endeavored to get down to the foundations of Celtic character, to dig for its first springs, as it were, and so became capable of pronouncing judgment on the fnudamental causes of Celtic life and literature. His verdict had much plausibiilty to recommend it, and indeed it has been quite largely accepted as an indisputable, oracular pronouncement on the Irish race. We say Irish, for though Arnold used the word Celtic broadly and included the Welsh, he meant the word, as most of the world still does, to stand for Irish. His analysis is defective because it takes into account only a partial constituent of Celtic, that is in our case, Irish genius; and as such it might be allowed to pass and be thankfully received—a half loaf being better than none—but for the supreme satisfaction with which it is accepted as the final word, the ultimate summarization of the influences at work in the rational animal of Ireland.[4] It will not, therefore, be irrevelant to pay more than a passing glance at Arnold's analysis, at the conclusions he reached when he struck on sentiment and sentimentality as the keynote to Irish character, the cause of its limited success and of its multiplied failures in many spheres of activity. As a prelude to our examination of Arnold's verdict we may find two helpful sentences from Chesterton: "The English people certainly have somehow got an impression and a tradition that the Irishman is genial, unreasonable and sentimental," and "The conventional Englishman is never so silly or sentimental as when he sees silliness and sentiment in the Irishman." Nobody wishes to gainsay the fact that there is sentiment in the Irish nature; it is there and powerfully, too. But as George Bernard Shaw remarks, the Irishman has two eyes. "He meant," says Chesterton, "that with one eye an Irishman saw that a dream was inspiring, bewitching or sublime, and with the other that after all it was a dream. Both the humor and the sentiment of an Englishman cause him to wink the other eye."

The inadequacy of Arnold's estimate most probably came from his taking the attitude of a theorist. He had some *a priori* notions of his subject and a few facts that coincided with his theories. He may have thought that by concentrating his literary talents and his small studies in ethnology he could prepare for his vision a telescopic power that should enable him to see far into the Irish make-up and its unique complexion. He should have realized that a telescope shows, however brilliantly, only a limited "field," and that there is more to be seen of the wide sky of truth by a pair

[4] An American Catholic editor, for instance, in rejecting a paper that contained a partial analysis of the Irish genius, said: "After all, Matthew Arnold has given the final word upon that subject."

of healthy eyes out on a free hilltop—a condition under which Mr. Chesterton seems to have made his observations. And that is the most fitting place for the analyst of Irish character, which is, of all things in the world, one of the most difficult to be focused and brought for final notice before the narrow lens of a student under the hooded dome of his pit.

The telescope seems to have been adjusted for Arnold's eyes by hands that were lacking the fullness of skill. M. Renan, looking mainly at the Bretons and Welsh, kept telling, in a sentimental fashion, about the timidity and the shyness of the Celtic nature, about its preference for a retired life and its embarrassment at having to deal with the great outer world, *à l'extérieur gauche et embarrassée*. This, as Matthew Arnold sees, does not ring true with regard to the "typical Irishman of Donnybrook fair." Yet it is this testimony that counts high with him when he calls sentiment the backbone of Irish life. Then he allows the hand of M. Henri Martin, "whose chapters on the Celts, in his 'Histoire de France,' are full of information and interest," to regulate the lens, accepting as a guiding formula from him: "The Celt is always ready to react against the despotism of fact." And last, though this is an inscription at the very forefront of his essay, Arnold keeps humming a refrain from Ossian, the accepted epitaph, as it were, over the graves of the Celts: "They went forth to war, but they always fell."

With such twists and turns of the telescope, yet with a thoroughly sincere desire to get the proper focus, Arnold made his observations and pronounced his verdict. It was preceded by plausible formulas, one containing an analysis of the English spirit, which he called energy with honesty and the other giving the equivalent for Germanic genius, which was steadiness with honesty. Approved for his English and German equations, he feels worthy to pronounce on the Irish. The root of Celtic nature, he says, is sentiment; that is, its vital force, the fountainhead of Celtic temperament, the motive power in its activities. And this judgment, we repeat, was made in good faith and for a laudable purpose, for the very purpose of winning England's good will and interest towards the wealthy storehouse of Celtic literature, of gaining for so worthy a cause a hearing that would count; for Arnold may have been willing to confess, in these words of Chesterton, that "Englishmen will speak to Ireland; they will speak for Ireland; but they will not hear Ireland speak." And the final sentence of his ambitious essay is this earnest prayer: "Let us reunite ourselves with our better mind and with the world through science; and let it be one of our angelic revenges on the Philistines, who among their other sins are the guilty authors of Fenianism, to found at Oxford a chair of Celtic, and to send,

through the gentle administration of science, a message of peace to Ireland."

From this last sentence we may repeat what we have already asserted—that Arnold, in his resolution of the elements of Celtic character, had his eye fixed mainly on the Irish. In the field of Celtic studies, for instance, the man that loomed largest before his admiring gaze was the Irish scholar, Eugene O'Curry, in Arnold's eulogistic phrase, "the obscure Scaliger of a despised literature." And again, the full flower of Celtic sentiment grew best in Ireland. For the sentimental Celtic nature, so he professes, is an organization quick to feel impressions, and feeling them very strongly; a lively personality, keenly sensitive to joy and sorrow; rebellious against fact; its essence is to aspire ardently after life, light and emotion, to be expansive, adventurous and gay. And what is the full flower of this soil and of these seeds? Sensuousness! "The Celt is sensual, or at least sensuous; loves bright colors, company and pleasure." And the Celt is here, too, the Irishman. For "the sensuousness of the Greeks made Sybaris and Corinth, the sensuousness of the Latin made Rome and Baiae, the sensuousness of the Latinized Frenchman makes Paris, the sensuousness of the Celt proper has made Ireland."

Yet Arnold did not neglect to say that out of such a root as sentiment could and did spring much that was of high importance to life and literature. To constitute an ideal genius, he is prompt to say, a great deal of the Celtic nature must enter in; Celtic sensibility is perhaps the most positive element of genius; in English poetry much of the turn for style, much of the melancholy and nearly all the natural magic comes from a Celtic source; and, finally, some investigators have found in the Celtic nature and its sensibility, or in M. Renan's phrase, *l'infinie delicatesse,* the main root of chivalry, of romance and of the glorification of the feminine ideal.

All this makes for high praise; but out of it there are issues that make for a greater degree of dispraise. For the Celtic race, especially on Irish soil, is sadly lacking in material prosperousness. And the radical cause of this deficiency, according to Matthew Arnold, is that selfsame sentiment, "with love of beauty, charm and spirituality for its excellence; ineffectualness and self-will for its defect." This explains the Celt's ineffectualness in material civilization and in politics; it has made him "dwindle and dwindle as history goes on, and at last shrink to what we now see him. For ages and ages the world has been constantly slipping, ever more and more, out of the Celt's grasp." And consequently Arnold finds it fitting to sing again the refrain from Ossian: "They went forth to war, but they always fell."

How totally different is the truer judgment[5] of a later English observer![5] We have traveled a wide circuit to come to it, but in going over the aberrant pathway tracked out by Matthew Arnold we have noted the sign-posts that he constructed, the guiding marks that for most English people point the way to the grave of the Celtic race. Mr. Chesterton, who pronounces anew on that race, in its Irish branch, seems to have cast aside the *a priori* method and to have looked at actual results, standing out upon a clear hilltop, looking at plain, indisputable facts, neither trimming his vision to an inch-wide telescope nor enlarging the near-at-hand objects under a magnifying glass. He transmits the question of radical causes and regards with unblinking eyes the accumulated testimony of actual effects, though he knows full well that there must be some cause other than a dawdling sentimentality in the Irish nature capable of making it so stupendously efficient in the practical realms of politics and material civilization. In this clarion-like pronouncement Chesterton takes the final fall out of the protagonists of Irish sentimentality: "It is constantly said of the Irish that they are impractical. But if we refrain for a moment from looking at what is said about them and look at what is *done* about them we shall see that the Irish are not only practical, but quite plainly successful. The poverty of their country, the minority of their members are simply the conditions under which they were asked to work; but no other group in the British Empire has done so much with such conditions. The Nationalists were the only minority that ever succeeded in twisting the whole British Parliament sharply out of its path. The Irish peasants are the only poor men in these islands who have forced their masters to disgorge. These people, whom we call priest-ridden, are the only Britons who

[5] It is not necessary to bring to bear on this point the encyclopaedial information that is within easy range of any student. The history of all English-speaking nations is written large with the achievements of the Celtic race, for the most part Irish to the very core. But a few lines from the first chapter of "The Irish Race," by Rev. A. J. Thebaud, S. J., is pertinent to the statement from Matthew Arnold: "If the celebrated writer meant to say that this defect of character always accompanied the Celts in whatever they attempted, and that thus they were constantly foiled and never successful in anything, or, still worse, that, owing to want of perseverance and of energy, they too soon relaxed in their efforts, and that every enterprise and determination on their part became 'ineffectual,' we so far disagree with him that the main object of the following pages will be to contradict these positions and to show by the history of the race, in Ireland at least, that, owing precisely to their 'self-will,' they were never 'ultimately unsuccessful' in their aspirations, but that, on the contrary, they have always in the end 'effected' what, with their accustomed perseverance and self-will, they have at all times stood for. At least this, we hope, will become evident whenever they had a great object in view, and with respect to things to which they attached a real and paramount importance."

will not be squire-ridden. And when I came to look at the actual Irish character the case was the same. Irishmen are best at the specially *hard* professions—the trades of iron, the lawyer and the soldier. The average skeptic wanted to know how I explained . . . the political impracticability of the Celtic Christians. But I wanted to ask, and to ask with an earnestness amounting to urgency, 'What is this incomparable energy . . . which can inflame a bankrupt peasantry with so fixed a faith in justice that they get what they ask, while others go empty away; so that the most helpless island of the Empire can actually help itself?' "

This, then, is Chesterton's commentary on a portion of Irish achievement; and it is one that he reiterates in a totally different context, as if to stop the traditional rant about sentimentalism. On the occasion of his repeating it ("George Bernard Shaw," page 22, page 25,) he ventures to trace this effective energy of the Irishman to one of its causes: "One generalization, I think, may at least be made. Ireland has in it a quality which caused it (in the most ascetic age of Christianity) to be called the Land of Saints; and which still might give it a claim to be called the Land of Virgins. . . . But it is not this purity which I should chiefly count among the legacies of old Irish morality. A much more important gift is that which all the saints declared to be the reward of chastity: a queer clearness of intellect, like the hard clearness of crystal. . . . This is probably why Irishmen succeed so much in such professions as require a crystalline realism, especially about results. Such professions are the soldier and the lawyer. . . . If you have lost a battle you cannot believe you have won it; if your client is hanged you cannot pretend that you have got him off."

This single generalization, however, is in a striking contrast to that made by Matthew Arnold when he dug up sentimentality for the root of Irish character and painted for its flower sensuousness; "the sensuousness of the Celt proper has made Ireland." On such a flower Chesterton has breathed a killing frost.

And finally, it is well to note that Chesterton has not by any means either exhausted his subject or his observations on the Irish race. He has spoken out his mind only about one fact in Irish achievement, namely, on the energy and the efficiency of that race in practical affairs: and only "single observation" has he ventured to make on the cause of this racial power. The nation's love of purity he found to be one of the precious legacies of old Irish morality; and perhaps at some future day, in his own good time, Chesterton may find a pleasure in making other "generalizations" concerning causes that have their rise in that same source, a source that is, under God, the sure guarantee to Ireland of a greater destiny

and a more sublime vocation than success in mere worldly enterprises. To the trite plaint[6] of English visitors to Ireland: "Your people never for the future plan; they live but for the moment," Chesterton can answer in these words of Aubrey de Vere:

> Our peasant, too, has prescience; far he sees;
> Earth is his foreground only, rough or smooth;
> In him from seriousness the lightness comes:
> Too serious is he to make sacrifice
> For fleeting good; the battles of this world
> He with the left hand fights and half in sport;
> He has his moment—and eternity.

And again, of that vocation which has, according to the testimony of worthy witnesses, been guaranteed to Ireland, Chesterton may some day contemplate with pleasure and speak of it in his own vigorous and brilliant way. Like another Englishman, Father Faber, of the Oratory, he may delight in speaking forth these words of Ireland's destiny: "It is not a splendid political or a prosperous commercial career. It is a holier greatness, a more exalted destiny that forbids a lower one. Ireland's vocation is, as it has ever been, an apolistic one. . . . As at the time of her only real greatness—her missionary greatness—the heathen are her inheritance: let her remember that first, and then all that she needs besides will be added unto her."[7]

For the present Chesterton is content to give the lie to traditional assertions about Irish sentimentality and ineffectualness. To Englishmen, and indeed to the world of English letters in every land, Matthew Arnold had sung his chosen line from Ossian: "They went forth to war, but they always fell." Over against that sentence may we set a truer one, not as an epitaph, but as a line of living praise: *Hæc est victoria nostra, fides vestra.* For it is easy for the Catholic mind to think of Ireland as an image of the Church herself —"for three early centuries the great missionary of the faith: for three late ones its martyr; ever in tribulation, but never consumed; at one time exalted as a nation, at another deposed from nationhood, but to become more powerful as a race, and effecting more in its captivities and dispersions than it could have done if oppression and the poverty bequeathed by oppression had never driven it to the margin of waters broader and more lonely than those of Euphrates or Choaspes."

Michael Earls, S. J.

Woodstock, Md.

[6] Aubrey de Vere, "The Sisters."

[7] Father Faber in a sermon preached in Limerick.

THE STATE OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION IN THE HEBRIDES IN 1671.

BY THE kindness of Dr. Maitland Thomson, of the Register Office, Edinburgh, the two following documents relative to the state of the Catholic Church in the Hebrides are available for publication, and have been translated, the first from the Latin, the second from the Italian, in which the originals are written. Dealing as they do with a period and a district upon which so far very little has been written, these two letters to Propaganda cannot fail to be of interest. Certainly the two recent volumes of Father Forbes Leith afford a great deal of most interesting information regarding the mainland of Scotland. But, as he states in the preface, in the earlier periods with which he deals the names of persons and of places are rarely given. This deficiency we are enabled to make one step towards supplying—so far, at least, as the islands are concerned—by means of the following papers. They form part of the transcripts made by the late Mr. Bliss, whose work in Rome will prove to be of the greatest value. At present the transcripts made by him relative to the reign of Queen Elizabeth are being prepared for publication in the Rolls series, but many years must elapse—twenty probably and more—before the documents relating to the period covered by the following papers are reached:

Of the secular clergy there were in 1671 seven or eight on the Scotch mission, two of whom are mentioned by name in these letters. Concerning Father White, the venerable Bishop Geddes wrote: "White, an Irish Lazarian, was brought from Spain, together with Mr. Dermit Gray, by the Lord McDonald to the Highlands this year (1654). He converted many to the faith and confirmed others in it. He disappeared in 1657; appeared again in 1662; disappeared a second time in 1664; again appeared in 1668 and continued in the Highland mission till he died, on 28th January, 1679. He was held in great veneration in the Highlands, and his picture was kept in a room of the Castle of Glengarry, called Mr. White's room, until that castle was burned."

The Castle of Glengarry, the ruins of which are still so striking a feature on the shores of Loch Oich, was also the scene of the death—martyrdom it might well be called—of the Father Munro, who is mentioned as coming to the mission in the year the report was drawn up. This remarkable priest was three times imprisoned and sentenced to death, if he again returned from his banishment, but on each occasion he at once returned to his field of labor. In 1704, whilst lying prostrate with fever in a miserable hut in Glen-

garry, he was discovered by some English soldiers, who carried him off to the castle, where he was thrown into the dungeon, and where, after receiving the vilest treatment, he was allowed to perish. This brave priest, not including the years spent in prison or in banishment, labored for thirty years among the Highland Catholic districts.

Mr. Lesley, mentioned by name in the first letter, was the procurator of the mission so often cited in the second. He, too, was a veteran in the service of the Church, although, unlike the two previous, he never was on the mission in Scotland, but did excellent work as the procurator in Rome during no less a period than fifty-eight years. It is easy to trace his want of practical knowledge of parts of the country in the reflections which he makes on the report of the worthy Franciscan, reflections, indeed, which are not as correct as the report itself.

The prefect of the mission at this time was Mr. Alexander Winster or Dunbar, who excelled his colleagues, even of that period, in pluck and resourcefulness. "He alone," says the Abbe Macpherson, "did not fear writing the news of the mission, and even the political transactions of the country, to Paris and elsewhere. He wrapt up everything of that kind which he wrote in such ambiguous and obscure terms that none but those he intended could discover his meaning. Hence he was quite indifferent, though his letters were intercepted. His conduct as a missionary was excellent, and he had the love and esteem of all who knew him." For thirty-two years he was prefect of the mission, until the appointment of Bishop Nicholson, and after that he labored twelve years more. He died in 1708, in the eighty-third year of his age and the fifty-ninth of his priesthood. For many years he was assisted by Mr. David Burnett as vice prefect, who evidently did not long content himself with the quieter duties of professor, even if he ever undertook them at all, a point on which the writer of the report is uncertain.

Of schools one had been opened in the island of Barra, whilst in 1712 another was commenced on the island in Loch Morar. This had to be abandoned in 1715, but was started afresh on the same site by Bishop Hugh Macdonald. Though the situation was changed three times within a century, it continued to supply many useful missionaries up to the date of its union with Blairs College in 1829. Thenceforward the Heather priests, who satisfied even the requirements of the fastidious islesmen as to pure Celtic qualifications by never going out of the country for any part of their education, became more and more scarce, until they died out altogether many years ago.

The jealousy of the Privy Council of Scotland as regards Irish

influence is better understood when one remembers that only twenty-five years before Montrose had, time after time, defeated the forces of the Covenant—and of the Government—by the aid of his Irish veterans, sent to him by the Marquis of Antrim, of whom mention is made in the following letters.

Probably it was also due to the Marquis' influence that application was made to the Primate of Ireland for information regarding the isles; he had certainly sent priests to the spiritual assistance of his kinsmen, as was stated just now in the case of Mr. White. The letters themselves, however, show that the Archbishop of Armagh had no permanent jurisdiction in this quarter and that politically it was inadvisable that he should have any.

The customs described as existing in the isles have varied little since the report was written. Meal and water—fuarag—is still a common drink, and it is said to have much of the nourishment, as indeed it has much of the appearance, of fresh milk. In one point there has been no change at all, namely, in the difficulty of passing from island to island, and the dangers incurred in doing so. When the present writer was in temporary charge of one of the parishes of South Uist, he was invited to bring some of his people to the blessing of the memorial erected by public subscription over the grave of the late Father Allan Macdonald, the apostle of the island of Criskay and the best Gaelic scholar of his day. The morning was so stormy that it was after the appointed hour before the party reached the shore, and they experienced great difficulty in getting a boat to take them across. Once launched, however, the boat went gaily enough. The piper who was of the party started his lament, the strains of which were only heard by the congregation on the opposite shore as the little boat rose over the crest of the great waves. The effect was said to have been very striking. That morning proved too stormy for the outside function to proceed, and though the memorial stone was blessed quietly in the afternoon, there was no possibility of crossing to the other islands to get home. The next day the storm still continued, but the different priests were bound to return to their own parishes. The two who made the longest journey were seven hours in an open boat, with little shelter from the wind and the waves, so that on reaching their destination one of the two had to be carried to shore in so exhausted a condition that it was many days before he recovered from the effects of the journey. Little wonder that the good Franciscan begged for a set of vestments to be kept in each island. He must often have had similar experiences and knew what he was talking about when he mentiond the danger and difficulty in taking the vestments from island to island.

The translation has been kept as near the original as possible and where the proper names could be recognized their spelling also has been retained:

F. Francis MacDonnel to Monsignor Baldeschi, Secretary of Propaganda:

Armagh, 10th July, 1671.

When I heard that His Grace the Primate of Ireland had received from the Sacred Congregation the care of the Scottish islands, or Hebrides, I hastened hither to Armagh from the isles, in order that I might suggest how the faith might be propagated in those islands. His Grace himself greatly desired this summer to return there with me, but I was of the contrary opinion, inasmuch as a report has spread of the arrival of the French, whom the Scots are said to favor, so that if His Grace the Primate were to go there, every one would think that he had come to prepare the way for the French. It is for this same reason that no missionaries are to be sent there this summer, as the news of their arrival would at once get abroad and they would be cast into prison. For it is proposed to effect the union of the two kingdoms of England and Scotland in one Parliament, to which union the islesmen are strongly opposed. Now, if the Primate were to visit them, it would at once be said that he had come to foster the opposition to this union.

The best and safest method of propagating the Catholic religion in these islands and of strengthening it for the future is to select some youths and to send them to Rome or to the seminaries on the Continent, to be educated and promoted to the priesthood. Being natives, these may later do much good in the isles and will be more gladly welcomed there. Meantime, his Grace the Primate should send thither some Irish priests or religious, since the people of these islands understand nothing but Gaelic, and they can hope for spiritual assistance from none but the Irish, since the Scots (Scoto-Angli) speak a corrupt form of English, and experience has long since proved that they afford no spiritual help to the isles.

Moreover, so small an allowance as fifty scudi is not sufficient for the missionaries destined for that field of labor. A priest must support, besides himself, one and perhaps two servants to carry the sacred vestments, books and other things from place to place. Now, what are fifty scudi a year amongst two or three? Certainly were I not related to the Lords MacDonnell, who have great influence in those islands, I could not have subsisted there till now. Father George Fanning, also of the Order of Friars Preachers, would have perished from hunger before now were it not that he lived with the Laird of Barra. He has not received a sixpence form the Sacred Congregation for the past eight years, although

he has labored much and with great fruit. I myself have received nothing for two and a half years, and three years' allowance will be due me next February. The Sacred Congregation only gave me one vestment, when two were very necessary, for the journey has often to be made from island to island, and there is great danger and difficulty in taking vestments between the five islands where there are Catholics. Indeed, there should be one set of vestments in each island, so that the priest be saved the labor and the danger of carrying them about.

As regards the allowance for the triennium which is almost complete, your Lordship may convey it to Mr. Lesley as heretofore; but for the future it will be best to send it to His Grace the Primate by means of His Excellency the Nuncio at Brussels, as also any letters with which you may favor me. Father George Fanning deserves a reward as well as his salary, since he has labored most diligently for eight years in the vineyard of the Lord; indeed, many thousands of Catholics would have fallen into heresy unless they had been supported by him.

From my receiving no answer to them, I conclude that my various letters to the Sacred Congregation have been lost on the way, and hence in future I shall write through His Grace the Primate, and I shall hope for the reply also through him. It would greatly help our mission if a letter were sent to the Marquis of Antrim, who is of the family of MacDonnell and has many followers in the isles; also it would be a good thing to write to the most noble Donald MacDonnell, Chief of Clanranald, for though he externally professes to be a heretic, still he is very well disposed towards us and has a great number of Catholic dependants; lastly, it would be of great service to write to the illustrious Gillerane MacNeil, of Barra, who is a Catholic.

An account of the other matters I gave to His Grace the Primate, and I shall always remain, etc.

Report of the Hebrides supplied by Mgr. of Armagh, Primate of Ireland, and dated 3d September, 1671, with reflections thereon by the procurator of the Scottish mission:

Monsignor the Archbishop of Armagh, Primate of Ireland, received a command to furnish a report of the Hebrides and to send some one thither for that end, or to go there himself should he find it convenient and the circumstances opportune. This charge he willingly accepted, and it is clear from what he has written that he was satisfied with the report given him by a Franciscan missionary when the latter visited him to fetch the holy oils. When this report was communicated to the procurator of the mission it gave him occasion to make some remarks on certain points and

to doubt of the truth of some of the things related, as will presently appear. It seems to him that he must believe that the number of the inhabitants of those islands is much greater than is therein described. This appears all the more probable because formerly these people carried on a most cruel war against the inhabitants of the mainland of Scotland and put in jeopardy the very power (corona) which the Macdonalds, lords of the isles, claimed as belonging to themselves. The Archbishop of Armagh writes that the first of these islands is called Bute; in Gaelic, Boad. It is eighteen miles long and five broad and is owned by one of the Stuart family. In it there is not one Catholic, through want of missionaries, although all are inclined to the holy faith and number about 20,000 souls.

The second island, called Arran, is twenty miles in length and eight in breadth. The inhabitants, who number 12,000, would all profess the Catholic faith had they any one to look after them; now externally they are heretics and live under the lordship of various proprietors among whom the land is divided.

The island of Islay is twenty-four miles long and ten broad. There are in it 8,000 souls, who change their religion at the bidding of their proprietors; now they are Protestants, formerly they were Presbyterians. The lord of the island is Signor Cadel (Calder), of the family of Campbell, who in Gaelic are called MacCallum.

The island of Jura is twenty-six miles long and six broad and has not more than 2,000 inhabitants. The lord of the island is the Marquis of Argyle, head of the Campbell family. All are heretics.

The procurator of the mission says that this comes from want of workers and from the heretical obstinacy of the Marquis of Argyle, who, however, is much more moderate than his father. When the present Marquis was in Rome he was so courteously treated by Father Dempster, then rector of the Scots College, that when this father was later taken prisoner in Scotland by the heretics the Marquis took a great part in saving him from the severity of the laws and would not bear any testimony against him. He is certainly a confirmed heretic, but he might be won over by some good missionary who had the entry to that house. His grandfather was an excellent Catholic, whilst his father was the worst of heretics and the contriver of all the plots against the late King. For this he lost his head, whilst his son was to have lost his estate and his goods, but through the kindness of the King everything was restored to him. He is a man of great ability.

Other islands annexed to this one, but smaller, are Luing, Seil, Colonsay, Kerrera and Lismore. The greatest of them is scarcely six miles long.

The isle of Mull is thirty miles in length, twelve in breadth and

numbers 6,000 souls. The proprietor is Signor Maklein (McLean); all are heretics. The isle of Tyreke (Tyree) is ten miles long and four broad. In it there are about 2,000 inhabitants, who live under the aforesaid Laird of McLean and are externally heretics.

The isle of Coll is twelve miles in length and three in breadth. Here the population is about 1,000. It is under the same laird as the two former.

The island of Uist is thirty miles long and eight broad. There are in it not less than 12,000 souls. The two proprietors of the island are the Laird of Clanranald, who possesses half, and whose pendants are partly Catholic and partly heretical. The only priest pendents are partly Catholic and partly heretical. The only priest they have is Father Francis Macdonel. There are other islands belonging to Clanranald, namely, Canna, Rum, Eigg and Muck, in which there are not less than 1,000 souls, all Catholic. Of the chiefs of Clanranald the procurator of the mission says that they are very powerful, but they have a great feud with the chiefs of the clan called Mackintosh, with whom, as they will not make peace, the missionaries will not absolve them. Hence they remain neither Catholics nor heretics.

The missionary Munro had the intention of attending to the reconciliation of these two families, and if this were to come about, he hopes that both would be converted.

The isle of Barra is six miles long and three broad. The landlord is the Laird of Macneil; there are about 1,000 Catholics in it, amongst whom is the laird himself. Father George Fanning, a Dominican, labors here with good result. This father, according to the procurator of the mission, has no patents or faculties from the Sacred Congregation. His ground for staying there must be either the privileges of his order or else because he believes that these people, being, as it were, abandoned and in extreme necessity of sacraments, any priest may come to their assistance. This is, indeed, one of the strongest arguments urged by almost all those working in these British Isles and also in England; and they claim to have a right to continue their functions and their work, all the more as they persuade themselves that recourse to Rome is either impossible or unnecessary and that the delays of that court are intolerable. For these reasons they think that they should not leave those souls to perish. However, these and similar views are creeping in very fast, and if they are not remedied by giving them superiors, very few in time will have recourse to this Holy See.

The isle of Lewis is thirty miles long and ten broad, the population being above 40,000, all heretics. The proprietor is the Earl of Seaforth, of the family of Mackenzie (Macchegni). This noble-

man is fairly powerful and not ill disposed towards the Catholic faith. He persuaded the Privy Council of Scotland to allow the Irish priests to stay amongst the Highlanders for this very good reason that, from the time when these people were converted by them to the Catholic faith, thefts and rapine were less frequent; and restitution, which was never heard of before, is now made very often. This moved the Council to allow the missionary White (Bianchi) to remain amongst them. Munro, lately gone to those parts, has the entry of that house.

The isle of Skye is in length thirty miles, in breadth twenty. There are in it about 6,000 souls. The proprietors are Sir James Macdonel, who owns one-half, and the Laird of MacLeod, who owns the other half. There are only a few Catholics, and they suffer a great deal from the violence of heretical preachers.

The procurator of the mission has difficulty in believing this supposed persecution, since the heretics would not dare to try anything without the consent of the Macdonalds, who are its lords, and it is not possible that they would consent to it, since they are very favorable to the Catholics. We beg, therefore, that the Archbishop of Armagh be asked to specify this point more fully.

In all the aforementioned islands the country people know nothing but the Gaelic language; the nobles, however, besides Gaelic, speak corrupt English. The proprietors of the islands possess vast dominions on the mainland of Scotland, of which the inhabitants speak nothing but Gaelic and are much inclined towards the Catholic faith, of which they retain many signs and rites, whilst they hate the Protestant ministers, even though the lairds follow that creed for political reasons. On this point the procurator of the missions has considered the necessity of not separating these missions from for political reasons. On this point the procurator of the mission are thus united, better to protect them and prevent discords. Besides, those gentlemen, not being able to learn distinctions of jurisdiction, desire the missionaries, according as there is need, sometimes to go to the mainland and sometimes to the islands, and if they should decline to do so, they would run the risk either of being removed from the mission or at least deprived of protection. The fact is that the proprietors rule these people very despotically and the missionaries must not offend them, if they wish to live there.

In the islands wheat is not indigenous, but there is barley, oats and spelt. Oxen, cows, horses, flocks and deer abound, also fish and birds of every description, and a great quantity of fish are caught. In these islands are no woods and no fruit trees on account of the violence of the sea winds, especially the north winds, which burn and cut up everything.

There are many memorials of saints here and churches also, but these have been destroyed by the heretics, so that now the ministers preach in private houses and there exercise their other functions. All the islands are subject to a pseudo Bishop, called Bishop of the Isles, who, according to the procurator's account, never resides there, and hence he is not accustomed to take notice of what happens. Ordinarily he is at court, and, provided his income is handed him, he does not trouble about anything else. Hence results in great part the toleration which these people enjoy in matters of religion. The ministers also, although they live amongst the people, are very moderate, and if some good workers came here they also might be converted and made to preach the Catholic faith to the people, as was done on the mainland in one parish called Glenlivet, which to the present day remains mostly Catholic.

The drink that they use in summer is milk, and in winter boiled water mixed with flour, whilst scarcely among the nobles or the rich is beer met with. Hence the missionaries destined for these parts suffer a great deal until they accustom themselves to the climate and the manner of life, all the more as it is best for them to travel by night on account of the violence of the persecution. The people give nothing, even as an alms, to the priests who minister to them, but they are obliged to pay a stipend to the heretical ministers. Nor do the missionaries derive any income from marriages, funerals or baptisms, and their sustentation is only the allowance given them by the Sacred Congregation. Among the Anglo-Scots, however, the missionaries lodge in the houses of Catholic noblemen, with whom they can live in comfort.

It is advisable for any one who wishes to be a missionary in the Hebrides to keep a servant to carry the altar furniture and some kind of portable bed, which is used even in summer; whence, says the procurator of the mission, one can gather that no stranger missionaries will be found willing to come to the assistance of these people, to whose hardships they either cannot or will not ever accustom themselves, as experience shows only too plainly. Hence there remains but one means of helping them, and that is by schools in which youths may be taught here. For if the boys are sent away from the islands, we run the risk of their never returning any more after they have tasted the delights of Italy, France or Flanders. Indeed, it will exceed our expectations if those who have been brought up there will be willing to return to teach without the inducement of a good salary.

The missioner must also take flour with him, because the inhabitants have for food only milk, butter and cheese. Taking all this into consideration, it becomes clear that the missionaries there are

reduced to great straits, having to provide for themselves and their servants on the fifty scudi which they receive from the Sacred Congregation, and even that does not reach them entire, since the rate of exchange must be deducted.

The Archbishop of Armagh writes that the method of propagating the faith in these islands is, first, to send there missionaries knowing the Gaelic language, well grounded in virtue and inflamed with zeal for souls. The procurator of the mission, however, is of opinion that the Irish are scarcely fitted to minister there, inasmuch as there would be danger of the jealousy of the Royal Council, and if this were aroused, the liberty now enjoyed would be lost. Hence it is necessary for many very important reasons to do everything as far as possible by means of priests of their own nation and to leave the jurisdiction over these people with those who are Scotch by nationality and that the Irish be there as their assistants.

Secondly, to send youths of that nation to be educated in parts beyond the sea, who would be more acceptable to these people than foreigners. On this point is copied in extenso the reflection made thereon by the procurator of the mission, who says: "You would hardly believe the affection which these people bear towards their compatriots and the facility with which with them they lose that title, inasmuch as those who go away and are educated outside their Highlands are no longer considered such and are called Anglo-Scotch. Hence it is most necesarsy that the youths be taught on the spot the knowledge necessary for sacred orders. He believes that for such a work some are fitted who have studied at the universities of Scotland, speak Gaelic, are natives of the Highlands or of the islands and know the ways of the people. Being well advanced in their studies, these, once they were converted, could in a very short time be prepared for ordination, and with that end in view it would be expedient to make an effort to gain them. They are naturally very clever and excel all the other Scots in the schools, and they are, moreover, much inclined to the Holy Catholic faith. From these we might in a short time have a good quantity of priests and we could distribute them through all the provinces and islands without danger.

The safest way of directing letters to these islands is to send them to Dublin, and from thence to Belfast to a man by name Daniel Margey, who is a Catholic, and who will then direct them to another man, Donald Groam Macdonel, who lives in Kintyre, otherwise called Caput Terrae.

The procurator of the mission suggests another way, and that is to direct the letters to London and from there to Edinburgh

to the superior of the mission, and in Edinburgh one always finds natives of the country who would carry the letters to whomsoever they were directed, whilst this would not be the case in Ireland.

Thirdly, it would also greatly help to the spread of the faith to make provision and give a salary to a Catholic schoolmaster who would teach the children here, for they need it much. It will be about ten years since Ewen MacAllister (Eugenio Makalastrio) was appointed as schoolmaster in Glengarry (Elenguri), a place in the Highlands; and it is now two years since P. NN. and David Burnett were selected for a similar office; but of the first we have no news and of the second we do not know whether or not he is willing to accept the office. The procurator says that in the meantime it would be well to avail oneself of some good Irish friar of St. Isidore, and in any case the procurator of the mission recommends his brother, who is in Paris finishing his theology. He could both fill the office of missionary and also instruct these youths in learning, since MacAllister is only qualified to teach grammar. Next, the procurator renews his requests that orders be given to the superiors of the colleges of that nation to keep up correspondence with the prefect of the mission, that the missionaries take those subjects that are offered to them and that two or three youths be induced to come to the Roman College, to be there instructed in learning and piety.

Fourthly, it would be well if the Sacred Congregation were to write to Gillerane MacNeil, Lord of the island of Barra, who is a Catholic, and to the above-mentioned Donald Macdonel, Lord of the country of Moydart, and to the Laird of Clanranald, who, although he is a heretic, is very favorable to Catholics. He has a Catholic wife, who was converted to the faith with 500 others by the above-mentioned Father Francis Macdonel. The procurator approves of this idea and says that there is nothing that does more good in these parts than to keep up correspondence with these gentlemen and foster their good dispositions by frequent letters. Since, however, it might happen that some would be written to and not others, it would be well to obtain from our Lord (the Pope) a Brief consoling and encouraging all, or to write to the missionaries that they should send here the names of all to whom it would be necessary to write, or, indeed, that the Sacred Congregation itself write them a circular letter.

This is the report of the Hebrides as given to the aforesaid Archbishop of Armagh by Father Francis Macdonel on the occasion of his coming to him to receive the holy oils. The Archbishop adds that he is very anxious to go and see these things with his own eyes, which are better witnesses than ears, but he says: *Spiritus*

quidem promptus est, crumena autem infecta" (The Spirit indeed is willing, but the purse is slender). He also praises Father Francis as a man of high qualities.

This report goes far towards proving what has indeed been often asserted before, namely, that the chief cause of the decay of the Catholic faith in the Highlands and islands of Scotland was the dearth of missionaries, who could keep the old faith alive amongst the people. This point is still more strikingly brought out by the letters of Father Francis White, which the present writer hopes shortly to publish. There are statements in Father White's letters which would scarcely be credited unless they were corroborated by contemporary witnesses such as the foregoing report of Father Francis Macdonnel.

Odo Blundell, O. S. B.

Fort Augustus, Scotland.

PIUS VII. AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.—X.

CARDINAL CONSALVI did not arrive in Paris until two days after the signature on May 30 of the treaty between France and the four Powers which had most contributed to the overthrow of Napoleon—Austria, Russia, England and Prussia. No allusion had been made in this treaty with regard to the restitution to the Holy Father of any part of the Papal States; either the Legations or the Marches. On the contrary, though the Allies deprived France of the vast extent of territory conquered from neighboring States which Napoleon had annexed to his Empire and brought her frontiers back very nearly to the position they occupied at the dawn of the Revolution, they guaranteed to her the possession of the principality of Avignon and of the Comtat Venaissin, two districts situated in the south of France and belonging to the Holy See, which had been taken by a decree of the National Assembly in September, 1791. It was, indeed, declared by one of the clauses of this treaty that within two months the Powers engaged in the recent war should send their plenipotentiaries to hold a congress at Vienna and agree as to the mode in which the stipulations of the treaty were to be carried out. The Cardinal could thus entertain a faint hope that he might succeed in persuading the sovereigns and the statesmen in whose hands lay the destinies of Europe to render justice to the claims of Pius VII. His first experience was not, however, calculated to afford him much encouragement. In an interview with Talleyrand, the Min-

ister for Foreign Affairs of Louis XVIII., he was indeed assured that France would be glad to see the Legations restored to the Holy Father, but, unfortunately, France was at that moment powerless and had even had some difficulty in obtaining leave to send a representative to the Congress. As to the restitution of Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, that was, he said, impossible. France, indeed, had not asked for them; but the Allied Powers had insisted that she should keep them, for they were firmly resolved that, in order to avoid anything that might give rise to disputes or serve as a pretext for war, there should in future be no more *enclaves*,[1] Cardinal Consalvi then visited the King, who was most friendly in his manner and who spoke eloquently of the virtues of the Holy Father, of the sufferings he had undergone and of the heroism he had displayed. But he, too, was resolved not to restore the possessions of the Church, alleging as an excuse his dread of offending the French people, which had made many concessions and sacrifices and wanted some compensation. He added, though, that after some time it might be possible to come to an understanding, but that at that moment it was hopeless.[2]

The Allied Sovereigns and their Ministers had already left Paris for London, whither Cardinal Consalvi resolved to follow them and attempt to secure their good will in favor of the cause of the Holy Father. He arrived in London on June 10, 1814, and though he was the first Cardinal to appear in England since the days of Cardinal Pole,[3] he was agreeably surprised to find that he was received everywhere by the people with demonstrations of respect and friendliness. They showed neither surprise nor displeasure on seeing his Cardinal's robes, for while in England he wore on all occasions the dress worn by Cardinals in Rome when out of doors—a black frock coat lined with red, red stockings and red skull-cap and gold tassels to his hat.

The Emperor of Austria had returned to Vienna instead of going to London, but his Prime Minister, Prince Metternich, assured Cardinal Consalvi in the interviews he had with him that Austria had no intention of taking the Legations. He seems, however, not to have succeeded in dispelling the Cardinal's suspicion that, though the Emperor was in favor of the restitution, his Ministers were of a contrary opinion, and that at the Congress the Powers

[1] An *enclave* is an outlying portion of a State situated within the frontiers of another State.

[2] P. Ilario Rinieri, La Diplomazia Pontificia nel Secolo XIX., Vol. IV. Il Congresso di Vienna e la Santa Sede. Roma, 1904, p. 115. This work is founded on hitherto inedited documents in the Archives of the Vatican.

[3] Cardinal Pole died at Lambeth on November 17, 1558, the same day as Queen Mary.

might be guided more by their interests than by the rules of justice. In fact, Metternich pointed out to him that the question of the Legations was a European question to be decided by all the Powers, and that Austria could not dispose of the Legations according to her own will. From the Emperor of Russia, whom the Cardinal invited to Rome in the name of the Pope, he heard much praise of the Holy Father, but he seems to have received only vague promises of assistance.

On account of the many festivities which took place in honor of the Allied Sovereigns, Cardinal Consalvi could not have an audience of the Prince Regent until July 1. It was on the occasion of the presentation to the Prince of addresses from the Houses of Parliament congratulating him on the conclusion of peace. Along with other Ambassadors, the Cardinal assisted at this brilliant scene, which he describes in a letter to Cardinal Pacca. He was then admitted to a private audience, and he declares that he cannot give an adequate idea of the courtesy and friendliness which the Prince showed him during this interview. He expressed warmly his admiration and esteem for the Holy Father; no general, he said, at the head of an army had ever managed affairs with more wisdom or fought with more valor than Pius VII. at the head of the Catholic Church. He admired especially the patience he had shown in difficult circumstances when it was necessary for the welfare of religion and the resistance he had offered when he believed that his duty required it, even until he had lost his throne and his liberty. Cardinal Consalvi then expressed the hope that the Holy Father might reckon on being assisted by England to regain the Legations, since it was on account of his refusal to close his ports or to enter into a coalition against the English that he had been dethroned and imprisoned, and the Prince assured him that in this question he would willingly act in concert with Austria and defend the interests of the Holy Father at the Congress.[4]

The Cardinal's interviews with Lord Castlereagh, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, were not less important and satisfactory than that with the Prince Regent. Castlereagh could not, indeed, give a positive answer, since the matter had to be discusstd at the Congress of Vienna with the Envoys of the other Powers; but he assured him that England would take much interest in the Pope's affairs and hoped that His Holiness' demands would be satisfied. During his stay in London Consalvi had to treat religious as well as political matters, for since some time the question of Catholic Emancipation had occupied the minds of English statesmen and had been much discussed between them and the Catholic Hierarchy.

[4] Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 131. Consalvi a Pacca, Londra, 5 Luglio, 1814.

Their negotiations referred mostly to the nature of the guarantees which the Government demanded before granting emancipation. They were: The oath of loyalty to the Government, the right of rejecting candidates known to be hostile to the Government and the right of examining all documents proceeding from Rome, with the exception of those from the Sacred Penitenziaria. In a word, claims much less arbitrary and far-reaching than those insisted upon by almost every Catholic Sovereign at that time. It would, however, be impossible to enter on any further discussion of the subject in this article; but it may be remarked that Lord Castlereagh, while treating religious questions with the Cardinal, stated that he saw no objection to the presence of a representative of the Holy See in England and of an English Envoy in Rome, who should maintain friendly relations between the two Governments. They could at first reside merely in a private capacity, but after the repeal of the laws against the Catholics they could assume publicly the title of Envoy, like those of other Powers. Cardinal Consalvi had not, however, been authorized to negotiate with regard to this proposal, so he agreed to apply to Rome for further instructions and to resume the discussion on again meeting with Castlereagh at Vienna.[5]

On his way to Vienna Cardinal Consalvi was obliged to pass again some time in Paris in order to inquire into the religious affairs of France, where some of the Bishops who had resigned their sees at the time of the Concordat,[6] and who had returned from exile along with the Bourbons, expected to be allowed to reassume their former dignity. Louis XVIII., too, was anxious to set aside the Concordat of 1801 and conclude another as well as to increase the number of dioceses which had been then established. He also wished, as Consalvi believed, that the Pope should reinstate in their former sees as much as possible the Bishops who had not resigned. On the other hand, the King not only maintained Napoleon's law, according to which no Bull, brief, decree or other document, even concerning private persons, issuing from the Court of Rome could be published or executed without the authorization of the Government, but he decreed that the Bulls and the acts of the Holy See as well as the "acts of other communions" were to be submitted to the "approval of the King."[7] Consalvi could only warn Cardinal Pacca of the nature of the demands which were to be presented to the Holy Father by Mgr. de Pressigny, the former

[5] Rinieri, Il Congresso, pp. 148, 157, 180.

[6] See the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for October, 1908.

[7] Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 200. Even the English Government, in demanding the right to examine documents coming from Rome, made an exception in favor of those from the Sacra Penitenziaria.

Bishop of St. Malo, whom Louis XVIII. was sending to Rome as his Ambassador, and put him on his guard against them. He then continued his journey to Vienna.

Pius VII. had sent Mgr. Rivarola to Rome as Apostolic Delegate to take over the city from Murat's representatives and to form a provisional government for its reorganization and administration. He published on May 13 a decree by which he abolished the laws imposed by Napoleon, reëstablished those which had previously existed and lowered the duties on salt and wine to what they had been at the time of the fall of the Papacy. The enemies of the Holy See have accused the Pope of showing much harshness towards those who had exercised public functions under the French Government; but, in fact, it chiefly consisted in dismissing those who had taken the oath to the foreign ruler—a very natural course for the Papal Government to follow. This was also the case with those who had been appointed by the French to positions connected with the institutions they had introduced and who could not lay claim to be indemnified when those institutions ceased to exist. Of the band of insurgents who had stormed the Quirinal only three were condemned to the galleys; the others were banished from Rome. Ecclesiastics, too, who had failed to perform their duty were punished more severely than laymen.[8] On July 30, 1814, however, these very moderate measures came to an end with the publication of an amnesty for all those who had been guilty of disloyalty, and many of these time-serving functionaries were allowed to reoccupy their former posts. The same accusations of excessive severity were also brought against all the other Governments which had been overthrown by Napoleon and restored after his fall. Cardinal Pacca ascribed them to the machinations of the secret societies, which still endeavored to spread the anti-Christian spirit of the Revolution, and hoped especially to render the diplomatists assembled at Vienna hostile to the restoration of the territories belonging to the Holy See.[9]

The reëntry of the Papal Government into its former possessions was, indeed, still very uncertain. By a convention made between Austria and Murat after the campaign against Prince Eugene the King of Naples had withdrawn his troops from Tuscany, which was given back to its former Grand Duke, Ferdinand III. He had also ceded to the Austrian Government the three Papal Provinces of Ferrara, Ravenna and Bologna, known as the three Legations.

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[8] Rinieri, Il Congresso, pp. 245, 263, 286.

[9] Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 261. Cardinale Pacca al Nunzio a Vienna, 18 Agosto, 1814, pp. 278, 280. Cardinale Pacca al Cardinale Consalvi, Roma, 18 Agosto, 1814.

A provisional administration had been established there, and they were occupied by the Austrian troops until the Congress should come to a decision with regard to their future destination. As, however, by the treaty made at Naples on January 11, 1814, Austria had promised to give Murat a portion of the Papal States as the price of his alliance,[10] he considered that he was still entitled to hold the three provinces of Macerata, Ancona and Fermo, known as the Marches. Some of the Austrian functionaries also held views opposed to those expressed by the Emperor as to the right of the Holy Father to regain possession of his States. Thus Mgr. della Genga while on his journey to Paris reported that General Eckhardt, the Governor of the three Legations, had been ordered to make every effort to induce the people to declare for Austria.[11] In spite of the assurances of friendliness and assistance which he had received at Paris and in London, Cardinal Consalvi on arriving in Vienna still felt much uncertainty as to the success of his mission and the probability of overcoming the many hostile influences which aimed at depriving the Holy See of its possessions.

According to the statesmen who planned the Congress of Vienna, its object was to carry out the stipulations of the treaty signed at Paris on May 30, 1814, between France and the Allies, as well as to decide with regard to the future of the States or portions of States which had been annexed by Napoleon to his Empire, but had now been reconquered and occupied by the Allied Powers. They boasted that the Congress would reconstruct social order, regenerate the political system of Europe and establish a permanent peace based upon a just distribution of power; but according to its secretary, Friedrich von Gentz, who was also an intimate friend of Prince von Metternich, it really aimed at sharing among the conquerors the spoils of the vanquished.[12]

The most important of these spoils were the Kingdom of Saxony and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Napoleon had formed the latter State with some of the provinces of the dismembered Kingdom of Poland which he took away from Austria and Prussia, and by the treaty of Tilsit (July, 1807), between France, Russia and Prussia, he had given it to the King of Saxony, who had always been devoted to his interests. In the campaign of 1813 the King had joined Napoleon; he had fallen into the hands of the Prussians after the battle of Leipzig and was still a prisoner of war. It was considered

[10] See the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for October, 1910, p. 658.

[11] Rinieri, Il Congresso, pp. 107, 661. Mgr. della Genga al Cardinale Pacca, Bologna, 11 Maggio, 1814.

[12] Prince von Metternich-Winneberg, Mémoires, documents et écrits divers, etc., Paris, 1884, Vol. II., p. 474.

only just that he should be deprived of his kingdom for having abandoned the Allies in the recent struggle for the freedom of Germany, and the King of Prussia claimed to annex it as compensation for the losses he had sustained and the services he had rendered. The Duchy of Warsaw was demanded by the Emperor of Russia, who intended to add to it the Polish provinces he already possessed, and thus create a kingdom of Poland, which he would endow with free institutions and of which he would wear the crown.

The Princes who had been deprived of their States by Napoleon as well as the Sovereigns whom he had created and who had been overthrown by the Allies also expected to be indemnified by the Congress. Among these was the Archduchess Maria Louisa, ex-Empress of the French, to whom the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla had been allotted by the treaty signed at Fontainebleau on Napoleon's abdication on April 11, 1814. But these Duchies were also claimed by the Infanta Maria Louisa, daughter of Charles IV., King of Spain, widow of Louis I., Duke of Parma and ex-Queen of Etruria,[13] and it seemed probable that to satisfy these pretensions it would be necessary to have recourse to the three provinces of Ferrara, Ravenna and Bologna. Pius VI. had ceded them to the French Republic in 1797 by the treaty of Tolentino, in order to save Rome; they were afterwards annexed to the kingdom of Italy, and they were now looked upon by the diplomatists assembled at Vienna as a conquest from France, a territory without an owner, to which the Pope had no longer any claim and which might, therefore, serve to provide indemnities, instead of being restored to the Holy See.[14]

Cardinal Consalvi was well aware of the difficulties with which he would have to contend, and he could only hope that the Emperor of Austria, who then held the Legations, would be restrained by his sense of justice and his religious principles from taking part in the spoliation of the Church. His first interview with Prince Metternich immediately after his arrival in Vienna produced on him a favorable impression, and he felt assured that Austria would not annex the Legations, nor, if possible, allow them to be given as compensation; but a few days later, when received by the Emperor,

[13] This was the name given by Bonaparte to the Grand Duchy of Tuscany when, in 1801, he gave it, with the title of King, to Louis I., Duke of Parma, whose duchies were given up to France. He was succeeded in 1803 by his son, Louis II., under the regency of his mother. But in 1807 Napoleon united the Kingdom of Etruria to his empire, and placed it under the administration of his sister, Eliza Bacciocchi, with the title of Grand Duchess of Tuscany, until it was restored in 1814 to its legitimate sovereign, Ferdinand III.

[14] See the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for January, 1907, p. 112.

he found him very cold and reserved, and it was with much difficulty that he drew from him a positive declaration that he would not take the Legations for himself. The Emperor warned him, however, that the Pope ought not to be too sure of regaining those provinces; the treaty of Tolentino was against him; there were many other just claims to be satisfied, and he did not wish to go to war on account of that question.[15] These words caused the Cardinal much anxiety, for he took them as an allusion to the rival claims of the ex-Empress Maria Louisa and of the ex-Queen of Etruria, and his uncertainty with regard to the restitution of the Legations lasted until nearly the end of the Congress. His fears were not appeased by Talleyrand, who told him that it had been unanimously decided by the chief plenipotentiaries that the Legations were to be *given* to the Pope and not *restored,* a decision which, as the Cardinal perceived, left the Congress free to give as much or as little as it chose and employ the remainder to provide compensation. It is true that Lord Castlereagh, who in London had already informed the Cardinal that England was disposed to support the interests of the Holy Father, repeated the same assurances on meeting him again in Vienna, but Consalvi also knew that the English Liberals (who then formed the Opposition) were in favor of a united Italy under Murat. He had also learned when in Paris from Mgr. Poynter, Vicar Apostolic of London, that an appeal to that effect had been sent from Italy to the English Cabinet and that an emissary had been dispatched to Italy to ascertain the wishes of the people, with a view to placing Italy under one King, reserving, however, a sufficient amount of territory for the Pope.[16]

Moreover, the intentions of Russia and Prussia, if not positively hostile to the Holy See, were at least doubtful, for their interests were opposed to those of Pius VII. The Emperor of Russia had taken Prince Eugene under his special protection and wished to give him the principality of Pontecorvo as an indemnity for the loss of the Viceroyalty of the kingdom of Italy, and Prussia, anxious to annex the kingdom of Saxony, had already suggested that the Legations might serve to compensate the King.[17]

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[15] P. Ilario Rinieri, La Diplomazia Pontificia nel secolo XIX., Vol. V. Corrispondenza inedita dei Cardinali Consalvi e Pacca nel tempo del Congresso di Vienna (1814-1815), Torino, 1903. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 8 Settembre; 17 Settembre, 1814.

[16] Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 367. La Corrispondenza, p. 132. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 18 Novembre, 1814.

[17] Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 350. Pontecorvo and Benevento were two small States belonging to the Holy See, and situated within the frontiers of the Kingdom of Naples. Napoleon had seized them in 1806 and given the former to Marshal Bernadotte and the latter to Talleyrand.

In presence of the claims of Pius VII. to the Marches and the two Principalities and of Ferdinand IV. to the throne of Naples,[18] Murat, who owed his crown to Napoleon, felt the insecurity of his position and often sought to induce Pius VII. to recognize him as King. He was even willing to purchase that recognition by the immediate surrender of the Marches. But the Holy Father refused to comply with his request until the Congress had decided the question.[19] He could only offer to remain neutral between the conflicting pretensions of Ferdinand and Murat and take no active steps against Murat, such as, for instance, excommunicating him, until that decision was given. On the other hand, one of Murat's representatives, the Duca di Campochiaro, had already informed Consalvi in Paris that the Popes' recognition at that moment would be of far more importance to his Sovereign than after the Congress, and that if it were put off till then the King would feel no gratitude or friendship for His Holiness, and would, at most, give up the Marches if obliged to do so by the Congress.[20]

On arriving in Vienna, Consalvi found that the action of Pius VII. was fully approved of by Metternich, who was also anxious to get rid of Murat, whose alliance was no longer wanted by Austria, and to restore the Marches to the Holy See. But the Prince dreaded the probable result of a war with Murat, as in that case the King, who could not hope to retain Naples without allies, would raise the banner of Italian independence, call to arms all the malcontents of the various States and proclaim the kingdom of Italy. Metternich promised, however, to write to Murat, advising him to give up the Marches at once, without insisting on an impossible concession, and to be satisfied with the Pope's promise to observe neutrality during the Congress.[21]

If Murat had ever seriously entertained the idea of restoring the Marches to Pius VII. in return for his recognition as King of Naples, or even to obtain the neutrality of the Holy Father during the Congress, he soon abandoned it and caused reports to be spread that the Powers had approved the treaty made between Austria and Naples; that the right to the Marches had been decided in his favor, and that he was to keep the throne of Naples.[22]

This sudden change of policy was caused by the probability that

[18] Ferdinand IV. of Bourbon, son of Charles III. of Spain, was driven from Naples in 1806 by Napoleon, who gave his kingdom to Murat. He held Sicily, where he was protected by British troops until the fall of Murat in 1815.

[19] Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 364.

[20] Rinieri, Il Congresso, pp. 383, 386.

[21] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 8. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 8 Settembre, 1814.

[22] Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 415. Pacca a Consalvi, 5 Novembre, 1814.

before long a war might break out between the Powers represented at the Congress, in which case the belligerents would probably seek to purchase his alliance by concessions of territory. The claims of Prussia to the entire Kingdom of Saxony and of Russia to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which have been already mentioned, were the cause of the dissensions which gave rise to this alarming rumor and led Murat to modify his plans. The aggrandizement of Russia by such a large extent of territory, with a population of between three and four millions, caused, in the words of Lord Castlereagh, "much alarm to the Courts of Austria and Prussia and gave rise to a general state of fear throughout all Europe."[23] It was, in fact, as both Metternich and Castlereagh pointed out, a flagrant infraction of the treaty of Reichenbach made on June 27, 1813, and renewed at Teplitz on September 9, of the same year, by which the Duchy of Warsaw was to be divided between Austria, Russia and Prussia.[24] But the Emperor of Russia replied that Austria and Prussia were also obtaining augmentations of territory; that to rectify their frontiers he was ceding to them portions of the Duchy; that circumstances had changed since the time of the treaties, and that the Duchy was merely an indemnity for the very great sacrifices which Russia had made for the cause of the Allies.

Austria and England protested in vain against this pretension of the Emperor of Russia, but it was impossible to dissuade him from giving effect to it, and Prussia, which had at first been strongly opposed to it, was won over to his side by his promise of assistance with regard to the annexation of Saxony. In fact, before the Congress had come to any decision on the subject the Emperor withdrew his troops from Saxony and placed the kingdom, provisionally, under a Prussian administration. It was an arbitrary act, which much displeased Austria and France, as they were strongly opposed to so great an augmentation of the power of Prussia, though they were willing that a portion of the territory of the kingdom might be conceded, but the smaller German States were much alarmed, as they feared that they, too, might one day share the same fate.

This state of uneasiness soon reached such a pitch that war seemed to be inevitable, and in the beginning of November Austria and Bavaria began to calculate the number of troops which they should furnish in case it should become necessary to force Russia and Prussia to abandon their ambitious projects. The question was

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[23] Angeberg, Le Congrès de Vienne et les Traités de 1815. Paris, 1863, Vol. I., p. 267. Mémorandum de Lord Castlereagh, Vienne, 4 Octobre, 1814.

[24] Angeberg, *id.*, Vol. I., p. 379. Note du Prince de Metternich au Prince de Hardenberg, 2 Novembre, 1814.

discussed during the month of December, and in January, 1815, Talleyrand, taking adroitly advantage of the irritation which Lord Castlereagh felt at the arrogant tone of the Russian Envoys in the conferences held between the Ministers of the Powers and the evident intention of the Emperor to lay down the law, induced him to enter into an alliance with France and Austria. By this compact the three Powers agreed to act in concert for the purpose of carrying out the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris according to the spirit of that treaty, and in case of any attack on their territories in consequence of their decision, to help each other to repel this aggression. Each of the Allies was bound to furnish 150,000 men.[25] The practical result of this alliance, which must have soon become known, was that Prussia, finding itself abandoned by England and Austria, withdrew its demand to be allotted the entire Kingdom of Saxony and consented to leave the King one-half, containing a population of somewhat over 1,300,000. Prussia also gave up its Polish provinces and accepted the portions of the Duchy of Warsaw which it pleased the Emperor of Russia to concede, and the Czar on his side gave up the idea of forming a Kingdom of Poland. All danger of war between the great Powers had thus passed away before the end of February, 1815.[26]

While these rumors of an impending war still circulated and Murat still hoped to secure a large tract of the Papal States as the price of his alliance, he proceeded to act as though he were already recognized as Sovereign of the province occupied by his troops. He raised heavy taxes, he established conscription and refused to allow the Bishops to name canons without his authorization. His emissaries also tried to induce the principal towns to present addresses to him, thanking him for the benefits he had conferred on them and begging of him to hasten as much as possible the definitive establishment in the Marches of his wise and far-seeing government.[27] The Austrian Government was much irritated by his conduct and deeply regretted the unfortunate treaty of January 11, 1814, of which Murat's position in the Papal States was in a great measure the result,[28] but was unable to act, as, in view

[25] Angeberg, Vol. I., p. 589. Traité secret d'alliance défensive conclu à Vienne entre l'Autriche, la Grande-Bretagne et la France, contrat la Russie et la Prusse, le 3 Janvier, 1815. Le Prince de Talleyrand, Correspondance inédite du Prince de Talleyrand et du Roi Louis XVIII. pendant le Congrès de Vienne. Paris, 1881, p. 210. Vienne, 4 Janvier, 1815.

[26] Angeberg, Vol. I., p. 277. Neuvième Protocol de la Séance du 13 Février des plénipotentiaires des cinq Puissances. Talleyrand, Correspondance, p. 291. Vienne, 15 Février.

[27] M. H. Weil, Joachim Murat Roi de Naples. La dernière année de règne, 1814-1815. Paris, 1909, Vol. II., p. 577. Rinieri, Corrispondenza, Pacca a Consalvi. Roma, 27 Ottobre, 1814, p. 72.

[28] See the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW October, 1910, p. 658.

of the possibility of a war with Russia, nearly all the Austrian troops had been moved to the frontiers of Gallicia, and there were not then more than about 50,000 men stationed in various parts of Northern Italy. When, therefore, Murat was requested by Metternich to restore the Marches to the Pope, he refused to do so unless Austria guaranteed to him the Kingdom of Naples and the Holy Father recognized him as King—conditions which neither Pius VII. nor Austria could accept. Metternich, therefore, advised Consalvi to warn the Pope not to irritate Murat, who could easily expel him from Rome and who feared nothing as long as he thought that the Congress would end by a war. The Prince hoped that the difficulties with Russia and Prussia would be settled in a very few days and that then he would send an officer to inform Murat that the Marches should at once be restored to the Holy See. But, as he had warned him a few days previously, the Revolution was far from being ended. In Italy and elsewhere its fire still burned beneath the ashes, and much prudence was necessary in order to avoid anything which might cause it to burst forth, for if it caught anywhere, it would be difficult to calculate how far it might extend or what might be its results.[29]

Talleyrand was anxious to please Louis XVIII., who as a Bourbon wished to see Murat expelled from Naples and Ferdinand IV. restored to his throne, but he could not persuade the Austrian Government to place the question before the Congress. He, therefore, tried to induce Consalvi to suggest to Pius VII. that it was his duty as the champion and defender of what was right and just to take active measures against Murat, either by excommunicating him or by appealing to the Congress. He assured the Cardinal that Murat would never dare to attack the Pope, but that if he did, all Europe would defend him. Cardinal Consalvi did not fall into the snare so cunningly laid for him by Talleyrand. He clearly saw that that statesman hoped that Murat, driven to defend himself, would call all Italy to arms, that Austria would then be obliged to make war for the preservation of its Italian possessions and that thus the restoration of Ferdinand IV. would be accomplished without any necessity for the intervention of France. Consalvi had, therefore, no difficulty in pointing out to Talleyrand the dangers to which the Papal Government would be exposed in case of a sudden attack and before the arrival of help. He remarked

[29] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 223. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 18 Gennaio, 1815. Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 233. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 21 Gennaio, 1815. Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. II., p. 384. Marquis de St. Marsan, the Sardinian Envoy to Comte de Vallaise, Sardinian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 7 February, 1815.

also that just then the Holy Father was giving the Bourbons a proof of his attachment to their cause by refusing to recognize Murat as King of Naples, though by doing so he would at once regain possession of a large portion of his States.[30]

The Austrian Government came at last to the conclusion that it was to its own interest that Murat should be overthrown, and Metternich revealed the plan to Consalvi. Murat had brought his fate on himself by his own conduct. He had promised to cede the Marches to the Emperor, who was to give them to the Pope; but he had broken his word when he thought that the Congress was about to end by a war which would have enabled him to keep those provinces, and by his intrigues he had procured from the people petitions asking to pass under his rule. He had thus shown that in case of war Austria could not reckon on him, and the only matter to be considered was by what method he should be got rid of. It was, indeed, as Metternich remarked, a dangerous undertaking, and it required to be most cautiously planned. Murat had many partisans throughout Italy, the people were generally discontented with their Governments and the desire of forming a united and independent State had been spread over the whole peninsula. Talleyrand's suggestion of submitting the question to the Congress, in order that it might dethrone Murat by a decree, would have had no other result than to drive him to despair. Metternich, therefore, informed Louis XVIII. that though Austria would not allow foreign troops to pass through Italy to attack Murat, it would not hinder the French and Spaniards from landing in Sicily and crossing over to the Kingdom of Naples for that purpose. In that case, it would not help Murat. He also requested Louis XVIII. to forbid the French Legation to appeal to the Congress with regard to Murat, as such a step would drive him to make a sudden attack, the result of which would not be doubtful, on account of the small number of Austrian troops then in Italy. Louis XVIII. accepted this advice; he ordered Talleyrand not to call the attention of the Congress to the affairs of Murat, and the Austrian Government, freed from the danger of a war with Russia, began to withdraw its troops from its Gallician frontiers and send them into Italy, so as to have a large force in readiness in case Murat should declare war, or if it should be decided to depose him, to oblige him to come to terms and surrender whenever a favorable opportunity should have arrived.[31]

[30] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 284. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 22 Febbraio, 1815.

[31] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 293. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 25 Febbraio, 1815. Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. II., pp. 387, 393. Letter of de Saint-Marsan to Victor Emmanuel I., King of Sardinia, 17 Février, 1815.

Murat's own folly furnished Austria, at that very moment, with a plausible pretext for pouring troops into Italy without exciting any suspicion that his deposition was their ultimate object. The Duca di Campochiaro, who represented Murat at Vienna, though not admitted to take part in the Congress, received from him on February 23 two dispatches. One was to be presented to Talleyrand, asking for an explanation of the hostile attitude adopted towards him by France, with which country he believed that he was at peace, and demanding to be at once recognized as King or to be informed if France were at peace or at war with him; if no reply were given, it would be looked upon as a declaration of war. The second note was for the Austrian Government. In it Murat asked leave to bring an army of 80,000 men through the Austrian possessions in Italy for the purpose of making war on France, and promised to pay all expenses in ready money. Campochiaro, who was an experienced diplomatist, did not approve Murat's action, which he looked upon as a false step, and he thought it more prudent to present these notes to Metternich not officially, but confidentially, saying that he preferred to disobey his sovereign rather than injure his cause by executing such an order.

Metternich approved the Envoy's action and told him that the Neapolitans should not be allowed to cross their frontiers, nor the French troops to enter Italy, and that any infringement of this decision would be looked upon as a declaration of war. As a precaution, the Austrian army in Italy would be raised to the number of 150,000 men, so as to be able to resist any attack. Metternich then addressed official notes to Talleyrand and to Murat to the same effect, warning them against any invasion of Austrian territories in Italy. He also pointed out to Murat's envoy that his King was maintaining an army which exhausted the resources of his States and that an invasion of Naples was not to be feared, since the Emperor was resolved not to allow foreign troops to enter Italy. Campochiaro was satisfied by this assurance that Italy would be guarded from all danger of a French intervention, and Metternich was able to tell Consalvi that if Murat advanced, the Austrian troops would soon be strong enough to attack him for not having obeyed the warning given him, and that if he did not declare war, or even if he gave up the Marches, he would certainly commit some act of folly which would afford a pretext for declaring war against him.[32]

While Europe was being thus reconstructed and reorganized in

[32] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 303. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 25 Febbraio, 1815. Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. II., p. 438. De Saint-Marsan a Victor Emmanuel I., 25 Février, 1815.

Vienna, Napoleon was plotting in the isle of Elba with a view to effecting his escape and again ascending the throne of France. His partisans and admirers have endeavored to disprove the existence of a conspiracy for that purpose, and have sought to represent the Emperor's flight as the result of a sudden inspiration, while those who are hostile to him assert that it was carefully prepared. Padre Rinieri's researches have thrown much light on this intricate question, which is still undecided; but they leave little doubt that Napoleon was kept well informed of the state of affairs and of public opinion in France, of the discontent in the army, of the animosity against the Bourbons and that when he thought that the favorable moment had arrived he left the island.[33]

When the news of Napoleon's landing in France reached Vienna on the morning of March 7, it caused the sovereigns and statesmen assembled there, if not a feeling of consternation, at least much embarrassment and anxiety. The labors of the Congress were, however, suspended for only a few days to allow the representatives of the eight Powers which had signed the Treaty of Paris to draw up a declaration which stated that Napoleon by his infringement of the convention which had assigned to him the isle of Elba as a residence, had become a general enemy; he had forfeited the protection of the law and had shown to the world that there could be no peace or truce with him. The Powers, therefore, agreed to unite their efforts and employ every means to suppress any attempt to plunge once more the nations of Europe into the disorders and troubles of the Revolution.[34].

Before leaving Elba Napoleon sent to Murat an emissary named Colonna to inform him of his departure and advise him to maintain friendly relations with Austria. But Colonna was also ordered to sign an offensive and defensive alliance with Murat and to request him to hold his troops in readiness on the frontier in case Austria should invade France. Murat, in consequence of this advice, instructed his Envoy at Vienna to declare that he was resolved to remain faithful to his ally, the Emperor of Austria, and to coöperate with the Powers. Campochiaro was also told to ascertain from Metternich what line of action the Austrian Government intended to follow, since the interests and the true policy of both States demanded that they should be thoroughly united; but he was ordered to give nothing in writing. A courier was sent at the same time to London, bearing a declaration that the events which had just

[33] Rinieri, Il Congresso, pp. 522, 535. Napoleon left Elba on the evening of February 26, 1815; he landed near Cannes on March 1 and entered Paris on March 20.

[34] Angeberg, Vol. II., p. 912. Déclaration des Puissances signataires du Traité de Paris. Vienne, 13 Mars, 1815.

occurred would not change the King's policy with regard to England.[35] It is a remarkable illustration of the duplicity which seems to have accompanied all Murat's proceedings that on the same day, as it was afterwards discovered, he sent his aide-de-camp, Count de Beauffremont, to France to assure Napoleon that he would support him.[36] A few days later (March 12) he wrote to Lucien Bonaparte, then living in Rome and on whom the Pope had conferred the title of Prince of Canino, to request him to inform Cardinal Pacca that he was resolved to assist the Emperor with his troops and that he would make known to his family and to the world what his sentiments had always been. The Prince was also charged to announce that a portion of the Neapolitan troops would pass through the Papal States on their way towards the north and to express the hope that the Holy Father would not leave Rome. Though Cardinal Pacca was well aware of how Pius VII. intended to act in the case of an invasion, he referred the matter to him and was instructed to reply to the Prince that the Holy Father did not wish the Neapolitan troops to enter his territory and that as soon as they should he should certainly act according as his duty required.[37]

Count von Miers, the Austrian Ambassador at Naples, gives in a letter to Metternich a graphic description of the state of agitation in which he found Murat on the morning after he had received the news of Napoleon's departure from Elba. He did not seem to know what step to take, or even what he ought to desire. He maintained that Napoleon would have the army and all France on his side and would expel the Bourbons; but he was anxious to know what decision the other Powers, and especially Austria, would take. His ideas were evidently not yet fixed, and he was waiting to see what should be the result of Napoleon's enterprise. Queen Caroline, on the contrary, who was more prudent and steadfast than Murat, was quite decided as to the course of action which her interests demanded. Though very uneasy with regard to Napoleon's fate, she knew that if he again became Emperor he would depose Murat. She assured Von Miers that the King's policy, therefore, was to unite with Austria, and she declared that she would make every effort to attain that end.[38]

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[35] Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 543. Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 401. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 18 Marzo, 1815.

[36] Angeberg, II., p. 1,065. Déclaration de la Cour de Vienne sur la conduite du Roi de Naples. Vienne, 12 Avril, 1815.

[37] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 378. Pacca a Consalvi, Roma, 13 Marzo, 1815.

[38] Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. III., p. 31, p. 472. Le Comte von Miers au Prince von Metternich, Naples, 9 Mars, 1815.

For some days Murat was in the same uncertain, vacillating state of mind, but he at last decided to attack Austria, though Queen Caroline, Von Miers and his more experienced generals and Ministers sought to dissuade him from his mad project. It was pointed out to him that all Europe was resolved to crush Napoleon; that France was exhausted and could render him no assistance; that his army, ill-provided and mostly composed of young soldiers, was much inferior in numbers to that of Austria, which reckoned 450,000 men under arms. Murat was carried away by the conviction that the Italian people would hail him as their liberator; he believed that the Italians detested the domination of Austria; that they were discontented with their various Governments, and that they would rise to follow his standard and be united under his rule.

He still protested that he was resolved to remain faithful to the Austrian alliance, but on March 12 there began a general movement of the Neapolitan troops towards the frontiers, and Count von Miers warned the King that if his army crossed the frontiers of Naples or of the Papal provinces which he held, the alliance would be considered as ended. In consequence, perhaps, of this frank declaration and of the efforts of the Queen and his Ministers, Murat again changed his mind, the advance of the troops was stopped, the official press contradicted the rumors of war which had been spread, and for a few days peace seemed assured. But the announcement on March 15 of Napoleon's triumphal entry into Lyons again inflamed Murat's imagination, and though his Council advised him not to come to any decision until he saw how Napoleon's undertaking would end and the Queen made every effort to persuade him to maintain the alliance with Austria, in which she saw his only chance of success, he resolved to declare war.

He again sent to Lucien Bonaparte a letter to be given to the Pope asking leave for the passage of his troops through the Papal States, and on the following morning, March 19, before any answer could be given, the Neapolitan Consul, Luccari, presented an official demand that two divisions of Neapolitan troops marching to Ancona might be permitted to pass, one in the neighborhood of Rome and the other by way of Terni. The state of the roads through the Abruzzi at that season was alleged as the motive for making this request, and it was promised that the Holy Father should be respected, strict discipline observed by the troops and all provisions paid for. Pius VII. stated in his reply that such a permission would be contrary to the interests of religion, as the Holy See might thereby be drawn into a war, and thus depart from the neutrality which the Pope had always observed as becoming to his ministry of peace and indispensable for the Father of the faithful.

Two days previously Count Crivelli, Murat's Envoy in Rome, but not recognized by the Papal Government, protested to Cardinal Pacca that his Sovereign would not send a soldier into the Papal States, and he forwarded him a letter from the Duca del Gallo, Murat's Minister, dated February 28, assuring him of the King's veneration for the Holy Father. As it was, however, impossible to place any confidence in these declarations, Pius VII. prepared to leave Rome, and the frontiers were carefully watched, so that he might receive timely warning of the approach of the Neapolitan troops and be enabled to make his escape. A commission, formed by Cardinals della Somaglia, Gabrielli and Grizzoni, with Mgr. Rivarola as secretary, was appointed to govern Rome during his absence.[39]

Murat left Naples on March 17 for the headquarters of his army at Ancona, and it was foreseen that the hot-headed enthusiasts by whom he would there be surrounded would soon drive him to his destruction. Nevertheless, if even then he had acted with decision and promptitude and attacked the Austrians at once before they had concentrated their troops, dispersed in many garrisons, and received reinforcements, he might have won a victory which would have caused a rising in his favor throughout all Italy. But he again hesitated and was loath to take a decisive step by declaring openly for Napoleon or for the Allies.[40] His first act on reaching Ancona was to make another attempt to conciliate Lord William Bentinck, who was then in command of the English forces at Genoa, assuring him that his policy with regard to France had undergone no change and that he desired to see peace established on a permanent footing between Naples and Great Britain. Bentinck, who had not ceased to be hostile to Murat, had already written to Marshal Count de Bellegarde to ask whether the movements of the Neapolitan troops were to be considered as an act of warfare against Austria, as in that case the armistice between England and Naples, which existed only in consequence of the treaty concluded between Naples and Austria, would come to an end. But the Marshal could only reply that Murat's conduct seemed to him doubtful and that Bentinck ought to ask him to explain it.

While on his way to Ancona Murat had sent orders to the left wing of his army to enter the Papal States, and on the evening of March 21 Prince Colonna di Stigliano crossed the frontier with a company of infantry and a detachment of cavalry and occupied Terracina. He was soon followed by the two divisions of troops

[39] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 413, Pacca a Consalvi, Roma, 20 Marzo, 1815. P. 407, Pacca a Consalvi, Roma, 18 Marzo. Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. III., p. 137.

[40] Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. III., pp. 116, 124, 252.

which had been assembled at San Germano and at Fondi, and they advanced towards Rome with the intention of seizing Tuscany and effecting a junction in the Legations with the army commanded by Murat.

Pius VII., accompanied by a few secretaries and servants, left Rome on the following day and reached Florence on the night of Holy Saturday (March 25). He continued his journey on the 29th by Pisa to Leghorn, where he would have wished to embark for Genoa on the English frigate Abonhir. But the captain was obliged to remain at Leghorn to protect the British merchants, and the Holy Father returned to Pisa; then passing by Sarzana, he embarked at Lerici, and after a short stay at Rapallo, entered the port of Genoa on Monday, April 3, and took up his abode in the palace of the Marchese Durazzo. He had been accompanied on his journey by the most enthusiastic manifestations of devotion to his person and of sympathy with his misfortunes on the part of the people, who were indignant at seeing the venerable Pontiff driven for the second time into exile.[41]

Murat's attempt to conciliate England did not succeed. Lord Castlereagh, who had returned to London, informed his Envoy, Cavalier Tocco, that he had no diplomatic position, that no answer could be given in London to his overtures, but that they would be forwarded to Vienna for the decision of the Duke of Wellington and the other plenipotentiaries. The King still continued to hesitate instead of acting, and with the object of gaining time by negotiating, Bellegarde sent General von Stahremberg to Ancona to ask for an explanation of this concentration of troops. Murat gave as his reason the chilling, not to say hostile, reception given to his Envoys at Vienna, which made him think that he was abandoned by Austria and had no other alternative than to make war. He knew, indeed, that his forces were inferior to those of Austria, but he asserted that he would have all Italy in his favor, and he stated frankly that he would side with Napoleon.[42] The General brought away, therefore, from the audience the conviction that Murat was about to take the field. At a council held on March 27 Murat's Ministers were strongly opposed to any further advance, but his generals were not unanimous on the subject, yet, nevertheless, on the same day he ordered his troops to begin their forward march, though some of his regiments had not as yet arrived and he had not then at his immediate disposal more than 15,000 or 16,000 men.

Two important letters reached Murat that day: one from Ben-

[41] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 449. Mgr. Mauri a Consalvi, Genova, 5 Avril, 1815.
[42] Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. III., pp. 188, 192.

tinck demanding an explanation of the military preparations made in the Kingdom of Naples, the other from Joseph Bonaparte, the former King of Spain. It informed him of Napoleon's triumphant march towards Paris, and asked him to unite his troops to those of the Emperor and advance towards the Alps. But the request was unnecessary, as the frontier had already been crossed. To Colonel Dalrymple, who had brought Bentinck's letter, Murat and his Minister, the Duca del Gallo, sought to explain their action by the necessity of taking precautions against the Austrian Government, which they accused of perfidy and duplicity. He also denied that he had any knowledge of Napoleon's plans, or that he intended to form an alliance with France.[43]

The main body of the Neapolitan army continued to advance along the shores of the Adriatic towards the Legations, and the small detachments of Austrian troops which garrisoned the chief towns fell back before it, while Murat's guards marched through the Papal States towards Tuscany without entering Rome. The first shots were exchanged between the Neapolitans and the Austrians on March 30 at the bridge over the Pisatello (the ancient Rubicon). The Austrians resisted until their positions were turned, when they retreated towards Forli and thence to Bologna. On the same day Murat, who at Pesaro had issued a decree by which he declared the Marches to be annexed to the Kingdom of Naples, published an appeal to the Italian people which is known as the Proclamation of Rimini. In it he developed the ideas of the unity and the independence of Italy which he had already done so much to spread throughout the country, and called on the nation to take arms and fight under his leadership. Much discontent then prevailed in Northern Italy with the Governments which had been restored after the fall of Napoleon, as their methods were so much at variance with the revolutionary principles of the administrations formed under French influence, and many volunteers had declared themselves ready to join Murat, who may, perhaps, have been deceived by their apparent ardor, and thereby encouraged to take the field. But this appeal to the people met with no answer; it excited no enthusiasm; it caused no insurrection. In the following years, however, its ideas were adopted by the Revolutionary party in Italy as a guide and programme, and being diffused slowly and persistently among the people by means of the secret societies, produced at last the effect desired by Murat.[44]

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[43] Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 544. Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. III., p. 213.

[44] Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. III., pp. 259, 504. This proclamation is believed to have been drawn up by Count Pellegrino Rossi, who was afterwards the Constitutional Minister of Pius IX. and was assassinated in Rome in 1848.

The Austrians still continued to retreat and offered a serious resistance to the Neapolitans only for a short time on the banks of the Panaro near Modena, but any hopes of ultimate success which Murat might have formed were dispelled by the circular which Lord William Bentinck sent from Turin on April 7 to all the commanders of the naval and military forces of England in Italy, informing them that the armistice between England and Naples had been terminated by the hostilities between Austria and Naples and that they should thenceforth assist the Austrians. This declaration was posted throughout Lombardy and Venitia and contributed very efficaciously to repress whatever tendency towards a general rising in favor of Murat might have existed.

Murat's successes did not last long, and the Austrian troops soon ceased to retreat, his attack on the fortified bridge over the River Po at Occhiobello was repulsed, he failed to take the citadel of Ferrara defended by General Lauer, and the Austrians, having received reënforcements, stopped the further progress of the Neapolitan army. Murat's illusions had at last disappeared, the few victories he had gained had produced no practical result, the thousands of volunteers on whom he had reckoned had not answered to his call, the Austrian forces were being rapidly concentrated and augmented, and it was evident that if he wished to save his kingdom he should at once bring this disastrous war to an end. He, therefore, held a council of war at Bologna on April 13, at which both his Ministers and his generals unanimously acknowledged the impossibility of continuing the campaign, and it was resolved to collect the troops which had been dispersed over too widely extended a line and retreat upon Ancona. The same order was sent to the two divisions which had passed through the Papal territory, without, however, entering Rome, invaded Tuscany and occupied Florence, whence the Grand Duke had fled at their approach. This army, owing to the want of energy of the officers who led it, never went beyond Pistoia, where Field Marshal Lieutenant Count Nugent, who commanded the Austrian troops in Tuscany, had retrenched a small body of men and checked their advance.[45]

The limits of this article will only allow room for a short sketch of the fall of Murat and the tragic end of his career. In his retreat towards Ancona he was followed along the shores of the Adriatic by the troops under Field Marshal Lieutenant Count von Neipperg, while Field Marshal Lieutenant Baron Bianchi led another army through Tuscany and the Papal States to intercept him on his way back to the Kingdom of Naples, and Count Nugent advanced towards Rome. Murat's position would have enabled him to hinder

[45] Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. III., p. 428, p. 456.

the junction of the forces of Bianchi and Neipperg, but he failed to act with decision and promptitude, and thus lost a favorable opportunity of retrieving his fortunes.

The column commanded by Bianchi came up with Murat's troops, which had passed through Ancona, at the little town of Tolentino, and a battle took place there which lasted two days (May 2 and 3). The Neapolitans fought bravely and carried many of the Austrian advanced posts, but the incapacity of some of Murat's generals made him lose the advantages which he had at first obtained, and, discouraged by his want of success, he gave orders to retreat, though the battle was far from being lost.[46] On the next day Murat established some order among his soldiers and continued his retreat towards the frontiers of his kingdom, closely pursued by a part of the Austrian army, while the main body under Bianchi took the direction of Central Italy, in order to cut him off from Naples. As Murat advanced his army broke up, his soldiers deserted, and when on May 17 he inspected in the neighborhood of Capua what still remained of his troops he found only about 3,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, all demoralized and discontented and more ready to lay down their arms than to fight. Seeing the uselessness of further resistance, he sent the Duca del Gallo to negotiate with Bianchi, and published a Constitution which had long been promised, but it came too late to save his dynasty. He then gave the command of the army to General Carrascosa and returned to Naples.

At the interview of Murat's envoy with Bianchi, Neipperg and Lord Barghersh (the English Minister at Florence) he was informed that there could be no negotiation and that the King should abdicate in favor of Ferdinand IV., and on May 20, at Casalanza, Generals Carrascosa and Colletta signed an agreement with the Austrian leaders, by which the kingdom was surrendered, to be restored by them to the Bourbon King and a general amnesty guaranteed. Murat had left his palace on the previous night, and accompanied by some friends had sailed for Jaëta, but had been obliged to take refuge at Ischia. Two days later he embarked on a small vessel in which some of his generals were returning to France and was landed at Cannes. Napoleon refused to receive him and ordered him to remain at Grenoble, whence after Waterloo he fled to Corsica. Metternich let him know that he would be allowed to settle in Austria, but he preferred to make an attempt to excite an insurrection in the Kingdom of Naples. It is probable that he had received letters from Naples asserting that everything was ready for a revolution and giving him assurances of assistance. It has also been asserted that he was the victim of a cunningly

[46] Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. IV., p. 370.

devised plot. On September 29, 1815, he left Corsica with about 250 men on board six small vessels, but they were scattered by a storm, and he landed at Pizzo, a small town on the coast of Calabria, on October 8 with only about thirty followers. The people refused to rise, they disarmed his soldiers and made him prisoner. On October 13 he was tried by court-martial, condemned to death and shot half an hour later.[47]

Before returning to Rome Pius VII. revisited Savona, where he had been so long imprisoned, and crowned the Statue of Our Lady of Mercy, the patroness of the town, venerated in a church in the Valle di San Bernardo, four miles distant. On May 18 he left Genoa, and after visiting Turin, he passed through Piacenza, Parma, Modena and Florence and reëntered Rome on June 7.

At the Congress of Vienna the conflicting claims of the ex-Empress Maria Louisa and of the ex-Queen of Etruria had already been settled. The compromise, suggested by Metternich, which he had charged Castlereagh to submit to Louis XVIII., when passing through Paris, had been accepted by the King. The Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla were to be given to the ex-Empress for her lifetime, and at her death were to return to the ex-Queen, who in the meantime was to hold Lucca, which should then be annexed to the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Cardinal Consalvi was thus somewhat relieved from the apprehension that the Legations might be employed as compensation for either of these claimants,[48] but the fate of Pontecorvo and Benevento, the two Papal territories situated within the frontiers of the Kingdom of Italy, was not yet decided. The Emperor Alexander had demanded that Pontecorvo should be given to Prince Eugene, and the Congress had consented, but the Prince had declined to accept it and had asked that the matter should be allowed to rest until the close of the war about to be declared against Napoleon. As to Benevento, Talleyrand seemed to have succeeded in retaining it, probably with reversion after his death to King Ferdinand IV.[49] Even with regard to the Legations, Consalvi was still uncertain, for he was warned that the Legations would not be restored to the Holy Father until he had consented to abandon all claim to Avignon, Benevento and Pontecorvo, a proposal which he rejected with indignation.[50]

[47] Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. V., p. 201. J. Chavagnon and Georges Saint-Yves, Joachim Murat (1761-1815), Paris, 1905, pp. 287, 296. Marquis de Sassenay, Les derniers mois de Murat, Paris, 1896, p. 279.

[48] See Note 13. Talleyrand Correspondance inédite, p. 306. Le Roi au Prince de Talleyrand de Paris le 3 Mars, 1815.

[49] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 472. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 12 Aprile, 1815. Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 600. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 15 Maggio, 1815.

[50] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 529. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 30 Aprile, 1815.

In fact, as Cardinal Consalvi remarks, with the exception of the Pope, all the Italian Princes had gained something by the Congress. He alone was still in danger of losing irretrievably what his predecessor had been obliged to yield to the French Republicans. After long discussions with Metternich on May 15 and May 19 Consalvi perceived that the Congress was still acting on the principle which it had already laid down, that whatever had been won from the French belonged to the Allied Powers, and that what they allotted to each claimant was to be accepted as a gift and not as a restitution. They also looked upon the Sovereign Pontiff, who wished to observe a strict neutrality, as useless for the defense of Italy, and they therefore considered that they were acting very generously towards him by giving him back the Marches and the Legations.[51] The Austrian generals, it is true, who had retaken the Marches from Murat, had left the civil administration in the hands of the Papal delegates, though full possession had not yet been officially restored, but the Legations had not been given up; Ferdinand IV. of Naples and Talleyrand still claimed Pontecorvo and Benevento, and Austria insisted on retaining, with a view to strengthening its frontier, a portion of the Legation of Ferrara, situated to the north of the Po, with a population of 39,620 inhabitants and a revenue of 80,000 crowns a year. It also demanded the right of permanently maintaining garrisons in Ferrara and Comacchio.

The chief obstacle to the restoration to the Pope of the Duchy of Pontecorvo was the Emperor of Russia, who offered much resistance, as he wished that that territory should be allotted to Prince Eugene, but he finally consented that the Prince should accept a large sum of money instead. The restitution of the Principality of Benevento, also situated in the Kingdom of Naples, was strongly opposed by Talleyrand, who, as Cardinal Consalvi proves, had intrigued from the beginning of the Congress in order to retain this State which Napoleon had conferred on him in 1806 at the expense of Pius VII. The Congress had given Benevento to King Ferdinand under pretext of abolishing the *enclaves* (see note 1), but by a secret article in a treaty between Austria and the King it was to be transferred by him to Talleyrand as the price of the help he had given him to regain his throne. This was the origin of the threat made by the Congress that the Legations should not be restored to the Holy Father unless he consented to give up Benevento, and according to the treaty it was to revert to the King on the death of Talleyrand.[52]

[51] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 607. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 15 Maggio, 1815.

[52] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, pp. 567, 574. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 9 Maggio, 1815. Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 600. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 15 Maggio, 1815.

In order to obtain the recognition of the rights of the Holy See, Consalvi was at last obliged to remind Metternich of the powers which the Pope held as Suzerain of Naples. The Normans, who conquered the southern provinces of Italy in the eleventh century, had made them a fief of the Church, for which the King did homage to the Pope,[53] and the Cardinal stated frankly that if King Ferdinand, who had taken that oath of allegiance, persisted in unjustly retaining the two provinces in question, the Sovereign Pontiff would declare that his kingdom was forfeited and would grant the investiture to the Emperor of Austria, or to an Austrian Archduke or to a Spanish Prince, one of whom would not fail to accept it.[54]

Talleyrand seems, however, to have feared to incur the censures of the Church by openly retaining its possessions; he made, therefore, an agreement by which the King was to hold Benevento and pay him an income equal to the amount which it annually produced.[55] As the Cardinal very well remarks: "It was a most disgraceful intrigue."

In the last days of May Consalvi was assured that at the close of the Congress the Marches and the Legations would be restored to the Holy Father, but the fate of Benevento and Pontecorvo still remained undecided, though the Austrian generals who had driven out Murat's troops had allowed the Papal administration to be reëstablished, as they had received no instructions with regard to the matter and they thought that such was the will of the Government.

The Allied Sovereigns had already left Vienna for the headquarters of the armies about to invade France, and their Ministers remained to sign the draft of the treaty known as the treaty of Vienna, by which the Congress ended its labors. Consalvi's anxiety as to the restoration of all the possessions of the Holy See, of which he had still reason to doubt, was not finally dispelled until June 12, when Prince Metternich sent him the draft of the artices in which the Powers which had signed the Treaty of Paris had dealt with the States of the Church. According to their decision, the Marches, along with the Duchy of Camerino, Benevento, Pontecorvo and their dependencies, together with the three Legations, except the northern portion of the Legation of Ferrara, were to be restored to the Holy See. The Emperor of Austria was to have the right to place garrisons in Ferrara and Comacchio and by a secret article added to the treaty the Holy Father agreed to pay 1,700,000 francs

[53] See the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for July, 1906, p. 421.

[54] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 644. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 28 Maggio, 1815.

[55] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 602. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 15 Maggio, 1815.

($340,000) towards the expenses of the war by which the States of the Church had been recovered. The Pope also agreed to accept a territory close to his States in exchange for the Duchy of Benevento, in case the King of Naples should wish it. As Cardinal Consalvi could not obtain an indemnity for Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, which had been assigned to France by the Treaty of Paris, or for the part of the Legation of Ferrara, annexed by Austria, or for the Austrian garrisons placed in Ferrara and Comacchio, he presented to the Congress on June 14 a formal protest in the name of the Sovereign Pontiff and of the Holy See against the measures which it had adopted contrary to their rights. Another and not less arduous struggle was necessary before Consalvi could persuade Metternich to restore the possessions of the Holy See at the end of four weeks. He had intended to give them up only on the conclusion of a general peace. Consalvi then learned from Metternich the details of the bargain which had been made with Talleyrand, who in order that Benevento might be restored to the Pope, had been persuaded to renounce all claim to it and accept compensation in money. He had demanded 6,000,000 of francs for this concession, but Metternich remarked that he would be made to accept two millions, of which the King of Naples would provide 1,500,000 and the Pope 500,000.[56]

The diplomatic talent, the unflinching courage and the unwearied perseverance of Cardinal Consalvi had at last prevailed over the indifference of some of the members of the Congress and the undisguised hostility of others, the efforts of the Revolution to destroy the temporal power had been frustrated and the States of the Church had been restored to the Holy Father. But the Cardinal's foresight and his knowledge of the spirit prevailing throughout Europe did not allow him to believe in the permanency of the settlement effected by the Congress, and before leaving Vienna he warned the Papal Government of the dangers which it would have to face on retaking possession of the Marches and the Legations and the great prudence that should accompany all its measures. The majority of the people, it is true, had shown by its refusal to join Murat that it desired the return of the Papal Government, but the persons who had been employed by the Napoleonic administration were imbued with the principles of the Revolution; they were for the most part Freemasons, and would always be hostile to the Papacy. It should be remembered that the Holy See had lost the Marches for eight years and the Legations for twenty and that during that time the morals of the population had been corrupted, its manners, its cus-

[56] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 716. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 12 Gingno, 1815.

toms and its ideas had been completely changed. It would be impossible to reëstablish the old order of things in those provinces, and if any attempt were made to do so, or if any blunders were made, they would not be kept for six months. He recommended, therefore, the formation of provisional governments, so as to effect a gradual transition back to Papal institutions and to change the actual state of affairs at first as little as possible.[57]

Cardinal Consalvi returned to Rome on July 2 and resumed his former position as Secretary of State. He undertook a complete reorganization of the administration of the Papal States, and the Pope's *Motu proprio* of July 6, 1816, approved the changes which he introduced. It announced that five new codes of law should be drawn up; it defined clearly the powers of the various tribunals and it placed the finances on a stronger footing. Many of the reforms established by the French during their occupation of Rome were retained.

In consequence of the sufferings which the Revolution had inflicted on the Church throughout Europe, ecclesiastical affairs also required to be reorganized. The example was given by the King of France, Louis XVIII., whose Ambassador, M. de Blacas, was charged with the negotiation of a new Concordat, which was signed on June 11, 1817. It reëstablished the Concordat of 1516 between Leo X. and Francis I., thereby repealing that of 1801, and it abrogated the *Articles Organiques* in so far as they were opposed to the doctrine and laws of the Church. It preserved, however, the sees which had then been created and reëstablished a certain number of those which had been suppressed, and it promised to endow them all with real estate or money as soon as it should be possible to do so. The French Chamber of Deputies rejected this Concordat on the ground that it was opposed to the liberties of the Gallican Church, and though, after further negotiations, it consented in 1821 to an arrangement between Pius VII. and the King, by which the Bishoprics should be increased to eighty, fourteen of which were to be metropolitan and sixty-six suffragan, the new Concordat never became law and that of 1801 continued to exist.[58]

Other Concordats followed that with France; one was concluded with Piedmont in August, 1817, by which the number of dioceses was increased to nineteen, and Russia made one for the Polish

[57] Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 732. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 12 Gingno, 1815.

[58] Artand de Montor, Histoire du Pape Pie VII., Paris, 1836. Vol. II., pp. 478, 489, 450. Alzog, Manual of Universal Church History, 1887, Vol. IV., p. 161. By later concessions the clergy obtained the right to accept gifts of real estate, and 3,900,000 francs were granted them to ameliorate their position.

provinces in January, 1818. In February of the same year a Concordat with Naples removed certain restrictions on episcopal jurisdiction and allowed the fullest freedom of communication with Rome, and in 1821 a Concordat with Prussia effected some changes in the distribution of suffragans among the metropolitan sees.

The reëstablishment of the Society of Jesus had been one of the first acts of Pius VII. on returning to Rome in 1814. In Russia it had been already restored in 1801 and in Naples in 1805, and in answer to the demand of the whole Catholic world, its complete restoration was granted on August 7 by the Bull *Sollicitudo omnium Ecclesiarum.*

Pius VII. had now become much enfeebled by age; he could hardly move without assistance, and in the early part of July, by a fall in his room, he fractured his leg. The doctors tried to conceal from him the danger of his accident, but he at once insisted on receiving the last sacraments. Nearly a month of suffering, patiently borne, followed, and on August 20 he expired, aged eighty-one years and six days, after reigning twenty-three years, five months and six days.

More fortunate than his predecessor, Pius VII., after struggling like him against the violence of the Revolution, had seen it at last vanquished; he did not die a prisoner and in exile. The Revolution, crushed for a time, renewed its attacks against his successors; its spirit now prevails in many lands and seeks to destroy all trace of Christianity; but the Church must eventually triumph, and though at the present moment further evils seem to be threatened, we may hope that Pius X. may live to witness another and an equally glorious restoration of the independence of the Papacy.

D. Sampson.

London, England.

UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN IRELAND.

Dublin University Commission Reports, 1878, 1903, 1907.
"Ireland and the Home Rule Movement," by Michael F. J. McDonnell. Dublin: Maunsel & Co., 1908.
"University Teaching," by John Henry Cardinal Newman. Longmans, 1908.

"TRINITY COLLEGE, Dublin," writes Mr. McDonnell, in his "Ireland and the Home Rule Question,"[1] "was founded by Queen Elizabeth with the proceeds of confiscated Catholic lands, both monastic and lay, with the avowed intention of propagating the principles of the Protestant religion"—"Protestant" in this case meaning the principles of the Episcopalian Church of Ireland. "The Commissioners," so runs a statement submitted by a committee of the Synod of the Church of Ireland,[2] "will be aware that Trinity College has since its foundation been the school in which the Irish clergy have been trained. The supply of clergy to the Irish Church is stated in the statutes to have been the principal object for which Trinity College was founded. The Fellows were not only, with two or three exceptions, obliged, on pain of deprivation, to take holy orders, but on their election each took an oath that he would make theology the main object of his studies."

Setting aside, for later reference, the prominence given to theology in the statutes and practice of "The College of the Holy and Undivided Trinity of Queen Elizabeth, near Dublin," it may be objected to the above statements that they represent a condition of affairs which must necessarily have come to an end, in principle, if not in fact, with the passing of the "Act to abolish Tests in Trinity College and the University of Dublin"[3] (26th May, 1873). [The reader will kindly note the official distinction as being important.]

The terms of the preamble are worth quoting:

"Whereas, It is expedient that the benefits of Trinity College and the University of Dublin, and of the schools in the said university as places of religion and learning, should be rendered freely accessible to the nation;

"And whereas, by means of divers restrictions, tests and disabilities many of Her Majesty's subjects are debarred from the full enjoyment of the same;

"And whereas, it is expedient that such restrictions, tests and disabilities should be removed;

"Be it therefore enacted" . . . to the above effect.

As far, therefore, as Parliamentary intentions go, Trinity College

[1] P. 132.
[2] Dublin Univ. Com. Rep., 1878, p. 61 (App. VI.).
[3] *Ibid*, p. 101 (App. XXV.).

and the University of Dublin ceased in principle to be "sectarian" with the passing of the "University of Dublin Tests Act, 1873."

Before considering to what extent, if any, Trinity College ceased at that date, or any later one, to be as "sectarian" in fact and in spirit as it had always been, some explanation of the phrase "University of Dublin," as distinct from Trinity, may be in order. It can be given in a few lines, quoted from Mr. Michael McDonnell's "Ireland and the Home Rule Question," already referred to and to which, in passing, the present writer desires to acknowledge his indebtedness. "The Charter of James I.," he writes,[4] "conferring on Dublin the privilege of a university foreshadowed the establishment of other colleges. Both the Act of Settlement, 14 and 15 Car. II. (1660), and the Roman Catholic Relief Act, 1793, expressly authorize the erection of another college in the university—a fact which makes the proposed change [now happily accomplished] which partisans are anxious to paint as revolutionary vandalism, appear in truth merely the belated performance of a long-expressed intention." It may be added that the reports of the Dublin University Commission fully bear out the contention as to the foundation or addition of other colleges to constitute with Trinity the University of Dublin.

To return, however, to the question: Has Trinity College ceased to be as "sectarian" in fact and in spirit as it ever was? We are again indebted for a reply to Mr. McDonnell, who, it will be seen, is careful to give chapter and verse for his assertions. At an inaugural meeting of the College Historical Society some years ago, he tells us, "Judge Webb declared: "Their university was founded by Protestants, for Protestants and in the Protestant interest. A Protestant spirit had from the first animated every member of its body corporate. At the present moment, with all its toleration . . . the *genius loci,* the guardian spirit of the place, was Protestant." If once more for "Protestant" we read "Protestant Episcopal" (Church of Ireland), the objections, not of Catholics alone, but of Presbyterians and others, to the practical identification of Trinity College with the University of Dublin becomes easily comprehensible.

"It is often alleged," Mr. McDonnell writes elsewhere,[5] "that the anxiety of the Irish for other facilities for higher education than are at present afforded arises from their priest-ridden condition and that the clergy urge the demand only in order that they may obtain more power than they already possess. The conditions in University College (Jesuit) are," he proceeds, "some answer to

[4] *Op. cit.,* p. 139.
[5] P. 134.

this charge." The final settlement of the question, a college without tests or a national university, as accepted by the Irish Catholic hierarchy, is more than a complete refutation of it.[6] "The shifts of intolerance," he adds, pertinently,[7] "are many, but I cannot believe that it will long continue to masquerade in this manner as the statesmanlike buffer between a priest-ridden country and an aggressive clergy." Events have justified his confidence.

The official reports of the Dublin University Commission, as it may be most conveniently called, fully bear out, as already indicated, Mr. McDonnell's above quoted statements. Thus, in 1903 there were, according to the Commissioners,[8] "two universities in Ireland, viz., the University of Dublin, of which Trinity College, Dublin, is the only college, and the Royal University of Ireland," founded under the University Education (Ireland) Act of 1879, a university, according to the same authority,[9] "whose sole function it is to conduct examinations." The Commissioners, we may add, go on to point out "the evils which are well nigh inseparable from a university which is no more than an examining board."[10]

The Commissioners, indeed, are careful to refer to one such evil which in the present connection is the most vital of all, namely, the religious difficulty.[11] After pointing out that "Roman Catholics do not avail themselves, to any considerable extent, of the existing State-endowed colleges," they show the result to be at that date that "the Roman Catholics of Ireland, forming 74 per cent. of the whole population, a large number of whom are interested in the question, are as a body unprovided with any adequately endowed university education, of which they are willing to avail themselves." Taking into account Judge Webb's "expert evidence" in regard to the Protestantism of Trinity and the Catholic objection on principle to the divorce between religious and secular education represented by the Queen's colleges, we may, I think, fairly substitute "conscientiously able" for "willing to avail themselves." Nor do the terms on which the Mahommedan University at Khartoum received its charter fail to materially strengthen this contention.

"Whether they [the Catholic hierarchy] were right or not," the Commissioners continue,[12] "this state of affairs exists; it is disastrous to the interests of education," the result being that "a comparatively small number of the Irish population go to college at all;" the royal university, "though created to meet the religious difficulty,

[6] P. 144.
[7] P. 145.
[8] Rep., 1903, p. 3.
[9] P. 22.
[10] P. 23.
[11] Pp. 25, sqq.
[12] P. 27.

has neither solved the difficulty nor satisfied educational needs. The kind of literary education which the Royal University promotes has been pushed beyond due limits and has become a source of weakness rather than of strength to the country. More than one Chief Secretary," they conclude, "has confessed that in making appointments he has found it difficult to find among the candidates well-qualified Roman Catholics."[13]

Whether the religious difficulty, which, as the Commissioners admit, is "the chief cause of this failure," may or may not be justly dismissed as a "scrupple," they at least bear witness to the readiness of the Irish Catholic hierarchy to meet the exigencies of the situation. "It is right to point out," they proceed,[14] "that the last official statement of the Bishops . . . does not insist on the strict denominationalism formerly demanded." At this point we may leave the report in question to the closer study of those interested in the details of the subject, only adding that, in respect of the vexed question of a Department of Irish Studies, the Commissioners display the same fairness and even generosity of judgment which characterizes the whole document. "We do not think it necessary," they say,[15] "to do more than to record our concurrence with the opinion unanimously expressed by the witnesses that an Irish university should encourage and make adequate provision for a department of Irish studies."

The final report of the Royal Commission on Trinity College, Dublin, and the University of Dublin, issued in 1907, while of no less interest than those already referred to, naturally covers very much the same ground. It may, therefore, be left to the student of details, there being one matter, at least, if not two, of more immediate interest to be considered as succinctly as may be adequate to their importance.

The first and most immediate of these is the question: On what principle do Catholics demand a university or college as "Catholic in atmosphere" as Trinity College is Protestant? Or, in other words, on what principle do they insist on including theology among the subjects necessarily to be taught at such a national institution?

One answer might, obviously enough, be given in the contention that Trinity College, professedly "national," was for nearly three centuries—1592 to 1869—primarily and actually theological of a particular type, and that, further, it was over this very question, as the report of 1878 shows, that the chief difficulties in regard to Trinity by the Irish Church Disestablishment Act of 1869 arose.

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[13] P. 29.
[14] P. 33.
[15] P. 57.

On the principle, however, that one wrong—if it be a wrong, which is by no means conceded—does not justify another wrong, the above answer can hardly be considered as adequate or satisfactory. The example of Trinity in this respect is indeed chiefly interesting as indicating the attitude of orthodox sixteenth century State Protestantism toward theology, considered as a department of knowledge, an attitude which, it may fairly be contended, was to all intents and purposes maintained at least till the middle or later years of the nineteenth. It is the attitude, in a word, which regards theology not only as one of many branches of knowledge, but as the supreme, the most important and the most necessary of them all.

In this connection, therefore, and also in search, as we may say, of an incidental explanation of Irish Catholic insistence on a "Catholic atmosphere" in a national university, we cannot do better than refer to Newman as to a master alike both of theology—in its widest signification—and of the theory, practice and principles of university education.

"Even the question of the union," he writes on page 8, "of theology with the secular sciences . . . simple as it is of solution in the abstract, has, according to difference of circumstances, been at different times differently decided." He even goes so far as to admit (on page 9) that "a system of what is called secular education, in which theology and the sciences are taught separately, may in a particular place or time be the least of evils," a purely secular university less dangerous to faith than one governed by a religious spirit antagonistic to the convictions of the minority. It is not, however, that he approves of such a system, and his definition, it should be noted, does not by any means connote that total exclusion of the religious element which has come to be associated with the notion of "secular education."

But he goes farther than this, and along lines intimately connected with the subject, as with the actual condition of Irish university education. Whatever may or may not be tolerable under the exigencies of circumstances, and the Church, as he shows, has made very generous concessions, at one period or another, there is one rule, and only one, to which Catholics must yield a ready and willing submission. "Ecclesiastical authority," he writes on page 10, "not argument is the supreme rule and the appropriate guide for Catholics in matters of religion." If so, and if education be, as it is for Catholics and indeed for all Christians, essentially a matter of religion, then the attitude actually assumed by the Irish Catholic hierarchy toward the Government's national university disposes once and for all of any charges of clerical instigation or of clerical domi-

nation over the movement which has culminated in that tardy and long-delayed matter of simple and elementary justice; the recognition of Catholic Ireland's claim to such facilities of higher education as it can conscientiously make use of.

"It is the fashion," Newman writes elsewhere,[16] "to erect so-called universities without making any provision in them at all for theological chairs. . . . Such a procedure," he does not hesitate to say, "seems to me an intellectual absurdity," and goes far to explain his reason for making the assertion, basing it on the very name "university" as an institution professing to teach universal knowledge, of which "theology is surely a branch," and one that cannot logically be excluded. "I cannot," he continued,[17] "so construct my definition of the subject matter of university knowledge and so draw my boundary lines around it as to include therein the other sciences commonly studied at universities and to exclude the science of religion."

If, therefore, the reasonableness and logic of Newman's contention for the inclusion of theology among the necessary elements of university teaching he conceded, the objection of Irish Catholics, not less to the "godless Queen's colleges" than to Protestant Trinity and their claim to a university which, by including theology, should accord with their cherished convictions—a claim, let it be remembered, unhesitatingly admitted in the case of the Mahommedans of Khartoum—becomes at least comprehensible. Nor, even supposing that theology, in the strict, technical sense, were not taught as such at the Irish national university, the mere concession of a Catholic, that is, of a religious "atmosphere," leaves the argument, to all intents and purposes, no less valid. For, as Newman rightly says,[18] "the word 'God' is a theology in itself, indivisibly one, inexhaustibly various, from the vastness and simplicity of its meaning." It follows that any university which even tacitly, much more, openly, acknowledges the place of God in education to that extent, at least, may be said to include theology among the necessary elements of universal knowledge.

It is true, of course, that "the religious world, as it is styled, holds, generally speaking, that religion consists not in knowledge, but in feeling or sentiment."[19] Hence, presumably, the apparent willingness of even professedly religious persons and communities to relegate religion, and particularly theology, to a domain wholly distinct from all that they conceive to be education. Hence, also, we may further assume, the unwillingness, to put it mildly, of the State to assist the institutions which remain loyal to the older

[16] P. 18.
[17] P. 24.
[18] P. 25.
[19] P. 26.

and more logical notion of universal knowledge and include theology among the necessary subjects of their teaching. It may be of some little service, therefore, to present, however inadequately, both the case for the Irish National University and the principles on which it rests. And for this reason, that if the claim here made on behalf of theology of the older Catholic notion of university teaching be conceded and the State's duty in regard to such institutions admitted, consequences of vital issue to the welfare of education in Canada must, or at least should, ensue.

To this point, however, I hope to return presently. It may be permissible, as it seems necessary, before doing so, to make certain further references to Newman. He lays it down, to begin with,[20] "that all knowledge forms one whole, because its subject matter is one," and that "we cannot separate portion from portion . . . except by a mental abstraction." Again: "I say, then, that the systematic omission of any one science from the catalogue prejudices the accuracy and completeness of our knowledge altogether, and that in proportion to its importance."[21] From this rule, it should be noted, he does not except even theology.

"If to blot out man's agency," he writes elsewhere,[22] "is to deface the book of knowledge on the supposition of that agency existing, what must it be, supposing it exists, to blot out the agency of God?" In yet another noteworthy passage he argues for the acceptance of the same conclusion[23] on the principle that "if the various branches of knowledge which are the matter of teaching in a university so hang together that none can be neglected without prejudice to the perfection of the rest, and if theology be a branch of knowledge . . . to what conclusion are we brought . . . but this? that to withdraw theology from the public schools is to impair the completeness and to invalidate the trustworthiness of all that is actually taught in them." And since on Newman's own showing the very word "God" is a theology in itself, a theology which is contained in, expressed and symbolized by the term "religious atmosphere," then, obviously, any system of university teaching which admits among its necessary subjects the notion of God, which has an atmosphere or spirit which can be described as religious, is a university within the meaning of Newman's, that is, of the Catholic definition of the term.

Nor does the nature or denomination of the theology here defined or assumed affect the issue in any material degree. The Irish Catholic hierarchy never questioned the right of Trinity College to make Protestant Episcopal theology a part of its teaching—for Protestant Episcopalians. They simply denied Trinity's right to

[20] P. 49.
[21] P. 50.
[22] P. 58.
[23] P. 67.

monopolize either the name or the office of the "University of Dublin"—so far as the Catholic majority of the population of Ireland was affected by such a monopoly. And the real basis of their claim to possess a university (or college in a university) as Catholic in "atmosphere" as Trinity is Protestant, is this, that "religious knowledge is not only a portion, but a condition of general knowledge. To blot it out is nothing short . . . of unraveling the web of university teaching."[24] More; "a refusal to recognize theological truth in a course of Universal Knowledge" results not only in "the loss of theology," but also in "the perversion of the other sciences."[25]

But if this be the principle governing the system existing not only at Trinity College and at the Irish (Catholic) National University, but also at the Mahommedan College of Khartoum, a principle recognized, tacitly if not formally, as valid by the State which has made grants to all three, what possible application, it may reasonably be asked, can it have to the conditions of Canadian university education? To such a question I would make bold to answer: As much as it has to Irish or Soudanese conditions, and no less.

If, that is to say, theology, a mere "religious atmosphere," even the simple notion of God, the principle of the oneness and indivisibility of knowledge be admitted, as it is in the cases here referred to and forms no insurmountable barrier to State endowment and State assistance, why should it not apply equally to those educational institutions in Canada which in this respect fall into precisely the same category as Trinity College, the Irish National University and the Mahommedan University of Khartoum? If, in other words, the British State recognizes, endows and assists universities which, by including theology among their necessary subjects, thereby become "sectarian," as it is the fashion to call them, why should not the Canadian State, Federal or Provincial, be at least as generous?

That, it would seem, is the point to which a review of university education in Ireland inevitably leads, and at which the matter, without attempted discussion of details or of manifest principles, advantages and consequences may preferably be left. It only remains to apologize, should apology appear to be required, first, for the somewhat numerous and extensive quotations, but chiefly for the presumption that may possibly be taken to underlie a conclusion which, as has been said, can on the lines here laid down hardly be avoided.

FRANCIS W. GREY.

Ottawa, Canada.

[24] Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 68. [25] P. 76.

CHURCH AND STATE.

AFTER the death in 395 of Theodosius the Great the empire, in accordance with the precedents of more than a century, was partitioned between the two sons of the late ruler, Arcadius, the elder, governing from Constantinople, under the guardianship of Rufinus, and Honorius, a mere child, from Milan and later Ravenna, under the guardianship of Stilicho.

The partition of the empire on this occasion was destined to be of more than ordinary moment, for never again were the two portions of what then formed the Roman State to be united under one chief. The fifth century, therefore, opens a new era in the long history of the empire, the chief characteristic of which, in the ecclesiastical domain, is the gradually increasing strain on the good relations of Western and Eastern Christendom, a strain which was eventually to culminate in a permanent rupture.

In previous papers, we have seen, these misunderstandings between East and West are traceable in the main to the usurpation by the Emperors of powers to which the Constitution of the Church gave them not the shadow of a claim as well as to the successive heresies and schisms which divided the forces of the Eastern episcopate. At the beginning of the fifth century the Eastern situation was for the moment tranquil, but soon it was destined to become worse than ever, owing to the keen rivalry between Alexandria and the capital and the outbreak of new heresies which still further embittered the contest for supremacy in Eastern Christendom between the ecclesiastical Pharaoh and the Bishop of Constantinople. Before the reign of Arcadius the struggle between Alexandria and Constantinople had reached no definite issue, although Alexandria, in compelling the withdrawal of St. Gregory Nazianzen from the capital, for the moment held the advantage. But the issue was far from decided when in 398 St. John Chrysostom, against the will of the Patriarch of Alexandria, Theophilus, was called from Antioch to fill the episcopal throne of Constantinople, left vacant by the death of the insignificant Nectarius.

The new Bishop of Constantinople had long been famous in the Orient for the eloquence of his preaching in the Cathedral of Antioch. His coming to the capital was consequently awaited with the greatest interest. That he was not at all overrated was at once apparent, and in a short time Constantinople was, if possible, more enthusiastic than had been Antioch over the golden-tongued orator.

But Chrysostom, to the inconvenience of some of his clergy, proved a strict disciplinarian, a fact which resulted in the formation among them of a party ill disposed to his administration. This

hostility would probably have been of little moment had Chrysostom continued to enjoy the favor of the court. But the Bishop's severe strictures on reprehensible customs in high places soon aroused the anger of influential personages in the entourage of the Empress Eudoxia, a circumstance which raised him new and powerful enemies. Certain Bishops also, who loitered around the capital, at the head of whom was the aged Acacius of Berea, were not at all admirers of his austerities, and only awaited an opportunity of openly taking part with his opponents.

Such was the situation when towards the end of the year 401 a deputation of Egyptian monks arrived in Constantinople, seeking the protection of the Bishop of the capital city from persecution they complained of suffering at the hands of Theophilus, Patriarch of Alexandria, on the charge of Origenism. Chrysostom refused to interfere in the case, save to intercede in their behalf with Theophilus. But Theophilus would brook no interference and curtly told Chrysostom that this affair was beyond his jurisdiction; at the same time he sent to Constantinople a second group of monks with accusations against the first. The accused monks now appealed to the civil tribunal, and with such success that their accusers were convicted of calumny and Theophilus himself was cited to appear in Constantinople to give an account of himself.

But this first check did not in the least discourage Theophilus. His partisans at Constantinople were numerous and influential, whereas, on the other hand, the court circle was daily growing more and more discontented with the strictures of John. Biding his time at Alexandria until conditions at the capital were almost wholly favorable to his cause, Theophilus finally embarked, with a large following of Bishops, and made no secret of his intention to depose the Bishop of Constantinople.

His calculations in this respect were not at all rashly formed. The prestige of his high office instantly made him in Constantinople the leader of the opposition to Chrysostom. Even the civil authorities, who had called him to account for his conduct towards the monks of Nitria, were easily persuaded to see things from his point of view. The consequence was that the roles of the two Bishops were quickly reversed: Theophilus became the judge and Chrysostom the accused.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the procedure of the "Synod of the Oak," presided over by the unscrupulous Patriarch of Alexandria. On charges utterly puerile, Chrysostom was deposed by Theophilus and exiled by the Emperor Arcadius.

The departure of John for his place of banishment was the signal for a popular outbreak, which prevented Theophilus from enjoying

in the capital the triumph he had anticipated; so threatening was the attitude of the people that he and his abettors hastily re-ëmbarked for the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. This agitation, which was felt even within the precincts of the palace, was a disagreeable surprise to the chief instigator of the whole trouble, the Empress Eudoxia. A mysterious accident in her chamber about this time in addition greatly alarmed the Empress, with the result that messengers were immediately dispatched recalling the exiled Bishop. Chrysostom returned, and against his better judgment resumed his functions without securing rehabilitation, as the canons required, through a synod. This fact was kept in mind by his opponents and used against him a few months later when he again lost the favor of Eudoxia by rather pointed and uncomplimentary allusions to her Majesty. John was now accused of resuming office irregularly, and was declared by a second synod deposed without right of appeal. Some months later he again took the road to exile, and a successor named Arsacius, taken from among his opponents, was appointed to the See of Constantinople. The intervention of Pope Innocent and of the Archbishops of Milan and Aquileia was now invoked by the friends of the deposed Bishop, with the result that the Pope pronounced the judgment rendered against Chrysostom null and void. The Pope also interested the Emperor Honorius in behalf of the illustrious exile; but their united efforts, owing to the strained relations between East and West, were of no avail, and a few years later Chrysostom died in banishment.

Thus St. John Chrysostom became another example in the East of what even the greatest and best of ecclesiastics might have to endure at the hands of the civil authorities when aided and abetted by jealous and unscrupulous prelates.

The election in 427 of Nestorius to the episcopal throne of the capital opened a new phase in the relations, in the Orient, of the Church and the Empire. Like his predecessor, St. John Chrysostom, Nestorius was a noted orator, and like Chrysostom also he had been a priest of Antioch when he received the imperial call to become Bishop of Constantinople. By a curious, though by no means unparalleled irony, the new prelate, who was destined to become one of the most famous of heresiarchs, began his episcopal career with an all-devouring zeal for the extirpation of heresy. In an inaugular address, delivered before the young Emperor Theodosius II., April, 428. Nestorius formulated his programme: "Give me, O Emperor," he cried, "a land purged of heretics, and I in return will give you heaven; help me to vanquish the heretics and I will help you to vanquish the Persians."

With all the zeal of a neophyte Nestorius at once began to carry

out, warmly seconded by the Emperor, his plan of campaign. Arians and Novatians, Quartodecimans and Macedonians were sternly pursued by the vigilant Bishop. Adherents of the Pelagian sect were alone exempted from persecution; their chiefs, indeed, enjoyed the favor of Nestorius, a fact which was remembered to his disadvantage in the West in the days of his troubles. After three years thus occupied in the extirpation of heresy Nestorius to his surprise suddenly found that he himself was regarded by grave personages as not only a heretic, but a heresiarch. This serious charge originated in the following manner: Among those who accompanied Nestorius from Antioch was a priest named Anastasius. In a sermon preached on a certain occasion in the capital Anastasius took exception to the term currently applied to the Blessed Virgin of Theotokos, or Mother of God. Mary, explained the preacher, is not the Mother of God, since God could not be born of a creature. The sermon created something of a sensation, but a sensation the reverse of agreeable to its author, for Anastasius was universally and severely condemned. The Bishop came to the rescue of his friend and in a series of discourses elaborated his ideas on the subject in debate, which were substantially those of Anastasius. Popular opposition to his views he dealt with in the high-handed manner to be expected from the author of the inaugural already referred to; those who dared contradict him he caused to be whipped and imprisoned. The opposition of his priests, expressed by one of their number named Proclus, was not so easily disposed of; in a series of discourses Nestorius was obliged to defend his position, thus attracting general attention to the gravity of the issue.

In his pastoral letter of the year 429 Cyril, Patriarch of Alexandria, nephew and successor of Theophilus, without any mention of names, took cognizance of the erroneous teaching of Nestorius. At the same time Cyril wrote a long letter to the solitaries of Nitria, putting them on their guard against the doctrine of the Bishop of Constantinople. Nestorius keenly resented this action of Cyril and several letters were exchanged of a character by no means calculated to bring about a better understanding between the two Bishops.

Realizing the gravity of the situation, Cyril now wrote to Pope Celestine invoking his intervention, on the ground that all doctrinal difficulties of any moment should, in conformity with ancient precedent, be submitted to the Holy See. He rightly counted on Roman support in the crisis, for the views of Nestorius were already and unfavorably known at Rome. Cyril also forwarded to the Pope certain of the homilies of Nestorius, with his own refutations of their unorthodoxy, for the further enlightenment of Celestine.

The response of the Pope was even more than Cyril could have hoped for. In August, 430, Celestine held at Rome a synod which condemned the teaching of Nestorius and called upon the offender to retract, within ten days after the reception of notice of this decision, his erroneous doctrines, under penalty of deposition. Cyril was commissioned to carry out this sentence, but the Pope failed to specify wherein precisely lay the error of Nestorius. The consequence was that Cyril, in a synod at Alexandria, took it upon himself to supply the omission and drew up a profession of faith, together with twelve anathematisms, embodying theological views peculiar to Alexandria, for the acceptance of Nestorius.

Meanwhile letters of Pope Celestine to John of Antioch and Juvenal of Jerusalem on the heresy of Nestorius had reached their destination. The former was a warm personal friend of Nestorius, who now proved his friendship by exhorting the Bishop of Constantinople, in his own name and in that of some other Syrian Bishops, chief among whom was the learned and apostolic Bishop of Cyr, the historian Theodoret, to submit to the Pope's decision. Nestorius replied that he would do so, and admitted that the contentious term Theotokos could be used in an orthodox sense; it would be for the future council, he added, to make a definite pronouncement on this matter.

But just as the controversy thus seemed on the point of ending, the anathematisms of Cyril reached Nestorius and put an end to all hope of an agreement. For in the eyes of Nestorius and his friends of Antioch Cyril's anathematisms were strongly tainted with Apollinarianism; accordingly, they were refuted by Theodoret and repudiated by Nestorius in twelve counter-anathematisms.

Meanwhile, Theodosius II. had issued in his own name and in that of his Western colleague, Valentinian III., orders for the convocation of a general council, which was to meet at Ephesus, Pentecost, 431. The letter of invitation was sent only to metropolitans, who were directed to bring with them some of the more distinguished of their suffragans; they were further admonished to arrive in good time under penalty of incurring both the divine and the imperial displeasure. Cyril received a special letter of invitation, which, however, was the reverse of complimentary to the recipient; he was reproached as a disturber of the Church and of the imperial household and warned that the decisions of the future council would be carried out to the letter. Evidently the Emperor entertained the hope that Cyril should be found in the wrong.

The general letter of convocation to the metropolitans of the empire issued on this occasion is of more than ordinary interest among documents of its class for the light it throws on the develop-

ment of imperial pretensions in regard to the Christian religion. There is, declares the Emperor, a most intimate relationship between the empire and the Church, so close, indeed, that the well-being of the former depends upon the latter. Indeed, Church and State mutually penetrate one another, and each derives advantage from the extension of the other. Thus the true religion is indebted to justice, and the State is at the same time indebted to religion and to justice. The Emperor, who reigns by divine ordinance, is the natural connecting link between the temporal and the spiritual orders. Therefore, it is his duty to maintain harmony between their respective representatives, and thus exercise between God and men the office of a mediator. These functions of his imperial office he performs, on the one hand, by guarding the interests of the State and on the other by seeing that the people live with the piety that becomes Christians. Thus his solicitude extends over a double domain, and the thought of the one necessarily involves the thought of the other. Above all, the pious Emperor is anxious that religion shall enjoy the degree of respect God requires for a thing so sacred; hence he desires to see peace and concord reign and that the conduct and achievements of all ranks of the clergy shall be above reproach. It is in order to restore the Christian religion to this desirable condition that the Emperor now summons a general council, whose decisions will be of the greatest moment to both Church and State; hence the metropolitans are ordered to carry out the directions noted above, and none of them may absent themselves from the council without the proper authorization.

In response to the Emperor's invitation Pope Celestine informed Theodosius that he could not personally attend the council, but that he would be represented by legates. The Pope wrote Cyril of Alexandria also, in answer to the latter's inquiry whether the Bishop of Constantinople should or not be allowed to take part in the discussions, counselling moderation. Cyril's prime object should be the restoration of peace in the Church and the winning back of Nestorius from the path of error. In his instructions to his representatives, the Bishops Arcadius and Projectus and the priest Philip, the Pope directs them to refrain from siding either with Nestorius or his adversaries and to act in harmony with the Bishop of Alexandria. The legates received also a letter to the council, in which the Pope eloquently exhorts the fathers to preserve intact the deposit of faith; Celestine, however, clearly indicates that he has himself already pronounced a final decision in the case, which his representatives are deputed to see carried into effect.

Theodosius appointed the captain of his guard, Count Candidian, his personal representative to the council. The Count was instructed

to take no part in the discussions on matters of faith, which must be left wholly to the Bishops. But, on the other hand, he was charged to tolerate no cabals or private assemblies, to see that the various provinces of the empire were fittingly represented before the opening of the sessions, to assist at the debates and maintain order and to permit none of the Bishops to leave Ephesus before the completion of their work. The fathers were to be allowed absolute liberty in debating the questions before them, but irrelevant discussions should not be tolerated. Finally, to prevent disorder, the Count was instructed to expel from Ephesus any and all persons drawn thither on this occasion by mere curiosity.

Despite the order of the Emperor that each province should be represented by only a limited number of Bishops, Cyril arrived at Ephesus some days before the date fixed for the opening of the council, accompanied by no less than fifty Egyptian Bishops as well as by a large number of the lower clergy and monks. Juvenal of Jerusalem brought with him fifteen Bishops from Palestine, while the Diocese of Asia, of which Ephesus was the capital, was represented by a hundred or more Bishops. Apart from the merits of the question at issue, the Asiatic Bishops, because of their strong opposition to the interference of the Bishops of Constantinople in their domestic affairs, were predisposed to side with Alexandria. Juvenal of Jerusalem had also his reasons for leaning to Alexandrian views; the ambition of his life, in the attainment of which Cyril's influence would be of the greatest moment, was the erection of Jerusalem into a patriarchal see at the expense of Antioch.

Nestorius, accompanied by sixteen Bishops, had reached Ephesus before Cyril, but the Papal legates and the Syrian Bishops, with their Patriarch, John of Antioch, were still absent. The day set for the opening of the council, June 7, 431, both of these important delegations were still en route, but a letter from the Patriarch of Antioch to Cyril announced that John, with the Bishops of his suite, expected to reach Ephesus shortly after Pentecost. Sixteen days passed and John was still absent. A delegation from his party, however, consisting of the metropolitans of Apamea and Hierapolis, then arrived, and, according to one account, informed Cyril that the Patriarch of Antioch had instructed them to say that the opening of the council should no longer be deferred. This story, however, is contradicted by the subsequent action of these same two metropolitans, who both signed the manifesto of the sixty-eight Bishops protesting against the opening of the council before the arrival of the Orientals.

Cyril, at all events, was decided on waiting no longer. Many of the Bishops, he said, were ill, some even had died at Ephesus, and all were anxious to leave for their homes. Moreover, the time

appointed by the Emperor had long since passed and he did not wish to be responsible for further disregard of the imperial orders. Accordingly, Cyril and his partisans decided for an immediate opening, which took place in the Cathedral of Ephesus, June 22, 431.

But the imperial protector, Count Candidian, did not agree with the Patriarch of Alexandria in his interpretation of the imperial instructions. On the contrary, he warned Cyril and Juvenal of Jerusalem that by opening the council before the arrival of the Orientals they were contravening the orders of the Emperor; Theodosius had instructed him, his representative, that no sessions should be held until the various provinces were fittingly represented. Candidian, therefore, asked for a further delay of four days. At the same time a delegation from sixty-eight Bishops, twenty-one of whom, including Alexander of Apamea and Alexander or Hierapolis, were metropolitans, presented a written protest against the action of Cyril.

To these protests the Bishops assembled for the first session of the council replied by asking that the instructions of the Emperor should be read, so that they might themselves judge as to their meaning. The Count at first refused to comply with this request, but when further pressed he yielded and read the letter of his master to himself and the council. When he had finished, one of the Bishops rose and proposed that, having heard the "sacred letter," they should at once proceed to carry out the imperial instructions and come to a decision on the question of faith. Candidian could not see the matter from this point of view, but the majority prevailed and the official, with his deputation of Bishops, had no alternative but to depart.

The council now proceeded to business. Nestorius, who was invited to assist at its deliberations, refused to attend. The debate opened with the reading of the principal documents in the case, among them the letter of Pope Celestine commissioning Cyril to depose Nestorius if he refused to retract within ten days, and the letter, including the anathematisms, in which Cyril demanded this retraction. The testimony was then taken of two Bishops, friends of Nestorius, which was particularly damaging to the accused. The first of these witnesses, Acacius of Mitylene, testified that Nestorius a few days previously, in conversation with him, had tried to induce him to deny the incarnation of the divinity in the person of our Saviour. The second witness, Theodytus of Ancyra, swore that Nestorius had recently stated in his presence that he would never admit a God of two or three months old, and that on the same occasion when he had heard this one of the entourage of Nestorius asserted that he did not regard the Jews as guilty of deicide, since they had put to death only a man and not God. Apropos of this,

however, Nestorius subsequently explained that he had been misunderstood, and that all he had said was that God could never have been but two or three months old.

In this the first session of the council Nestorius was condemned, in accordance with the canons and the requirements of "the letters of our Holy Father and colleague, Celestine, Bishop of Rome," as a teacher of blasphemous doctrines; his punishment was deposition and excommunication. The sentence was subscribed by over two hundred Bishops, including some twenty of the sixty-eight who had protested against the opening of the council before the arrival of the Oriental Bishops.

Cyril, Nestorius and Count Candidian now wrote to the Emperor, informing him, each from his own point of view, of what had been done. Candidian also issued a proclamation at Ephesus pronouncing the sentence against Nestorius null and void, owing to the fact that it was the verdict of only one section of the episcopate. Nestorius complained to the Emperor of violence at the hands of partisans of his opponents and advised the convocation of a new council, consisting of the metropolitan and two Bishops from each province and the exclusion from all participation of monks and the lower clergy. Cyril, on the other hand, informed Theodosius that he had waited sixteen days for the Orientals (the time was actually only fifteen days); that John of Antioch had advised him through Alexander of Apamea and Alexander of Hierapolis not to delay the opening any longer; and that in any event the council had merely followed the lead of Pope Celestine, who had already condemned the teaching of Nestorius.

On June 26 John of Antioch, with his contingent of Oriental Bishops, at length reached Ephesus. The council lost no time in endeavoring to open relations with him, but John declined their advances; the messengers of the council were driven from his residence with blows by a friend of Nestorius, Count Irenaeus.

Had John of Antioch at this juncture acted with calm and prudence he could probably have rendered invaluable service to the Church. But just at the moment when he so resented what he, with some reason, regarded as the arbitrary procedure of the Alexandrians he himself went one step further in arbitrariness by holding a council of his own followers, consisting of forty-three Bishops, who assumed the role of a legitimate œcumenical council. John presided over this body of prelates, to whom Count Candidian, after relating his grievances, read the imperial letter of convocation. After this preliminary the council went to work. Cyril and Memnon of Ephesus were without difficulty convicted of Arianism and Apollinarianism and pronounced disturbers of the peace as well as viola-

tors of the imperial commands. They were accordingly deposed and the Bishops of the legitimate council were excommunicated until such time as they would acknowledge their error and join the Antiochians in anathematizing the Patriarch of Alexandria and the Bishop of Ephesus.

Meanwhile the report of Cyril's council had reached Constantinople, where the news of the deposition of Nestorius made a favorable impression. But shortly afterward the report of Count Candidian arrived and brought about a complete change in the attitude of the Emperor. Theodosius at once dispatched a new envoy, Palladius, to Ephesus, for the purpose of making an investigation, and declared null and void all that had thus far been decided upon. Palladius was regarded as an ally by the Antiochians, but he gave a hearing to both parties and returned to the capital. About this time the three Papal legates reached Ephesus and a second session of the council was convened, July 10, for the purpose of hearing read the letters of Pope Celestine. In his message to the fathers the Pope exhorted them to guard against the admission of any erroneous teaching relative to the person of Christ, and added that he had no doubt the assembly would agree with his previously given decision on the particuar question that now occupied their attention, a decision which his representatives would see carried into effect.

That the confidence of the Pope in his colleagues thus expressed was fully justified the cries of applause which greeted his letter left no room for doubt. "This is the true judgment; thanks to the new Paul, Celestine, to the new Paul Cyril, to Celestine, guardian of the faith." The legate Philip thanked the fathers for the happy union, thus manifested, of the members of the Church with their chief, knowing as they did that "Peter is the head of the common faith and of all the Apostles." Philip then asked that, in conformity with the demands of the Pope, the work of the council achieved before their coming be submitted to the legates for approval. This was done in the third session, when the legates signed the Acts as representatives of the Pope and of the Western Bishops.

A conciliar letter was then forwarded to the Emperor Theodosius II. informing him of the approval of its decisions by the Papal envoys and requesting his authorization for the appointment of a Bishop of Constantinople in place of the deposed Nestorius. In the fourth session the council took cognizance of the action of John of Antioch relative to Cyril and Memnon and pronounced the deposition of these Bishops by the Orientals null and void. John was next three times cited to appear before the council, and on his refusal to do so he and his partisans were excommunicated, though not

deposed, until such time as they would come to a better state of mind.

But the orthodox, because of the hostility of Count Candidian and the activity at Constantinople of the friends of Nestorius, experienced great difficulty in communicating the real state of affairs at Ephesus to the Emperor. All the roads leading to the capital were watched and the ships entering its port searched, lest the friends of Cyril should obtain a hearing at court. At length a beggar succeeded in bringing a letter, concealed in a hollow cane, from Cyril to his adherents in Constantinople, informing them of the situation. The monks of the various monasteries at once took action and, headed by an archimandrite, Dalmatius, famed for his austerities, sought and obtained an audience from Theodosius. The outcome was so favorable that the Emperor issued orders to the officials at Ephesus to permit deputies from the council to proceed to the capital. In compliance with these commands three Bishops from the council were now sent to court and shortly afterwards the Antiochians commissioned Count Irenaeus to lay their side of the affair before the Emperor. After hearing both sides, Theodosius issued an edict confirming, on the one hand, the deposition of Nestorius by the council and on the other the depositions of Cyril and Memnon by the Orientals. A new commissioner, Count John, announced at Ephesus this decision and placed under arrest the three deposed Bishops.

The Bishops of the council thereupon addressed to both Emperors a strong letter of protest against this curious pronouncement and demanded that Theodosius should summon to his capital a new deputation of orthodox Bishops if he wished to know the exact state of affairs. The Emperor accepted this suggestion with an amendment; he commanded that eight representatives of each party should present themselves at court and state their respective cases. Among the deputies of the orthodox party were two of the Papal legates, the priest Philip and the Bishop Arcadius, while the Antiochian deputies included John of Antioch and Theodoret of Cyr. The instructions given by the orthodox to their deputies are of interest as showing their attitude towards the imperial power. First of all, the delegates were forbidden to enter into communion with John of Antioch and his partisans. If the Emperor, however, should make any approaches to the delegates on this point they were authorized to accede to his wishes on condition that the Antiochians agree to accept the deposition of Nestorius, to anathematize his errors and condemn his partisans; that they further demand pardon in writing of the council for their action in regard to Cyril and Memnon; and that finally they assist the council's representatives

in their efforts for the deliverance of the Bishops of Alexandria and Ephesus from imprisonment. As to the doctrinal decisions of the council, the delegates were to demand their ratification by the Emperor. These terms were the minimum required, and they were put forward with all respect for the civil authorities, who, say the fathers, are to be respected and obeyed as far as possible.

While on their way to the capital the envoys received orders to remain at Chalcedon, where they were received in audience by the Emperor. At first the hopes of the Antiochians were high, and they felt confident, with the aid of influential courtiers, of triumphing over their opponents. But the approval of the council by the Papal legates and the presence of two of these legates in defense of its action probably were the principal factors in an unexpected volteface of Theodosius, who, to the surprise of the Orientals, suddenly decided in favor of orthodoxy. The Emperor then returned to the capital, bringing with him the council's envoys, to whom he entrusted the responsibility of selecting and consecrating a successor to Nestorius. A priest named Maximianus, who had long sojourned at Rome, where he was *persona grata,* was chosen for the high office; Nestorius was directed to return to his monastery at Antioch. The Bishops at Ephesus were then permitted to depart for their respective dioceses, but Theodosius still insisted on regarding Cyril and Memnon as deposed. Cyril, however, taking matters in his own hands, had previously escaped from Ephesus and returned to Alexandria. This defiance of authority must have been rather embarrassing, but as there was no help for it, the Emperor issued a second rescript permitting Cyril to stay at Alexandria and Memnon at Ephesus. Theodosius, however, as though to disguise his real weakness, inserted in this pronouncement a clause to the effect that during his lifetime he would never condemn the Antiochians. Eventually John of Antioch and his principal followers, after long pourparlers and through various influences, agreed to condemn the errors of Nestorius and acquiesced in his deposition. At the same time, however, Cyril, after explaining his anathematisms to the satisfaction of the Orientals, accepted, as in accordance with his belief, a profession of faith submitted to him by John, and thus for the moment peace was restored between the two Eastern Patriarchs. Some irreconcilable Bishops were exiled and Nestorius himself was directed to take up his residence at Petra, in Idumea.

But the debate between the two schools of theologians representing Alexandria and Antioch was destined to be renewed, some years later, in a new form and with new actors. As in the previous instance, the trouble began at Constantinople. Its author was the aged and universally esteemed archimandrite Eutyches, ruler of

some three hundred monks in the capital and sponsor as well as spiritual director of one of the highest functionaries of the State, the Grand Chamberlain Chrysaphius.

Eutyches was one of the most warm admirers of the now deceased Patriarch, Cyril of Alexandria, and consequently an ardent opponent of the Antiochian theology. In studying the writings of his revered master Eutyches came across an expression to the effect that "the nature (phusis) of the Incarnate Word is One," from which he drew the conclusion that after the Incarnation there is in Christ but one nature. But in Cyril's terminology, according to a recent writer,* the words phusis (nature) and hupostasis (substance) were practically synonymous. Ignorance of this fact on the part of Eutyches, and indeed on the part of many others, appears to have been largely responsible for the monophysite schism; terms were used in wholly different senses by the parties in the controversy.

The grave issue thus raised by the pious archimandrite might have been quickly and satisfactorily disposed of were St. Cyril himself then living. But his death (444) had occurred before the interpretation of his teaching put forward by Eutyches had attracted attention, and his successor, Dioscorus, without hesitation lent all the weight of his high position to the furtherance of the new heresy. Thus was peace again disturbed in the East and the cause of orthodoxy gravely threatened, for the Emperor, having whole-heartedly repudiated Nestorianism, now took the side of Eutyches and Dioscorus under the conviction that by so doing he was combating the error condemned at Ephesus.

The seriousness of the question was soon realized in the Antiochian sphere of influence, and in 447 Theodoret of Cyr published a refutation, without naming its author, of monophysitism. Domnus also, the successor of John as Patriarch of Antioch, wrote to Theodosius protesting against the heretical teaching of Eutyches. The Emperor's reply was a rescript prohibiting the circulation of the writings of Nestorius and all other publications not in conformity with the teaching of St. Cyril and of the Council of Ephesus; he also directed that all members of the clergy who were what he considered partisans of Nestorius—in other words, who were opposed to Eutyches—should be deposed. Irenaeus, the former friend of Nestorius, who meanwhile had been made Bishop of Tyre, was ordered to resign his see and return to the ranks of the laity; a successor named Photius was appointed in his place.

Things had reached this point when Eusebius, Bishop of Dorylaeum, who as a layman twenty years previously had denounced Nestorius, now came forward and presented a memorial to Flavian,

* Lebon, "Le Monoplysisme Severien," Louvain, 1909.

Bishop of Constantinople, and the *sunodos endemousa* against Eutyches. Flavian, however, whose personal views were those of St. Cyril as understood in Antioch, was reluctant to open what he foresaw would be a long and dangerous controversy. But, Eusebius insisting, he had no choice, and Eutyches was cited before the synod. At first the accused declined to appear on the ground that he never left his monastery, and that, anyhow, Eusebius was his personal enemy. Subsequently, however, he thought better of the matter, and November 22, 448, he presented himself before the synod, accompanied by an imposing cortege of monks and court functionaries, as though to intimidate his judges. At the same time a request, equivalent to a command, was received from the Emperor asking that the patrician Florentius be allowed to assist at the examination.

The answers of Eutyches to the questions of the judges were unsatisfactory; he insisted on maintaining that "before the union of the divinity and humanity" in Christ there were two natures, but that after the union there is but one nature. As he refused to admit and retract his error, he was deposed from his office of archimandrite and excommunicated.

With the hope of obtaining Roman support Eutyches and the Emperor now wrote Pope Leo their versions of the issue, but Leo declined to accept an *ex parte* statement and waited to hear from the synod. From Flavian he soon received the documents of the process, which placed him in a position to give judgment. He pronounced in favor of the synod. The correct teaching of the Catholic Church, declared the Pope, is just the opposite of what Eutyches supposes; before the Incarnation, instead of two, there was but one nature, the divine; after the Incarnation the divine and the human natures are united in Christ, but without confusion.

Eutyches, however, would not yield, and, at his instigation, supported by Dioscorus of Alexandria, the Emperor issued a summons for an œcumenical council to be held at Ephesus, for the purpose of settling the question. The Pope as well as Flavian was opposed to the holding of a general council at this time, on the ground that it was altogether unnecessary, but yielding to the wish of the Emperor, he consented and appointed four legates, Bishop Julius of Pozzuoli, the Roman priest Renatus, the deacon Hilary and the notary Dulcitius, to represent him; one of these, Renatus, died en route.

The council assembled at Ephesus in August, 449. Two imperial commissioners were appointed by Theodosius II. and received instructions of the usual tenor, namely, to maintain order and see that business was carried on expeditiously. The Emperor further directed that Flavian and the other Bishops who had composed the

synod of Constantinople might be present at the debates, but should not take any part in them, on the ground that it was the justice of their decision which was in question. Theodoret of Cyr was to be excluded from the council also, unless the fathers should decide otherwise; his offense was that he had written against St. Cyril of Alexandria, now in favor with Theodosius.

The Papal envoys, on their arrival at Ephesus, entered into communciation with the Bishop of Constantinople. They had brought wtih them from the Pope a number of letters, the most important of which was the dogmatic letter to Flavian, the celebrated Tome, defining the Catholic doctrine on the nature of Christ.

The council opened, under the presidency of Dioscorus of Alexandria, August 8, 449. Beside the president sat the legate Julius, Juvenal of Jerusalem, Domnus of Antioch and Flavian of Constantinople. About 130 Bishops, most of them devoted to Dioscorus, participated. After the reading of the first imperial letter the legate Julius asked that the Pope's communication to the council should be read. Dioscorus, while pretending to comply, eluded this request, a policy which he successfully adopted, regarding the Papal letters, through all the sessions of the council. The first question brought up was whether the sentence already pronounced against Eutyches was or not justified by the facts. Eutyches was admitted and presented his profession of faith, after which the Acts of the synod of Constantinople were read. The statement of Eutyches that he believed in two natures before the Incarnation and one afterwards was warmly approved by the majority, who at the same time recommended that his accuser, Eusebius of Dorylæum, be burned alive. The archimandrite was immediately rehabilitated, after which Dioscorus carried war into the opponents' camp by formally accusing Flavian and Eusebius of violating a regulation of the first council of Ephesus which forbade any addition to the symbol of Nice: the formula regarding the two natures was thus interpreted by the Patriarch of Alexandria.

This declaration of the president brought consternation into the assembly. The legate Hilary protested; Flavian appealed against it to the Pope; and a number of Bishops on their knees exhorted Dioscorus to moderation. But Dioscorus knew not what this term meant. Pretending that he had been threatened by the opposition, he called for "the Counts," who, awaiting the word, instantly threw open the council chamber to a host of clamoring soldiers, sailors, monks and Egyptian parabolani. Dioscorus then ordered the doors closed and the votes of the Bishops taken. As it was impossible to draw up the Acts at once in their final form, Dioscorus decided to take the signatures of the Bishops on blank sheets, which after-

wards he could have filled in as he pleased. The legate Hilary effected his escape and returned to Rome. Meanwhile Dioscorus, accompanied by Juvenal of Jerusalem, went from seat to seat and compelled the Bishops, one after another, to sign the blank Acts; even Domnus of Antioch yielded. When Dioscorus reached Flavian his fury got beyond control, and he struck the venerable Bishop on the face. This was the signal for his followers to act. Two deacons seized Flavian and threw him to the floor, after which exploit the monks of Barsaumus took a hand, encouraged by the furious cries of their master. Finally Flavian was dragged from the basilica and escorted by soldiers into exile; three days subsequently he died.

Dioscorus now reported to the Emperor, and fifteen days later held a second session of his followers, which was devoted to dealing with their leading opponents. Theodoret of Cyr, Ibas of Edessa and Irenæus of Tyre, among others, were deposed, and their deposition was acquiesced in by the weak Domnus of Antioch. But when the Alexandrian had thus used the Patriarch of Antioch Domnus was himself arraigned and deposed.

With no small difficulty the legate Hilary made his way from Ephesus to Rome, bringing to the Pope the first news of the travesty of a council that had been held as well as the appeal of Flavian. Later on came Eusebius of Dorylæum and some priests of Theodoret of Cyr with appeals to the Apostolic See. Pope Leo the Great thereupon called a synod at Rome to act on the matter, and subsequently he forwarded to the East a series of letters addressed to the Emperor and his sister Pulcheria, to Flavian, whose death was not yet known to him, as well as to the clergy, the archimandrites and the faithful of Constantinople. In his letter to the Emperor the Pope, first of all, speaks of the hopes he had entertained relative to the council Theodosius had convened at Ephesus and of his disappointment at the outcome. Had the letters sent by him to Flavian and the council been read, all would have been well, but private interests and the disloyalty of a few, together with, in particular, the want of moderation shown by Dioscorus, had led to decisions which would destroy the very foundations of the Christian religion. So blasphemous were these decisions that no pressure was strong enough to induce the Pope's representatives to accept them; which being the case, the Emperor is adjured to disapprove of a council whose Acts are so unworthy of Christian Bishops. Should the Emperor neglect this admonition and allow himself "to be weighted with another's sin," the Pope fears "lest He whose religion is being destroyed be provoked to wrath." Finally the Pope recommends Theodosius to order a council, really œcumeni-

cal, to be held in Italy, that all contentious matters may once for all be settled.

But protests were of no avail with an Emperor as obstinate as he was weak, and the "robber synod" received the imperial sanction. Theodosius also forbade those whom he regarded as Nestorians, that is, those who held the doctrine of the two natures, to be elevated to the episcopate, and proscribed the writings of Theodoret of Cyr as well as those of Nestorius. Valentinian III., with his mother, the Empress Galla Placidia, at the request of Pope Leo, protested to his Eastern colleagues against the doings at Ephesus and urged that the decision of the Apostolic See, "wherein he assuredly first adorned the primacy who was deemed worthy to receive the keys of heaven," be accepted as final. But the intervention of his co-Emperor had no effect, and for the moment the Alexandrians had things their own way. Dioscorus was powerful enough to obtain the See of Constantinople for his own apocrisiarius at the capital, and Anatolius succeeded Flavian.

In compliance with custom, Anatolius applied for recognition to the Apostolic See, his request being supported by Theodosius and Dioscorus. Leo replied that he would gladly recognize Anatolius when satisfied as to his orthodoxy; Anatolius had but to accept the Tome and all would be well. His reply to the Emperor was to the same effect; the Pope requested Theodosius to "see that such a document as is due (i. e., a profession of faith) may reach us as soon as may be from the Bishop of Constantinople, as from an approved and Catholic priest, that is, openly and distinctly affirming that he will separate from his communion any one who believes or maintains any view about the incarnation of the Word of God other than my statement and that of all Catholics lays down." To expedite matters, the Pope sent a delegation of two Bishops and two priests to Constantinople for the purpose of receiving from Anatolius a profession of the tenor required. Meanwhile an unlooked-for event completely changed the whole situation; Theodosius lost his life in a hunting accident, and when the Papal representatives arrived at the Eastern capital they found the orthodox Empress Pulcheria occupying the throne alone.

One of the first acts of Pulcheria was to order the execution of the chamberlain Chrysaphius for grave abuses of power under the late ruler; as we have seen, this personage was mainly responsible in the religious sphere for the rapid spread of the Eutychian heresy. The Empress next associated with herself the Senator Marcian, whom she married, and as Marcian adhered to orthodoxy as strongly as his wife, it became clear that important events would soon modify the ecclesiastical situation.

Among the first to perceive the signs of the times was Anatolius, who, despite his antecedents, now without hesitation subscribed the Tome of Pope Leo and exerted himself to bring about its acceptance by other Eastern Bishops. This was not at all a difficult matter, for now that the imperial wind had changed, the Bishops of the latrocinium eagerly declared that their signatures had been given under constraint and that they were ready to repudiate them. The Bishops exiled during the late reign were recalled and the remains of Flavian, like those of his great predecessor, St. John Chrysostom, some years earlier, were brought back in triumph to receive honorable interment in the Church of the Holy Apostles. Dioscorus, however, declined to submit, and he, with his two chief aides at Ephesus, Juvenal of Jerusalem and Eustachius of Berytus, remained under excommunication.

Matters were thus gradually shaping themselves and peace seemed likely to be restored with little further difficulty in the East. But Marcian seemed to think that the circumstances called for a general council, which, by the weight of its authority, would define once and for all the Catholic doctrine on the nature of our Lord. He therefore proposed that Pope Leo should attend a council of this character in Constantinople or in any other convenient locality. Leo strongly opposed this proposition, on the ground that a council at this moment would be as inopportune as it was unnecessary. Eventually, however, he yielded to the Emperor's wish in the matter and sent representatives to the council, deputing one of this number, Paschasinus, Bishop of Lilybæum, in Sicily, to preside in his place.

The council met at Chalcedon and held its opening session October 8, 451; more than five hundred Bishops assisted. The Pope's letter to the fathers opens with a significant allusion to a contingency always possible in the East, namely, the danger of undue interference on the part of the civil authorities in matters pertaining to the Church alone. The Bishops of the council, exhorts the Pope, should remain devoted to the Catholic faith, and none of them should be "misled by fear or favor of the secular powers into departure from the ways of truth." Leo then speaks of the Emperor's "piously intentioned" council and of Marcian's respect for "the rights and dignity of the Apostle Peter" shown by his invitation of Peter's successor to attend the council in person. This invitation, however, he cannot accept, and therefore he is sending legates who will preside over the council in his place. Wherefore, he continues, "let all attempts at impugning the divinely inspired faith be entirely put down and the vain unbelief of heretics be laid to rest, and let not that be defended which may not be believed." The correct

teaching of the Church the fathers will find set forth "with great fullness and clearness in the letter which we sent to Bishop Flavian of happy memory." An imposing deputation of civil dignitaries represented the Emperor at the council and "presided to the furtherance of due order;" the Papal legates, we learn from the conciliar letter afterwards sent to the Pope, "assumed the hegemony over the council as the head over the members." With the exception of the Papal legates, four in number, and two African Bishops, the council was composed entirely of Eastern Bishops.

The first question to come before the assembly was the status of Dioscorus of Alexandria. This matter was introduced by the presiding legate, Paschasinus, who announced that his instructions from the Pope directed that he and his colleagues must under no circumstances take part in the council unless the Patriarch of Alexandria were excluded from active part in its deliberations. "Let your Magnificence," the legate demanded of the chief imperial official, "command Dioscorus to leave or we shall immediately depart." The officer inquired what in particular were the legate's objections to the presence of Dioscorus, to which the second legate, Lucentius, replied that the Patriarch of Alexandria had convoked a council without the consent of the Apostolic See; meaning, apparently, that although the Pope had agreed to the holding of the recent council of Ephesus, yet Dioscorus had improperly arrogated to himself its direction, to the exclusion of the Papal representatives. The commissioner to this objected that Lucentius could not be at once accuser and judge and that the case of Dioscorus should be disposed of in the regular way. But the Papal envoys, nevertheless, won their point to the extent that Dioscorus was ordered to take his place in the centre of the church to answer for his conduct in the latrocinium.

Eusebius of Dorylæum then arose and made his charge against Dioscorus, after which the accused asked that the Acts of the synod of Constantinople be read. His request was granted. The imperial secretary next announced that the Emperor Marcian had recalled from exile Theodoret of Cyr and that Pope Leo had restored him to his rank as Bishop; in consequence, he added, there was no reason why the vindicated Bishop should not participate in the council. Theodoret was therefore admitted, amidst the furious protests of the Egyptians. Mutual recriminations then for a time became so violent that the imperial officials were obliged to impress on both parties that their conduct was wholly unbecoming so dignified an assembly.

Dioscorus had not much to say in his defense; he merely pleaded that Juvenal and Thalassius had shared with him authority in the

latrocinium and were equally responsible for its decisions. Moreover, he claimed the Acts of this council had received the approval, under their signatures, of the Bishops present as well as that of Theodosius II. The obvious reply of the Bishops who had thus yielded to intimidation was that they had not been free agents, to which the Egyptians replied that Christians worthy of the name do not yield to constraint and taunted their opponents with cowardice. Dioscorus was then asked to explain why the Pope's letters had not been read at Ephesus. He answered that for this Juvenal and Thalassius were in fault; these two Bishops, however, declined to accept so grave responsibility.

As the investigation proceeded Dioscorus, Juvenal and Thalassius were interrogated by the commissioners as to why they had declined to admit at Ephesus the formal accusation of Eusebius of Dorylæum against Eutyches. They replied that not they, but the Emperor's representative, Elpidius, had refused Eusebius a hearing. This excuse was pronounced by the commissioners insufficient, on the ground that where a matter of faith was in question Elpidius should have had nothing to say. At the close of the session, late in the evening, the commissioners announced that the debate on the dogmatic question would be taken up at the next session. Meanwhile, they declared, it seemed to them now certain that Flavian and other Bishops had been unjustly dealt with, and that, consequently, if it pleased the Emperor, Dioscorus and those responsible with him for the outrages of Ephesus should be punished with deposition from the episcopal dignity. Further action on this subject was deferred to a subsequent session.

In the second session the doctrinal issue was practically settled by the acceptance of the Tome of Pope Leo as an excellent exposition of the Catholic teaching on the natures of Christ. The reading of this famous document was greeted with cries of "This is the faith of the fathers, of the Apostles; this we all believe. Anathema to him who believes otherwise. Peter has spoken by the mouth of Leo; that is the teaching of Cyril, this is the true faith." The Bishops of Illyria and Palestine, who had entered the council as partisans of Dioscorus, but who during the first session had gone over to the majority, for the moment dissented from certain passages of the Papal letter. Subsequently, however, after receiving satisfactory explanations from the legates, they also subscribed the Tome.

The third session of the council was devoted to the disposition of the case of the Patriarch of Alexandria. The imperial commissioners were not present. The session was opened by the legate Paschasinus, who, after alluding to his character as legate of the Pope, directed that a second memoir of Eusebius of Dorylæum

against Dioscorus should be read to the council. Dioscorus was not present, having declined several invitations to attend. After listening to further complaints, made by four of his clergy, the Papal legates summed up the accusations against him as follows: Dioscorus had illegally admitted Eutyches to communion; at Ephesus he had hindered the reading of the Pope's letter to Flavian; subsequently, when other Bishops acknowledged the fault of which they had been guilty at Ephesus and obtained pardon of the Apostolic See and of the present council, Dioscorus, so far from repenting, had actually dared to excommunicate the Pope. For these and other offenses Paschasinus pronounced on the offender the following sentence: "The most holy Archbishop of Rome, Leo, declares through us and through the holy council here assembled, and in union with the blessed Apostle Peter, who is the corner-stone of the Catholic Church and the foundation of the orthodox faith, that Dioscorus is deposed from the episcopate and from every other ecclesiastical dignity." This sentence was subscribed by all present; the Egyptian Bishops, like Dioscorus himself, had remained away.

The next business to dispose of concerned the five chief accomplices in the latrocinium of Dioscorus: Juvenal of Jerusalem, Thalassius, Eusebius, Eustathius and Basil. These five personages had also subscribed the Tome of Leo, in consequence of which the fathers urged the commissioners to admit them to the council chamber. The officials replied that they had written the Emperor on the subject and were awaiting his reply. When this came it was to the effect that the council should decide the matter, whereupon it was at once agreed that the repentant Bishops should be pardoned. Subsequently the monastic followers of Eutyches appealed to the Emperor in their own behalf, but Marcian referred them also to the council, saying: "If I myself wished to decide the question I would not have summoned a council . . .; what the holy council determines is for me the rule."

After considerable further debate, in which the Papal delegates stood out with the Orientals for a clear acknowledgment of the two natures, a profession of faith was drawn up in harmony with the Tome. This the Emperor, who was present in state at the sixth session, approved. Addressing the council, he said that from the beginning of his reign the grave issue just disposed of had been his greatest preoccupation. To remove all error he had brought them together, and they, by their decisions, had so dissipated all obscurity relative to the Incarnation that in future no one would dare utter an opinion on this subject different from what had been taught by the Apostles, by the Council of Nice and by Pope Leo in his letter to Flavian. The Emperor's address was greeted

with loud applause and cries of "You are priest and Emperor, conqueror in war and teacher of the faith!"

Such is a brief outline of the more important incidents in the relations of the Church and the Empire during the first half of the fifth century. Their characteristic features differ in little from those of the Eastern empire from the reign of Constantine to that of Theodosius. As in the fourth century, the Emperors, particularly those who espoused the cause of heresy, still practically assumed as a matter of course the direction of the Church, although still careful to recognize in principle that they had no right to interfere in the definition of a dogma of faith. The attitude of Marcian was indeed generally correct, except in the matter of convening the Council of Chalcedon, to which Pope Leo the Great was opposed. But at the council itself the conduct both of the Emperor and his representatives was in strict conformity with the imperial role of Bishop-Exterior.

As in the fourth century also, it is to be noted that the orthodox Bishops were, as a rule, more sturdy in defense of the Church's freedom than their opponents. Yet, at the same time, there is always noticeable, even among the orthodox, in the Orient a tendency to regard the Emperor as the God-given ruler both of the Church and the State: witness the acclamation of Theodosius II. at the Synod of Constantinople and of Marcian at the Council of Chalcedon as "priest and Emperor."

But the feature most worthy of note in this fifty years is the gradually increasing consciousness of authority and responsibility manifested by the Papacy. During the fourth century the Emperors had had things pretty much their own way, with the consequence that the freedom of action of the Church was constantly and seriously hampered and ultimately threatened with complete destruction. Serious resistance to this condition of things began in the fifth century and found its highest expression in the pontificate of Leo the Great. As yet this resistance was chiefly indirect and always respectful. But none the less was it evident and effective. The brigandage of Ephesus showed clearly enough what the consequences to religion would be from an alliance between an enthroned weakling and an ambitious, unscrupulous Bishop. Leo resolved that that sort of thing should cease, and it ceased; how, we have seen in the story of Chalcedon, where the Pope's legates assumed their rightful place and with a calm consciousness of authority directed the deliberations of the assembly. And nobody disputed their claims, but, on the contrary, all recognized the voice of Peter, as chief of the Apostles, speaking through his successor.

The pontificate of Leo the Great was therefore the most important

by all odds thus far in the history of the relations of the Church and the Empire; a precedent was then established never to be forgotten at Rome. The substance of this precedent may be summed up briefly thus: The internal government of the Church, and particularly the determination of what constitutes the Christian creed, belongs to the Bishops of the Church, united with their head, the Pope.

The terrible crisis through which the Western Church was, just at this time, passing in the long run proved a blessing in disguise. For while the barbarian invasions destroyed the Western empire, they at the same time placed the Popes in a stronger position than they had previously occupied for the defense of that fundamental principle of the Christian religion enunciated by our Lord in the words: Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and to God the things that are of God.

MAURICE M. HASSETT.

Harrisburg, Pa.

ENGLAND UNDER GEORGE II.

THE approaching coronation of King George V. reminds us that the House of Hanover has held the throne of Great Britain nearly two hundred years. His Majesty is the eighth sovereign of the dynasty; and of the five Georges, the last will, probably, not be the least; though time will tell. He has, back of him, the honorable and correct traditions of his grandmother's court, and he will likely show the world how, in many respects, we are in advance of the age of George II., whose reign I have selected for my theme as typical of the House of Hanover in the eighteenth century. Though neither the longest, nor the most important reign of the dynasty, it was the last that came to an end, with the British flag flying over the American colonies, and it thus becomes of greater interest to us. Further: occupying the middle of the century, at a period of transition, it is best calculated to illustrate the age which toward its close was to produce such far-reaching results, as the American and French revolutions, and it gives us the better portion of the early history of the House of Hanover.

George V. is a descendant of George II. through his son, Frederick, Prince of Wales, who did not live to succeed his father. The present English King represents thus the seventh generation of the

dynasty, deriving his descent in the female line through Victoria, granddaughter of George III., son of the Frederick who never reigned and whose father was George II.

The eighteenth century was eminently a period of transition. Absolutism, begun in the fifteenth, had reached its highest level on the Continent. The great Monarch of France had bequeathed to his successor a powerful kingdom, over which he had long wielded an iron sceptre. Prussia, in the person of Frederick II., was rising to prominence and Russia was taking its place in the family of nations. Austria, no longer linked to Spain by the dynastic ties which for two centuries had held these countries united, was the theatre of much of the struggles which agitated the century, and Spain, whose decline had long set in, was now held in the grasp of Bourbon despotism. But there were undercurrents at work which were to culminate first in the French Revolution and later in Napoleonism, until they finally emerged into the open sea of nineteenth century constitutional government. France was honeycombed with deism, which spread throughout Europe—England as well as the Continent—reaching even the far-off shores of the New World. There was one exception to the absolutist tendencies which prevailed among the ruling classes in the eighteenth century. In England the despotic power of the crown had been broken with the downfall of the Stuarts and the British Constitution had triumphed. The prerogatives of the sovereign remained intact, but the limits set to his power, widened since the time of the Tudors, had been drawn closer, while the authority of the Commons had increased in proportion.

The century was still young when an important dynastic change occurred. England was at heart intensely Protestant. It had cost Henry VIII. a strong effort to wrench the country, especially the lower classes, from their old allegiance to Rome. Under Elizabeth, and even at a much later period, religious persecution raged against the Catholics; but their cries were stifled and the triumph of Protestantism was now complete. The ancient faith of "Merrye England" was not quite dead, but it dared not show itself. In James II. England had tolerated a Catholic Prince, whose imprudence and want of tact had lost him the crown; but it was determined to tolerate no other. The Stuarts were not excluded from the succession, as such, but the Catholic Stuarts were. In fact, William of Orange ascended the English throne only because he was connected with the royal Scottish house, and even to-day the blood of the Stuarts still flows in the veins of England's ruler. To bar all Catholic claimants from the throne forever the Act of Succession was passed in 1701, while William III. still lived, and the English

crown was hereby settled on the Protestant members of the House of Stuart. Queen Anne died without issue in 1714, and the British crown at once passed to George Louis of Hanover, son of Sophia, granddaughter of James I., who had married Ernest Augustus, Duke of Brunswick-Luneburg and Elector of the Empire. Ernest Augustus was descended from Ernest, Duke of Luneburg, surnamed the Confessor, the friend of Luther, the same who first Protestantized the Duchy. George Louis, Elector and Duke of Hanover, became thus George I. of England.

When the House of Hanover entered Great Britain, England was no longer what it had been under the Stuarts. The great struggle between the King and Parliament had come to an end with the Revolution and absolutism was conquered forever. Parliament had again obtained its ancient power, with the House of Commons in the ascendancy. Since the time of William III. the King had governed by the aid of Ministers who possessed the confidence of a majority in both houses; but the existence of a Prime Minister may be dated from the reign of George I., though the title only gradually came into use.

When, in 1727, the sceptre passed from the hands of George I. to those of his son, the second George, Great Britain consisted, as it does to-day, of the kingdoms of England and Scotland and the principality of Wales. Ireland was a downtrodden dependency, worn out by civil and religious persecution, its trade restricted, its manufactures languishing and its poor living on starvation wages, if they received any wages at all. Far off, in distant lands beyond the seas, the British flag still waved, but George II. was the last King to die as sovereign of the American colonies. The King of Great Britain possessed also the Bahama Islands and in the West Indies those of Barbadoes, Nevis, Antigua, Monserrat and St. Kitts. Adjacent to the mother country England owned the islands of Jersey and Guernsey, while the Rock of Gibraltar, on the straits that divide the Atlantic from the Mediterranean, and Minorca, one of the Balearic Isles in that inland sea, were also dependencies of the British crown. British empire in India had not yet begun, but the East India Company had for a long time been trading with those distant regions and paving the way for British sovereignty. Australian colonization was still a thing of the future.

The population of England at that period can only be guessed at. Even when the eighteenth century had passed its maturity it remained still a matter of conjecture. One of the bases of this conjecture was the proportional tax of the counties. According to Houghton's calculation, England and Wales in 1693, that is, thirty-four years before the accession of George II., contained 1,175,951

houses. Allowing an average of six persons to each house, the population would have been 7,055,706. Of these 1,000,000 were men capable of bearing arms, while the clergy were less than 15,000. London, which, together with Westminster and Southwark, was upwards of seven miles long, contained, toward the middle of the eighteenth century, a population something less than a million, though it had increased wonderfully since the great fire. Scotland at the same period was supposed to possess a million and a half of inhabitants, while those of Ireland are put down at between two and two and a half millions. Macaulay believes that toward the close of the seventeenth century England could not lay claim to more than 5,500,000 inhabitants.

George Augustus, the only son of George I., was born in 1683, several years before his father ascended the English throne. He was then thirty-one years of age. A man of singular regularity and method, he seemed incapable of rising above the routine of everyday work, and, in affairs of state, he allowed himself to be guided by Walpole, his powerful Minister. The King had quite a reputation for economy, and he took great delight in counting his money. It is related that, on one occasion, when he had done this over and over again, a lady of the court, to whom he was much inclined, said to him: "Sir, if you continue counting your money, I will leave the room." This must have had the desired effect, for in the King's heart women found a soft spot. He had been brought up at a German court, and German courts in the eighteenth century were greatly influenced by that of Versailles, which was by no means a school of morality. His father had set the example, and his son, Frederick, Prince of Wales, who did not live to succeed him, kept up the tradition. Frederick's chief passion, says Horace Walpole, were women and gambling, while the King was avaricious, though his ruling passions were Germany, the army and women also.

The age was one of satire; nor did the court escape its darts. The numberless lampoons, ballads and pamphlets of all descriptions that were scattered broadcast spared neither the King nor his courtiers. An impression had gone abroad that George was ruled by his wife, as the latter was governed by her favorite, Mrs. Clayton, the Viscountess Sundon, a woman of immense influence, while Queen Caroline lived. The following verses are an instance of the freedom with which writers of that class treated their sovereign:

> You may strut, dapper George, but 'twill all be in vain;
> We know 'tis Queen Caroline, not you, that reign—
> You govern no more than Don Philip of Spain.
> Then if you would have us fall down and adore you,
> Lock up your fat spouse, as your dad did before you.

In spite, however, of the King's weakness, and in spite of the

internal corruption of government which prevailed until Pitt came into office, England was making rapid strides toward the position she held at the death of George II., that of the first maritime and colonial power of the world. The reign of George II. was an era of consolidation and growth. William of Orange had found England an isolated, insular nation, of little account in international affairs. He at once brought her forward to the arena of European politics, and under Anne and the Georges she continued to make steady progress until the blow was struck which deprived her of the American colonies, a loss for which she was compensated by the vast extent of territory taken from France and by the colonization of India and Australia, that was soon to begin.

By the middle of the century England had outrun France and Spain, and she was second only to Holland in her commerce and trade. English corn fed several countries of Europe, English horses were everywhere and English cloth supplied the Indies, East and West. At that period the annual exportation from England to America of clothing, hats, shoes and domestic utensils was computed at £200,000; her yearly output of coal was of 5,000,000 chaldrons, while other minerals were exported to the value of £500,000. Compare this with £34,930,183 for metals alone in 1887.

Among the English trading companies, which spread like a network over the world, the most important were the Merchant-Adventurers', the Turkey, the East India, the Muscovy, the Eastland, the Greenland, the Spanish, the African, the Hudson Bay and the South Sea Companies. The name of this last one recalls the financial panic of the reign of George I., known as the bursting of the South Sea bubble, an event that brought Walpole into power. A monopoly of trade on the coast of Peru had been granted to the holders of South Sea stock, but the collapse of the stock involved the ruin of thousands. To Robert Walpole belongs the honor of having been the first Prime Minister of England. With the accession of George I. the Whigs came into power and Walpole soon found himself on the crest of the wave. This man, whose son Horace has left us his "Memoirs of the Reign of George II.," was much attached to the Prince of Wales, son of George I., and when the Prince succeeded to the throne he continued to retain his influence. His strong practical sense, good nature and absence of sensibility were great aids to him in reaching the power he wielded till near the end of his life. Tall and well-proportioned, his features regular and his eyes full of intelligence, Walpole was in his manners coarse and loose in his morals, yet he ruled England, while two foreign-bred kings, one of whom could not even speak the language of his adopted country, wore the crown. Pope wrote of him:

> Seen him I have, but in his happiest hour,
> Of social pleasures, ill exchanged for power;
> Seen him, encumbered of the venal tribe,
> Smile without art, and win without a bribe.

In spite of his coarseness and his boisterous gayety, Walpole managed to conciliate the Princess, afterwards Queen Caroline. This lady, Wilhelmina Carolina von Anspach, was married to Prince George in 1705, several years before his father became King. When she first visited England Walpole was thirty-eight years of age and rather handsome. The Princess, however, was of a nature much too refined to be favorably impressed with one whose want of good manners, as we learn on the authority of Mrs. Thompson in her "Memoirs of the Court of George II.," must have made him peculiarly obnoxious. Yet sound policy caused her to tolerate the society of the powerful Minister, and it was probably due to her influence that, at the accession of her husband, he was continued in power.

The first years of George II. were spent in comparative peace, but in 1739 began a disastrous war with Spain. The King was then a widower, his consort having died two years previously. In Queen Caroline George II. lost a wife extremely devoted to him, perhaps not so much from natural affection as from a strong sense of duty. Their characters were greatly at variance, the King being little versed in learning, while her education was complete, and she had acquired a wide range of knowledge. His gross nature could ill sympathize with her refinement, though he admired and extolled her charms, while opposing her generosity and forcing her to bear the odium of his avarice. A woman of ready discernment of character and of a natural beauty, of which even the ravages of the small-pox did not completely deprive her, the Queen ruled her royal husband with a gentle, but firm hand, while showing him the most deferential respect and entire submission.

Walpole did not enjoy his power long after the Queen's death, for the Spanish war occasioned his downfall. This war was not of his own choosing. He recognized its injustice, but weakly yielded to a popular clamor for it and paid the penalty in consequence.

The military arm of Great Britain had obtained its prestige on the Continent in the reign of Queen Anne, principally through the victories of the Duke of Marlborough. Toward the middle of the eighteenth century the standing army of England amounted to about 100,000 troops, scattered over Great Britain and Ireland, Flanders, the East Indies, Gibraltar, Minorca and the American colonies. The militia, which were to be employed only in service at home, were computed at 200,000.

England's power then, as now, lay in her fleet. Since Henry

VIII. had launched the Henry Grace de Dieu, a ship of 1,000 tons burden, the largest vessel England had ever seen, more than two hundred years had passed. In the reign of James I. ships of 1,200 and 1,400 tons ploughed the main. George II. might boast of men-of-war of nearly 2,000 tons, the largest of which was the Royal William. In 1747 the British navy consisted of six first-rate ships of 100 guns each, eleven of 90 guns, thirty-nine with guns ranging from 70 to 80, seventy-six with from 50 to 66 guns, thirty-nine of 44, fifty-three of 24 and one of 10 guns, besides a large number of smaller vessels, such as fire and bomb ships, hospital and store ships, sloops of war, transports and lighters.

Among the distinguished British officers of the period I notice Admiral Sir Edward Hawke, who defeated the French fleet off Ushant in 1747, and Captain George Brydges Rodney. The latter commanded in the same battle the Eagle, a sixty-gun ship of 1,130 tons. He became a rear admiral in 1759. The name of Admiral Rodney will, I suppose, never be forgotten in the little West Indian island of St. Eustatius, which he captured in 1780, the island dating its decadence from that event. I well remember how, in my childhood, when I lived in St. Eustatius, Rodney was to me like one of those terrible heroes in fairy tales that so strongly impress the imagination of children. Many were the stories told of the days of the terrible admiral. The great Nelson was not yet born at the period of which I am writing. He came into the world the year after George II. died.

The latter portion of this reign was much disturbed by trouble at home and abroad, but these things are matters of general history. Pelham succeeded Walpole, and under his Ministry the corruption of English politics reached its lowest depths. In 1743 a war was undertaken with France to protect the Hanoverian domains of the King, and while hostilities were in progress on the Continent a new danger arose at home. Charles Edward, the son of the Pretender, landed in Scotland in 1745, defeated the English army at Prestonpans, and before the end of the year he had advanced as far as Derby. The English failed to support him, he was forced to retreat and the following year his enterprise ended in the battle of Culloden, which ruined his prospects. The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, two years later, put an end to the war on the Continent.

When Henry Pelham died in 1754 he was succeeded by his brother, the Duke of Newcastle, under whom the corruption of government continued. The administration of the latter was short, for the war which broke out with France drove him from power. The fall of Minorca awoke Englishmen to a sense of the danger; they clamored for a stronger hand to hold the reins of government,

and the Ministry of Newcastle fell. A regeneration began with the accession of the new Ministry, under the celebrated William Pitt, a man to whom England owes so much and whom Americans will always gratefully remember. Unfortunately, the great Whig families sided with Newcastle, so that a compromise was effected, and the old system of bribery continued.

The Seven Years' War lasted until 1763, and blood flowed freely in Europe as well as in America. Austria, France, Russia and the German princes on the one hand and Prussia with England on the other were parties to the struggle. In our history this conflict is known as the French and Indian War. France lost Canada; but the American colonies spent $16,000,000, and the lives of thirty thousand men was the price paid for the extension of territory. This war brought into prominence a man who was destined to play an important part in the future history of his country, the immortal George Washington. He had suffered a defeat at the hands of the French on July 3, 1754; but a short time previously, with a force of fifty men, he had defeated them and slain their commanding officer. In the despatch in which this victory was announced Major Washington wrote: "I heard the bullets whistle, and, believe me, there is something charming in the sound." When this letter was brought to the attention of King George he remarked that Washington would not have written thus if he had been used to hear many bullets. Walpole, who wrote long before Washington had drawn the sword in defense of American liberty, adds the remark: "This brave braggart learned to blush for his rodomontade, and desiring to serve General Braddock as aide-de-camp, acquitted himself nobly."

It was during this war that Havana was captured by the British under General Lord Albemarle and Admiral Pocock. A number of Americans, among whom were General Lyman and Colonel Israel Putnam, took part in the siege, which lasted nearly two months and cost the English many lives. One of the most heroic incidents of this struggle is the gallant conduct of Velasco, the Spanish commander of the Morro, who fell mortally wounded while striving in vain to bar the passage of the enemy into the old fortress. Friends and enemies united in paying tribute to his bravery.

The Treaty of Paris ended the Seven Years' War and restored Havana to the Spanish.

The age of George II. was not characterized by wars alone; it was also an age of letters as well as of statesmanship. If the historian records the names of such statesmen as Walpole and Pitt, he also tells us that England might boast at that period of writers and literary men like Horace Walpole, Lord Chesterfield, Berkeley,

Hume, Pope and of such orators as Pitt, Campbell and many more.

The empirical philosophy, against which a reaction was to set in, in the idealistic school of Kant, was then at its height. Condillac was teaching in France and the pseudo-philosophy of Rousseau and Diderot was beginning to spread rationalism throughout the world. Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, died in 1753, while Hume, in the position of librarian at Edinburgh, was preparing his "History of England" and continuing his philosophical studies. These two are the great representatives of the English empirical school. The former had been in relations with the French philosopher Malebranche, a man of very different views; but their relations appear to have been cordial, for Berkeley is known to have visited him when on the Continent.

Another French ecclesiastic with whom an English churchman entered into friendly relations was Père Courayer, with whom Wake, Archbishop of Canterbury, kept up correspondence regarding his desire to unite the Church of England with that of France. This, of course, would have meant submission to Rome, without which any ecclesiastical union with France would necessarily have remained a mere chimera. Père Courayer seems to have held Dr. Wake in great esteem.

The closing years of Swift's life embrace the first portion of the reign of George II., but his great literary activity belongs to those of Anne and George I. The age was one of general laxity and the clergy itself felt this influence, although the increase in the value of their benefices and the accession to their ranks of sons of the nobility had raised them in the reign of George II. above the social level they occupied in the preceding century. Swift, dean of St. Patrick's, Dublin, was no longer the humble Vicar of Laracor, where his average congregation amounted to ten people. In 1716 he secretly married Esther Johnson, the Stella of his earlier writings, and his relations with Miss Vanhomrig came to an end. When George II. ascended the throne "Gulliver's Travels" had just been published, and the author had reached the height of his literary fame. He lived during eighteen years of the reign of the second George and died in 1745. Five years after Swift's death another English churchman, Conyers Middleton, departed this life. He may be regarded as the founder of theological rationalism in the English Church.

Among the literary men of this epoch, which followed that of Addison and Steele, who were no more, the names of the two Boyles, Earls of Orrery, and of Lord Chesterfield must not be overlooked. Charles Boyle, third Earl of Orrery, has left us his translation of

Plutarch's life of Lysander, and from his son, John, who cultivated the muses in his retirement, we have the "Letters from Italy."

Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield, was one of the orators of this reign as well as a prominent figure in the politics of his day. Pitt admired his oratorical talents and preferred him to any other, though he was far surpassed by Lord Chatham himself. Chesterfield will probably be longest remembered by the famous "Letters," written for the benefit of his illegitimate son, Philip Stanhope, who preceded him to the grave by several years.

Perhaps the most illustrious literary man of this epoch is Samuel Johnson, whose activity belongs principally to the reign of George II. His dictionary appeared in 1755, a work which established his fame and gave him immortality.

Poetry was quite fashionable at this period. Men and women wrote to each other in verse, and the muse was invoked to lash the real or imaginary vices of the age. Richard Savage, the poet, is more known on account of his extraordinary life and his connection with Dr. Johnson and with Pope than for his literary merits. He was united with the latter in the publication of the "Dunciad," and Samuel Johnson wrote his life.

The most famous poet of the period was Alexander Pope. He had made a name for himself when George II. came to the throne and some of his greatest works had been given to the world. Although the Catholic religion, to which he belonged, had excluded him from the public schools of his native country, it did not bar his ascent to Parnassus at a time when England was intensely Protestant and the penal laws were still in force. It was chiefly in the reign of George II. that he acquired his fame as a moralist and satirist. The "Dunciad" appeared in the beginning of this reign. Lord Hervey, one of the historians of the reign, was also a victim of Pope's pungent verse.

What Pope was doing by means of his pen Hogarth was effecting with his pencil. The life of this great pictorial satirist, the greatest among Englishmen, whose equal, perhaps, never existed, extends over the greater part of the eighteenth century. He was about thirty at the accession of George II., and he survived the King three years, leaving to posterity his remarkable works, that present a picture in which the manners and customs of his age and country have remained crystallized for all times.

London was then, as it is now, the centre of England's commercial interests; it was also the heart of its literary activity. There lived Johnson and Pope and Hogarth. There flourished the court, around which a host of satellites, like so many fireflies on a summer night, were constantly fluttering. In this age of progress and com-

fort it is hard to form an idea of the London that was. The great landmarks of England's history, the Tower, Westminster Abbey and the old buildings of Parliament, stood then, as they had been standing for a long time. The Royal Exchange of the reign of George II. has disappeared. It was consumed by the flames in 1838. The business of the Bank of England was carried on at Grocers' Hall until 1733. A portion of the present building was then erected. Of the twelve bridges which now span the Thames, only London Bridge existed, Blackfriars not having been begun until several years after the death of King George. The Mansion House, the present residence of the Lord Mayor, was erected in 1740, before the old Guildhall had been rebuilt.

The principal palace of the King was St. James', which had taken the place of old Whitehall, since the latter had been destroyed by fire. George II. added to the old Kensington Palace that had been purchased by William III. It was here that in later years Queen Victoria was born. Old Hampton Court, the favorite residence of Henry VIII., presented to him by Cardinal Wolsey, was still used in the days of George II., while Marlborough House had been purchased by the Crown in the preceding reign. Buckingham Palace did not become a royal residence until the year after the death of George II. In these abodes the sovereigns of Great Britain held their court, surrounded by an immense retinue of servants, from the Lord Steward down to the Master of the Revels. The number of these had, however, been greatly diminished since the reign of James I.

There were several newspapers in the reign of George II., by which the public was kept informed regarding matters of interest, both at home and abroad, although the increasing influence of the press could not fail to meet with opposition on the part of the Government. The "Times," England's greatest paper, was not yet born, but the "Public Advertiser" had been founded in 1726 as the "London Daily Post and General Advertiser." Its principal contemporary, though much younger than itself, was the "Morning Chronicle," a paper which continued in existence until late in our own century. There was no evening paper in those days, nor for many years after.

The reign of George II. came to an end with his death in 1760. Not the least merit of the years he had spent on the throne was the support he gave to his countryman Handel, who produced in England those masterpieces which the world has so greatly admired. No man, perhaps, exercised greater influence on the musical development of England. The rivalry between him and Buononcini, which for a time divided the aristocracy of London, has been immortalized

in the verses generally attributed to Swift, but which seem to have been written by John Byrom:

> Some say, compared to Buononcini,
> That Mynheer Handel's but a ninny:
> Others aver that he to Handel
> Is scarcely fit to hold a candle.
> Strange all this difference should be
> 'Twixt Tweedle-dum and Tweedle-dee.

The King and Handel both repose beneath the lofty arches of Westminster Abbey. George, the second English King of Hanover's blood, sleeps in the vault of Henry the Seventh's Chapel beside Queen Caroline. The Hanoverian Handel, who died one year before his sovereign, has found a resting place in the south transept, known as the Poet's Corner. The monument over his ashes is the last work Roubiliac lived to finish. Here rests in death the composer with his contemporaries, Sir Robert Taylor, the architect; Sir John Pringle, president of the Royal Society and physician to their Majesties; Dr. Stephen Hales, the botanist, and James Thomson, the poet.

In the Abbey lie buried also Lady Walpole, the first wife of Sir Robert; Admiral Vernon and the great Earl of Chatham, William Pitt. Death has placed its seal upon them, and the age of George II. slumbers in the dust, while the towers of the venerable Abbey still cast their shadows on the stage where once it acted.

CHARLES WARREN CURRIER.

Washington, D. C.

CRITICISMS IN KANT.

KANT AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

IN THESE earlier articles on "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason" we are dealing merely with the great fundamental errors of the work—and even with these in only a general way. The exposition of these errors, however, is intended to be so adequate that, even were we to proceed no further and leave the subordinate errors untouched, the earnest student of philosophy, who really understands Kant, will have a sufficient basis on which to proceed, and will thus be able to detect the fallacies for himself and discount the random reasoning which has imposed upon so many. For example, in the present article we shall consider Kant's treatment of the proofs for the existence of God; that is, we shall deal with the fundamental and leading errors underlying his rejection of these proofs, leaving for a future time the refutation of the particular

arguments by which he seeks to discredit these proofs. The reason of this arrangement is that the fundamental fallacies may be exposed as soon as possible, the subordinate errors being so manifold, that to delay upon them, would postpone for too long a time the exposure of the nature of the fallacies that lie at the foundation of his false theory of human knowledge. Kant has once more become the fashion, and the sooner his multiplied shortcomings are understood the better. Moreover, the broad foundation of folly being once shaken, we may then proceed more leisurely to a consideration of the details, which will then be an easy task. It is the intention, however, to proceed to the criticism of most of even the minor errors, so that at least all the principal errors will come under review and the gigantic sophistication of the vaunted system of knowledge be seen in its true colors.

Kant's treatment of the proofs for the existence of a Supreme Being—the highest and gravest of all the problems that can be proposed to man for his consideration—is in the highest degree disingenuous. Instead of meeting these proofs directly, he adopts the tactics of a barrister who holds a brief to discredit them and resorts to all the devices known to pettifogging methods. It is true he states—after a fashion—the proofs on the opposite side; but he does so only to belittle, to misrepresent, to vilify and malign them. Substitution, adroit shuffling of names and terms, suppression of the vital necessities of the case, misrepresentation—these are some of the devices by which Kant seeks to discredit the proofs for the existence of God before he utters a word in disproof of them. Instead of a zeal to discover where the truth lies, there is, throughout, the sophistry which, by fair means or by foul, endeavors to make the worse appear the better reason. This is hardly the proper temperament of a philosopher, whose main object should be the discovery of truth wherever it lies and at any cost.

It would be difficult to find anything at once so ingenious, so disingenuous and so positively vicious as is his introduction of the grave problem itself. The caricature which he paints in his Transcendental Ideal is a foul travesty of the great question. Instead of meeting directly the argument from a first cause of the universe or the argument from design—or any of the other proofs for the existence of God—and judiciously weighing their merits and demerits, Kant's very first step is a fraudulent misrepresentation of the origin of the notion of the Supreme Being. The importance of this feature seems to have escaped the critics altogether; yet it is the very basis of all Kant's sophistry in dealing with this supreme problem. According to Kant, the notion of a Supreme Being is not an idea necessarily forced upon the intellect by the laws of

reason at all. It is not the outcome of a logical necessity. It is not the first cause—absolutely necessary. According to Kant, the *ens realissimum* is a mere beau-ideal of reality—a utopian fancy—a dream of transcendental romance. It is the lofty standard which man sets up for himself for comparison, but which has no more existence than the hero of a novel. The mind has been seeking for merely the notion of the highest reality, and, having imagined it, has merely clothed it with the character and existence of a hero of rational romance—the highest standard of greatness and type of reality which it can represent to itself. The idea which Kant thus fashions for himself into an ideal is not the offspring of reason, but of the imagination, and, while it is the concept of the most exalted standard of all reality, can, of course, lay no claim whatever to reality of any kind.

"These ideals," he tells us, "though they cannot claim objective reality (existence), are not therefore to be considered as mere chimeras, but supply reason with an indispensable standard, because it requires the concept of that which is perfect of its kind, in order to estimate and measure it by the degree and the number of defects in the imperfect. To attempt to realize the ideal in example, that is, as a real phenomenon, as we might represent a perfectly wise man in a novel, is impossible, nay, absurd, and but little encouraging, because the natural limits, which are constantly interfering with the perfection in the idea, make all illusion in the experiment impossible and render the good itself in the idea suspicious and unreal.

"This is the case with the ideal of pure reason, which must always rest on definite concepts and serve as a rule and model, whether for imitation or for criticism."

This ideal of pure reason is the Supreme Being, the *ens realissimum,* the highest reality, and, according to Kant, seems to be born wholly of transcendental romance—not of reason. Consequently it is not to a logical necessity, or to necessary being, or to the Great First Cause, Kant primarily introduces us, but to a highly fantastic, arbitrary idea, which is made to appear rather as a Quixotic creation of the fancy than as the answer to the imperative demands of reason. This seems incredible, but Kant tells us:

"By this complete possession of all reality we represent the concept of *a thing by itself* as completely determined, and the concept of an *ens realissimum* is the concept of an individual being, because of all possible predicates, one, namely, that which absolutely belongs to being, is found in its determination. It is therefore a transcendental *ideal,* which forms the foundation of the complete determination which is necessary for all that exists, and which constitutes at the same time the highest and complete condition of its possibility,

to which all thoughts of objects, with regard to their content, must be traced back. It is at the same time the only true ideal of which human reason is capable, because it is in this alone that a concept of a thing, which in itself is general, is completely determined by itself and recognized as the representation of an individual."

Here, then, according to Kant, is the cradle of the notion of the Supreme Being. That notion is not the result of a stern logical necessity from which the mind cannot escape if it inquires at all into the origin of things, nor is it the outcome of an inexorable causality, nor is it derived even from the contemplation of the order and intelligence manifested in the universe. It is neither one nor the other, nor all of these things. Its origin has nothing whatever to do with necessity. It is the ideal of the mind, discovered by the imagination, which, having started out on an expedition of inquiry, has brought home this transcendental ideal as the result of its quest. Unfortunately, however, it is only an ideal, the mere offspring of an idea—and is wholly destitute of objective reality; that is, of existence. Kant tells us:

"It is self-evident that for that purpose, namely, in order simply to represent the necessary and complete determination of things, reason does not presuppose the existence of a Being that should correspond to the ideal, but its idea only."

And again:

"Hence the object of its ideal which exists in reason only is called the *original Being* (*ens originarium*), and so far as it has nothing above it, the *highest Being* (*ens summum*), and so far as everything as conditioned is subject to it, the Being of all beings (*ens entium*). All this, however, does not mean the objective relation of any real thing to other things, but of the *idea to concepts*, and leaves us in perfect ignorance as to the existence of a being of such superlative excellence."

Now, it is this artificial and arbitrary notion—this mere transcendental ideal—without existence or reality of any kind—that Kant sets up throughout as the idea of God and on which he wages his strange warfare. He tells us:

"If we follow up this idea (the ideal) and hypostasize it, we shall be able to determine the original being by means of the concept of the highest reality as one, simple, all-sufficient, eternal, etc., in one word, determine it in all its unconditioned completeness through all predicaments. The concept of such a being is the concept of God in its transcendental sense, and thus, as I indicated above, the ideal of pure reason is the object of a transcendental theology.

"By such an employment of the transcendental idea, however, we should be overstepping the limits of its purpose and admissibility.

Reason used it only as being the concept of all reality, for a foundation of the complete determination of things, without requiring that all this reality should be given objectively and constitute itself a thing. This is a mere fiction by which we comprehend and realize the manifold of our idea in one ideal, as a particular being. We have no right to do this, not even to assume the possibility of such an hypothesis; nor do all the consequences which flow from such an ideal concern the complete determination of things in general, for the sake of which alone the idea was necessary, or influence it in the least."

This, then, is Kant's account of the origin of the reasons for belief in the existence of God. It is not the Great First Cause of all things, nor the Author and Supreme Ruler of the universe, nor the necessary and necessarily existing Being to which we are introduced. Not at all. It is this mere figment of the idealizing imagination that is made the foundation of all proofs and arguments for the existence of the Supreme Being. The best that can be said of it is that it may be called a joint creation of the imagination and of reason, although reason has really little share in its manufacture. It is this ideal which Kant tears to tatters. It is this "mere fiction" which he is everywhere sophistically thrusting into the place of the necessary being—into the place of the first cause—into the place of the all-wise Author and Supreme Ruler of the universe. It is to it he returns again and again. It is against it all the artillery of his sophistry is directed. Thrice he slays the slain that never had real existence at all, so that when Kant has finished it is not the existence of God that has suffered, but the existence of his own ideal.

Now, Kant was astute enough to realize all this. He was well aware that such bald sophistry could not pass muster for a moment with even the most ordinary understanding. It is indeed true that Descartes had founded a proof for the existence of God on the idea of the most perfect being; that Leibnitz followed Descartes; and that, centuries before either Leibnitz or Descartes, St. Anselm had given us an ontological proof—as it has been called—that followed to some extent along those lines; but each of those insisted upon a very different certificate of birth for the idea of the Supreme Being from that of the imagination to which Kant assigns his "ideal" being. No one understood this better than Kant, and no one comprehended more fully than he that he must acknowledge the real necessities in the case. Consequently he finds himself constrained to admit the compelling forcefulness of the real arguments for the existence of God. Meanwhile, however, he had, with much admirable forethought and much consummate ingenuity, worthy of

a better cause, established this strategic point to which he could retreat on occasion and where he could stoutly maintain that the notion of the Supreme Being was a mere idea—"a pure ideal"—but wholly without objective reality. This was to be a *point d'appui* for him throughout his whole contention. By it he had already forestalled all the real proofs and had established a fairly plausible claim to the conclusion that the objective reality of this ideal being could hardly be admitted. It is this empty figment of the imagination which he keeps before himself and before his readers throughout; and when he does finally come to the real proofs, he makes a bold attempt to reduce them all to this ideal, which—for the purpose—he again transforms into an idea. He reduces all the proofs for the existence of God to three; the ontological, the cosmological and the physico-theological—as he calls it. He states each with sufficient candor and honesty; but he tells us that the cosmological proof and the teleological proof are merely the ontological proof in disguise, while he reduces the necessary being of the ontological proof to the terms of "the transcendental ideal;" so that—if we accept his argument—when he has shown this ideal to be without objective reality, he has practically canceled all the proofs from reason for the existence of God. Nero is said to have wished that all Roman citizens had but one neck, that he might cut them all off at a single stroke; and Kant seems to have had a similar design in his treatment of the proofs for the existence of God. His entire argument throughout is a return to this "ideal of pure reason," which he surreptitiously substitutes for the real argument in each of those proofs. Now, this *reductio ad unum* is without doubt a clever piece of strategy. It is splendid generalship; but it is poor philosophy. Kant thus becomes, like Carnot, simply an organizer of victory. Having created his "ideal of pure reason," he uses it as a flying column easily summoned to his aid in every emergency, and by its use he disposes of all the arguments for the existence of God. Nothing is easier, of course, than to show that the existence of the transcendental ideal is an existence in the imagination only—"an existence in the idea only," as Kant calls it—and that, therefore, the Supreme Being is without existence; that is, without objective reality of any kind. But, of course, in his assaults upon it Kant is merely assailing a man of straw, which he himself has manufactured. The manner in which he accomplishes the substitution of this ideal, first for the necessary being, next for the first cause and finally for the Author and Supreme Ruler of the universe, is adroitness itself. It is, however, fully equaled by the skilful but wholly sophistical manner in which, after admitting the full force of the proofs for the existence of God and quoting them with

sufficient frankness—nay, with all apparent sincerity and candor —he proceeds, by a similar substitution, to weaken their efficacy, to belittle their overwhelming force and to misrepresent their full significance, until led on step by step, almost unawares, we find ourselves—instead of defending the reality of a first cause and its existence, or the incontrovertible reality in the absolutely necessary being—confronted not by any of these, but by this selfsame "transcendental ideal." Nothing to all appearances could be more ingenuous than Kant's frank statement in which he tells us in his transition from this ideal:

"Notwithstanding this urgent want of reason to presuppose something, as a foundation for the complete determination of the concepts of the understanding, reason nevertheless becomes too soon aware of the purely ideal and factitious character of such a supposition to allow itself to be persuaded by it alone to admit a mere creation of thought as a real being, unless it were forced by something else to seek for some rest in its regressus from the conditioned, which is given, to the unconditioned, which, though in itself and according to its mere concept not given as real, can alone complete the series of conditions followed up to their causes. This is the natural course, taken by the reason of every, even the most ordinary, human being, although not every one can hold out in it. It does not begin with concepts, but with common experience, and thus has something really existing for its foundation. That foundation, however, sinks, unless it rests upon the immovable rock of that which is absolutely necessary; and this itself hangs without a support, if without and beneath it there be empty space and everything be not filled by it, so that no room be left for a *why*—in fact, if it be not infinite in reality.

"If we admit the existence of something, whatever it may be, we must also admit that something exists by necessity. For the conditioned exists only under the condition of something as its cause, and from this the same conclusion leads us till we reach a cause which is not contingent, and therefore unconditionally necessary. This is the argument on which reason founds its progress toward an original being."

Everything here seems to be frankness itself. The full force of the argument for the real existence of a necessary first cause is admitted as well as the conclusion that this cause must be infinite in reality. The contingent can exist "only under the condition of something else as its cause." But having stated the argument candidly, Kant seems to think that he is absolved from all further necessity of recognizing the force of his own admission and immediately substitution, belittlement, misrepresentation, dry cynicism

take the place of the candor. He loses no time in surreptitiously canceling the effects of his statement. With consummate suavity of manner he soon tells us:

"This, therefore, is the natural course of human reason. It begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being. In this being it recognizes unconditioned existence. It then seeks for the concept of that which is independent of all condition, and finds it in that which is itself the condition of all other things, that is, in that which contains all reality. Now, as the unlimited all is absolute unity and implies the concept of a being, one and supreme, reason concludes that the Supreme Being, as the original cause of all things, must exist by absolute necessity."

It is difficult to absolve Kant from the charge of wilful misrepresentation here. At once he begins to drop a strand or two from the chain of necessity. He tells us that "reason begins by *persuading* itself of the existence of *some* necessary being;" whereas it is not persuasion, but an overwhelming conviction—which really amounts to an apodictic certainty—which compels us to the conclusion that a necessary being must exist. Next he calls this a persuasion of the existence of *some* necessary being, in order to create the opinion, unconsciousy and insensibly, that there is a choice of necessary beings; so that by the time we reach the absolute necessity of the Supreme Being as the cause of all things, we find that this necessity —so conclusively shown in the argument—is wonderfully weakened and has lost the apodictic ring which we find in his first candid statement of the case. This, however, is but a beginning which Kant follows up diligently throughout the whole question. Immediately he adds: "For if we accept everything as here stated, namely, first, that we may infer rightly from any given existence (perhaps my own only) the existence of an unconditioned necessary being," etc., whereas the real state of the case is not that "we *may* infer rightly," but that we *must* inevitably conclude "from any given existence the existence of an unconditionally necessary being," as Kant himself has candidly admitted a few moments before in the above quotation where he states the proof. Now, this is not mere sophistry. It is palpable dishonesty of the most culpable kind. By easy stages then he tries to lead back to the transcendental ideal—which he never really leaves altogether—and to keep the necessity of the existence of the first cause out of sight completely. That is, for the absolutely necessary being he loses no time in substituting the Supreme Being; and this Supreme Being is from the outset vitiated and adulterated by the imaginary process which classes it with the heroes of romance. Soon the process of belittlement is added. Kant informs us:

"The concept of a being of the highest reality (*ens realissimum*) would therefore seem of all concepts of all possible things to be the most compatible with the concept of an (mark the 'an') unconditionally necessary being, and though it may not satisfy that concept altogether, yet no choice is left to us, and we are forced to keep it, because we must not risk the existence of a necessary being, and, if we admit it, can in the whole field of possibility find nothing that can produce better founded claims on such a distinction in existence."

Kant has certainly mastered the art of damning with faint praise or of so discrediting where he pretends to credit that he throws the reader completely off his guard. We started with the absolute necessity of the existence of the necessary being as the necessary consequence of the existence of the contingent. Next we were told—although the statement had a false ring—that the Supreme Being must be concluded by reason to exist by absolute necessity. And here this necessity is so defecated to a myth that it is simply a matter of "look out or you will find it difficult to find a place in your Supreme Being at all." This is skilful, but wholly sophistical manipulation. Finally he tells us dryly:

"We cannot deny that this argument possesses a certain foundation, when we must come to a decision, that is, when after having admitted the existence of some one necessary being, we agree that we must decide where to place it."

It should be remarked here that all this misrepresentation, belittlement and substitution, as well as the gradual, stealthy progress back to "the ideal of pure reason" which is without objective reality, occurs before Kant leaves the statement of the proofs or before he proceeds to rebut them by a single word. And yet by an adroit selection of terms he has almost won his case. The Supreme Being comes into the arena already wholly discredited. All this demonstrates clearly what a judicious selection of words can accomplish. And yet it is of this discredited and already shamefaced Supreme Being that Kant has told us just a few moments ago, that "the contingent exists only under the condition of something else as its cause, and from this the same conclusion leads us on till we reach a cause which is not contingent, and therefore unconditionally necessary." All of which shows that Kant is a consummate master of strategy, however we may regard him as a philosopher. In our first article we saw something of the same kind; and we shall meet with the same when we come to deal with the categories. In fact, Kant seems to have adopted these tactics throughout and to have depended upon them quite as much as upon the force of his arguments. Strategy rather than logic is the measure on which he relied for

the success of his contentions. Indeed, Kant's methods here are adroitness itself. He wishes to deny reality to the object represented by the notion of a Supreme Being. He wishes to establish as a truth that the notion exists only in our minds and cannot be proved objectively. At the same time, no one understands better than Kant that, underlying this idea, there is postulated by reason the necessary existence of the cause of the contingent. Kant himself has admitted this and nowhere has he the courage to openly deny it. He dare not maintain that the existence of the necessary being cannot be proved; for he has proved it himself. This he has established on the immovable rock of reality. *There* existence is unimpeachable. *There* is objective reality that is incontrovertible. Kant dare not call it in question. What he does, however, is to remove this necessity of necessary existence as far as possible from the discussion, and in the place of the necessary being to introduce the idea of a Supreme Being, whose properties, as he terms them, he has been trying to discover—or imagine; for it is imagination rather than reason which Kant uses here throughout. He seeks for "the properties" that are most compatible with absolute necessity. He pretends to seek for a place in which to locate this absolutely necessary being. His perplexity arises from the necessity of admitting a necessary cause for all that is contingent. He has been obliged to admit the necessity of the existence of the necessary being. He has also admitted that this necessary being must be infinite in reality. He admits that, if the contingent exists, the necessary being must also exist. Hence he recognizes the full force of the argument from the existence of the contingent to the existence of the necessary being which is its cause. This necessary being, however, he soon merges in the highest reality and the highest reality again in the Supreme Being, and this in turn in the ideal being, which he tells us is a mere idea without objective reality; so that having reached the existence of a necessary being by the road of pure logical reasoning, he leaves it instantly to go in search—with his imagination—of "a being worthy of such superlative excellence." That is, he sends reason out on a guessing expedition in quest of a being "worthy of such a distinction as the unconditioned necessity of existence . . . in order to find among all concepts of possible things one which has nothing incompatible with absolute necessity." He then informs us that "after discarding everything else as incompatible with that necessity, reason takes the one being that remains (sic)—after what?—for the absolutely necessary being;" and "the being . . . which is in no point and no respect defective and is sufficient as a condition everywhere, seems, on that account, to be most compatible with absolute necessity." The being which Kant seems to

have thus discovered in his inquiring process seems to be the Supreme Being. Consequently the Supreme Being is immediately introduced at once into the place of the necessary first cause, and the necessary first cause of all things is quietly dropped out of sight. The substituting process is begun at once, and the being whose existence is soon challenged is not the necessary cause of the contingent, but this Supreme Being of Kant's own manufacture—a thing of shreds and patches. This Supreme Being soon becomes identical with the ideal of pure reason—indeed, is that ideal —which we are told has no existence outside the mind. It is a mere idea; Kant cannot determine it with sufficient accuracy, and so he rejects it as incapable of proof. Now, it is quite plain that we have not here question of the existence of God, but of the nature of God. Kant's supreme being is his answer not to the question: Is there a God? but to the question: What is God? And when Kant maintains that this being has no existence or reality, we can hardly disagree with him; for it is a mere figment of his own imagination. There can hardly be any doubt, then, that he is right when he tells us of the objective insufficiency of a supreme being of this character. This reality we can never meet in experience or out of it, for the very simple reason that such a being is impossible. A God that the mind could adequately determine would be no God at all.

Those who have undertaken to prove the existence of God from reason alone have never pretended to be able to give us an exact portrait of the Supreme Being. Such a being as the mind could conceive is only a concept of the imagination, wholly without objective reality. It may be the ideal of Kant and his followers, but of no one else. But the necessary being, the cause of all things, the wise and intelligent being who rules the universe—this being has been proved not to be a mere figment of the imagination, but an existing being, whose existence Kant himself declares to be necessary if we are to admit the reality of the contingent. Hence we find that Kant has, with or without design, confounded or confused two things essentially different. For the absolutely necessary cause of the contingent he has substituted "the ideal of pure reason." He fraudulently gives us the one for the other. And he has made the attempt to make the arguments against the latter valid against the former. It is this figment of the imagination that is in Kant's mind throughout. The serious reader of Kant who grasps his full meaning can hardly fail to see that it is the confusion of those two notions—which are forever overshadowing each other in Kant's imagination—that is responsible for the preposterous claims which Kant advances and which are so diametrically opposed to the ad-

missions which he finds himself forced to make, as, for instance, in the passage quoted above, where he says:

"Reason does not begin with concepts, but with common experience, and thus has something really existing for its foundation. That foundation (that is, the empirical, common experience), however, sinks, unless it rests upon the immovable rock of that which is absolutely necessary; and this itself hangs without a support, if without and beneath it there be empty space, and everything be not filled by it, so that no room be left for a *why*—in fact, if it be not infinite in reality." (Here he admits the reality of the infinite, nay, declares it absolutely necessary.)

"If we admit the existence of something, whatever it may be, we must also admit that something exists *by necessity*. For the contingent exists only under the condition of something else as its cause, and from this the same conclusion leads us on till we reach a cause which is not contingent, and therefore unconditionally necessary."

No one has put the case in stronger terms than these, and the only reason that we can see why Kant has wandered so far from these just and necessary conclusions of true reason is, that he allowed himself to be confused by the duplex lens of unlimited reality, which came and went so incessantly before his mind. However that may be, here, at least, there is no doubt that Kant recognizes that it is not from the concept merely or from the idea, but from the reality of the contingent that we are forced to conclude the objective reality of the first cause. There is no rom for doubt here. The contingent does not rest on a mere idea destitute of objective reality or of existence. Not at all. We are told plainly that the contingent exists only under the condition of something else as its cause, and that this cause must be *"infinite in reality."*

Nevertheless, in spite of all this, we find Kant soon arguing—forgetful of it all—that this infinite reality does not exist, and stoutly maintaining that it is but an idea without objective reality of any kind. The real fact is that, in spite of all his sophistry, Kant finds himself helpless before the logic of the absolute necessity of the existence of an absolutely necessary cause of all things and does not dare to deny its force. The argument from the contingent to the necessary being is so overwhelming in its irresistible logic that Kant does not dare to challenge it. He is forced to admit it, and being compelled to admit it, while at the same time he holds a brief against it, the only resource left him seems to be an attempt to misrepresent it, to belittle it, and *per fas aut nefas* to weaken its invincible strength. Consequently he grumbles over it, he snarls at it, he evades and shuns when it is at all possible. He shifts into

its place the *ens realissimum,* and, with the necessity of a first cause persistently crowded to the background, he wages his warfare against the notion of an *ens realissimum* or the Supreme Ruler of the universe, because, as he tells us, he cannot determine this notion fully or meet with its object in experience. It would be exceedingly interesting to follow Kant through all the divagations by which he tries to rid himself of the argument for a necessary cause of the universe; but this must be omitted for the present, as it would lead us too far from our present purpose. Here we must examine Kant's fundamental reasons for his Quixotic rejection of a proof which he has admitted in all its fullness and strength. Let us try to grasp these objections in all their fullness and force.

Briefly summarized, Kant's reasons for rejecting the proofs for the existence of a Supreme Being are two: (1) He argues that the idea of a Supreme Being is merely an idea wholly without objective reality, and that consequently the Supreme Being cannot be proved to have existence. And (2) he argues that since we can never meet with the Supreme Being in experience there can be submitted no convincing proof of its existence. These two reasons are buttressed by two subordinate ones, on which their validity is supposed to rest, viz., (1) that the principle of causality is not valid outside experience; in other words, it is immanent only, and consequently has no validity in the argument for the existence of God; and (2) that, since we are unable to complete for ourselves the synthesis of the sum total of all phenomena—inasmuch as the mind is unable to grasp it in its fullness—the idea of the sum total of all phenomena or of the totality of all phenomena; that is, of the universe as a whole, can be only a transcendental idea. Consequently, the problem resolves itself into something like this formula: for one transcendental idea which we take as an effect to find another transcendental idea which is its cause. Kant does not use exactly this formula; but it amounts to this precisely. However, since Kant does not elaborate the latter notion to any great extent and relies mainly on the inefficacy of the principle of causality, and since an adequate treatment of this special feature would extend this article to undue limits, we shall, for the present, omit the consideration of our inability to grasp the synthesis of all phenomena.

That these are Kant's reasons for the rejection of the proofs for the existence of God does not admit of any question. He is exceedingly explicit on the subject and returns to it again and again. For instance, he tells us:

"It makes a great difference whether something is represented to our reason as an *object absolutely* or merely as an *object in the idea.* In the former case my concepts are meant to determine the

object; in the latter there is only a schema to which no object, not even a hypothetical one, corresponds directly, but which only serves to represent to ourselves indirectly other objects through their relation to that idea and according to their systematical unity. Thus I say that the concept of a highest intelligence is a mere idea, that is, that its objective reality is not to consist in its referring directly to any object (for in that case we would not be able to justify its objective validity); but that it is only a schema arranged according to the conditions of the highest unity of reason, of the concept of a thing in general, serving only to obtain the greatest systematical unity in the empirical use of our reason by helping us, as it were, to deduce the object of experience from the imagined object of that idea as its ground or cause."

In this strange doctrine—to which we shall return later—Kant denies objective reality to the idea of a supreme being. Elsewhere he tells us:

"In whatever way the understanding may have reached that concept, it is clearly impossible that the *existence* (italics Kant's) of its object could be found in it through analysis, because the very knowledge of the existence of the object implies that it exists *outside our thoughts*. We cannot, in fact, go beyond concepts, nor, unless we follow the empirical connection by which nothing but phenomena can be given, hope to discover new objects and imaginary beings."

This is very plain language and admits of only one interpretation, that is, that there is no objective reality to correspond to the idea of the Supreme Being. Indeed, this is his main argument throughout—coupled, however, with the notion that his position on this point is strengthened by the fact that we never can meet with the Supreme Being in experience, and that the argument from the effect to its cause breaks down when we come to the question of something outside experience. He says:

"For all synthetical principles of the understanding are applicable immanently only, i. e., within its own sphere, while in order to arrive at the knowledge of a Supreme Being we must use them transcendentally, and for this our understanding is not prepared. If the empirically valid law of causality is to conduct us to the Original Being, that Being must belong to the chain of objects of experience, and in that case it would, like all phenomena, be itself conditioned. And even if that sudden jump beyond the limits of experience, according to the dynamical law of the relation of effects to their causes, could be allowed, what concept could we gain by this proceeding? Certainly no concept of a Supreme Being, effects, to bear witness to its cause."

And again:

because experience never presents to us the greatest of all possible

"And even if we were thinking only of the form of the world, the manner of its composition and its change and tried to infer from this a cause totally different from the world, this would be again a judgment of speculative reason only; because the object here is not an object of any possible experience. In this case the principle of causality, which is valid within the field of experience only and utterly useless, nay, even meaningless, outside it, would be totally diverted from its proper destination."

It is hardly necessary to multiply quotations to show Kant's position on these points. They are the false principles on which he insists throughout his entire contention.

It is not a little singular to find how easily he has found disciples, especially in these views where the reasoning is so shallow and the sophistry so palpable. But it is astonishing to find such a man as the late Dr. Brownson humbly subscribing to these Kantian canons and preaching them as if they were incontrovertible. Incredible as it may seem that Kant should put forward such rubbish as philosophical arguments—and they are the only ones on which his rejection of the proofs for the existence of God is based—it is with utter amazement that we find Dr. Brownson's keen mind imposed upon by them. Yet the fact is that he seems to have swallowed them without wincing. The argument that the proofs for the existence of God must be rejected because they give us the object in the idea only and that consequently the idea is without objective reality, he adopted and made his own and argued from as stoutly as if it were based on sound philosophical principles. He not only makes a complete surrender to Kant upon this point, but frankly adopts all the conclusions from the doctrine and maintains them against all oncomers. He even attempts to rail at the scholastics on this point and argues plainly in these words:

"We object to those who profess to rise from the contingent discursively to the necessary, because if they have only the *ens contingens* and its phenomena, they can conclude only the contingent and its phenomena. . . . It is equally impossible by synthetic reasoning, which adds to the subject a predicate not contained in it or a predicate not intellectually apprehended, as Kant has sufficiently proved in his "Critik der Reinen Vernunft."

Thus we see that Brownson swallowed Kant's arguments from immanence whole. This argument has imposed upon so many that it may be well to expose its shallowness and weaknesses.

Now at the very outset it is necessary to bear in mind that the existence of God is forced upon us by the laws of reason itself;

that without the first and necessary cause the contingent can have no meaning and no existence; and that Kant himself has been forced to concede all this, and that he has expressed the necessity of a necessary cause in language as strong as any one. He has told us that in reaching the notion of the necessary being reason "does not begin with concepts, but with common experience, and thus has something really existing for its foundation." Hence, according to Kant himself—when he is forced to deal squarely with the matter—the notion of God does not arise from concepts or ideas, but originates with real existences in our common experience. He also tells us that this "foundation" for the notion of a Supreme Being "sinks, however, unless it rests upon the immovable rock of that which is absolutely necessary"—which, if it means anything at all, must mean the existence of the necessary being as the cause. Of this he leaves little room for doubt; for he at once tells us: "If we admit the existence of something, whatever it may be, we must also admit that something exists by *necessity*." Therefore, according to Kant's own admission, there must exist, "by necessity," something independent of the world and apart and distinct from it, which is its cause. And he further tells us: "For the contingent exists only under the condition of something else as its cause." Now, Kant makes no effort whatever to cancel these admissions. They stand, therefore, unconverted and incontrovertible. This is the foundation which it is necessary to keep ever in mind in dealing with Kant's further views on this point. For Kant instantly takes leave of this line of thought and hardly ever again alludes to it or its necessity. It might naturally be supposed that, having made such fatal admissions, he would have attempted to meet them directly and controvert them. But he does nothing of the kind. There they stand in all their impregnable strength; so that when Kant has accumulated his mass of irrelevant sophistry, this argument still stands towering, clifflike, unassailed and unassailable as a rock of adamant. What Kant does is, by a devious and circuitous route, to avoid this impregnable fortress and turn men's attention away from it to his "ideal of pure reason," which, as has been seen, he had previously prepared with so much assiduity and care, and which he now substitutes everywhere for this necessary being. Consequently, when all is said and done by Kant against the proofs for the existence of God, this admission by him remains intact—unquestioned even by Kant—and in it we have established the existence of a necessary cause, as well as the fact that the contingent itself can have no meaning of any kind—is wholly unintelligible, in fact—if we deny the existence of this necessary cause. How, then, can Kant call this a mere idea? The adroit manipulation of "the ideal of pure reason" is but a diversion

—a mere demonstration—to lead away from the real question at issue; and the idea or ideal is fraudulently thrust into the place of the necessary cause, without whose existence, Kant admits, the contingent itself cannot exist. But no artificial or adventitious invention must be permitted to stand in the way of the real conditions of the case. To ignore the real argument is to misrepresent the real problem. To call this existence, thus postulated by reason, "an object in the idea only," is so directly opposed to all the laws of logical reason that Kant has been forced to invent his ideal of pure reason to impart to it any color of plausibility at all. The argument from the contingent to its necessary cause is that of a reality based upon a reality; whereas Kant would have us believe that it is merely "a relation of an idea to concepts." Now, the fact is that we have here not a relation between mere ideas at all, but a relation between the reality of the contingent and its cause. This is so evident that the plain man and the wayfaring man cannot err therein. Nevertheless, it is this relation which Kant and his followers—Brownson among them—insist is merely a relation between ideas and does not involve existence at all. But the effect—the world—is a real existence and therefore a reality; and this effect cannot exist, according to Kant, unless there also exist something as its cause. It is—to concede all that can be lawfully conceded—the relation of a real effect to its cause whose existence is necessary, but which itself is unknown. There is just one step in this relation; and this step is from effect to cause. And than this effect nothing can be more real in the empirical world; for it is the sum total of all empirical reality. Therefore, it is the mere assurance of audacity to claim that this is merely an idea and a relation between ideas. Than the given effect nothing can be more real; and the step from this sum total of all reality is simply the step from effect to cause. If, then, the effect is real and really existing, and if the existence of this effect depends on the existence of its cause—without which it cannot possibly exist—it is difficult to understand how Kant could by any process of legerdemain or skillful substitution claim that the existence of the cause is not involved in the conclusion at all. It is the very thing that is involved; and without it the contingent with all its reality sinks into the abyss. Kant would have perceived this easily had he not permitted himself to be blinded by his ideal of pure reason, which, like a swinging lamp, is forever intercepting his view of the real conditions in the problem. The existence, then, of the cause is an apodictic certainty, as truly real as the existence of any cause in the world of empirical reality; and without it the entire contingent sinks without foundation of any kind. The ex-

istence of the cause is, then, a logical necessity. Its existence is absolutely necessary for the existence of the contingent. Consequently, the existence of the cause is an absolute necessity. Without it we cannot—as Kant himself has admitted—conceive the existence of the contingent at all. It is utterly inconceivable, then, how Kant can call all this an object in the idea only, declare it without objective reality, and maintain that it does not involve existence on the part of the necessary cause. Unless all the laws of logic are at fault, it is this, precisely and preëminently, that it does involve and imperatively demand, viz., the existence of the cause.

But because we do not meet in experience the first cause or the Supreme Being and cannot have an empirical verification of the existence of the necessary first cause, Kant seems to think that he is justified in denying existence to the Supreme Being or the first cause. And this brings us face to face with one of the most profound problems in the whole realm of philosophy, viz., the relation of logical necessity to reality. It is the real question to be decided here. Kant seems to have perceived this at least in a dim sort of way; but his manner of dealing with the problem is one of the scandals of philosophy. He dare not put the question directly as we have stated it—perhaps it did not strike him in this way at all. What he does is to make this necessity a regulative principle which guides reason, although it is itself wholly fictitious in its character. But of this later.

It is worth while to inquire into the nature of this relation. We have not seen the question treated by any of the philosophers; nevertheless, it is the real problem raised by Kant in this particular instance, whether or no he himself was aware of it. If we are to believe Kant's contention that all our logical necessity does not give us existence or reality, then logical necessity does not involve reality. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the truth of all sound, logical propositions rests, not on the subject or the idea, but upon the truth of the reality that underlies the idea. The truth of the thought in the long run must rest on the truth of things. The truth of the proposition—man is mortal—does not rest on the mere ideas there expressed, but upon the truth of the reality. In other words, the truth of the proposition rests upon the objective reality of the truth that underlies the proposition. It is not, then, so much the truth of thought that gives true logical propositions as the truth of things. Or perhaps it were better to say that it is the truth of thought based on the truth of things that gives us truth in a logical proposition. If I say that a circle is round, my statement is true, not because of the truth of the words, but because of the truth of the thing. Every statement, then, is true if the thought as expressed

in the verbal formula corresponds to the truth of the thing. Hence all logical truth is based directly not on mere truth of thought—although this, too, is requisite—but on the truth of the things that underlie the thought. In particular propositions this is self-evident. All logical errors are errors because they misrepresent the reality, and they are logical errors simply because they are at the same time real errors. This requires no proof in particular propositions. In general principles or in universal propositions the connection is not so self-evident, and hence have arisen the contentions of philosophers regarding the origin of universal ideas. Now, the principle of contradiction and the principle of causality are wholly independent of all experience and are in themselves criteria of truth. When applied in experience we know they ring true and we accept their testimony, although we are fully aware that their truth does not rest on empirical objects. Whence, then, do they obtain their apodictic character? It is not from experience. It is not from the mind itself. It must be from their acquaintance in some mysterious manner with the reality in all truth of which the propositions themselves seem to be a part. One thing is certain: we cannot deny to them a determining character in the ascertainment of truth; for if we were to do this, we would thus upset the very foundations of all empirical truth. There is only one conclusion then, viz., that these general principles have their foundation deep in reality and are consequently true. Hence the truth of all propositions lies down deep in the reality that underlies objectively the idea expressed by the propositions themselves. Hence the truth of the statement rests on the truth of the thought and the truth of the thought rests on the truth of the thing. Hence in every logical proposition that includes a truth the truth of the thing is implied in the truth of the statement; that is, underneath it all lies the truth of the objective reality; otherwise we would have no truth at all. Hence the truth of all propositions lies down deep in the truth of the reality underlying the idea. This is true in all mathematics. It is true throughout physics. It is true in what are known as the primary principles of reason. It is true of cause and effect. It is true of the principle of contradiction. It is true especially in all conclusions which we designate as logical necessities. And it is superlatively true where the logical conclusion follows by what is known as absolute necessity. It is the underlying reality beneath both the verbal statement and the ideas, on which the truth of this logical necessity is based. These principles, then, are established truths, without which we can have no knowledge at all. And if the conclusions of reason which are apodictically certain or which imply an absolute logical necessity are to be called in question, then we have no criterion of knowledge

at all and no standard by which to judge whether a thing be true or false. This is so true that no one before Kant had ever thought of questioning it. But as the truth of logical necessity seemed to stand in Kant's way when he wished to discredit the proofs for the existence of God, there was only left for him—what he had no hesitation in doing—to challenge the truth of logical necessity. Accordingly, in one of his arguments for the rejection of the proofs of the existence of God he tells us:

"All these pretended examples are taken without exception from judgments, not from things and their existence. Now, the unconditioned necessity of judgments is not the same thing as the absolute necessity of things. The absolute necessity of a judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the thing or of the predicate in the judgment."

And he proceeds to tell us:

"Nevertheless, this pure logical necessity has exerted so powerful an illusion that after having formed of a thing a concept *a priori* so constituted that it seemed to include existence in its sphere, people thought they could conclude with certainty that, because existence necessarily belongs to the object of that concept, provided always that I accept the thing as given (existing), its existence also must necessarily be accepted (according to the rule of identity), and that the Being therefore must itself be absolutely necessary."

Kant here challenges the truth of logical necessity and boldly maintains that the truth of thought is entirely different from the truth of things; or in other words, that a thing may be true and yet the true statement of it may be false; that is, that a thing may be logically true and really false. He maintains that no objective reality underlies the logical necessity in a judgment. Consequenty when, from the existence of the contingent, we conclude, by absolute logical necessity, the existence of the cause, while our conclusion is logically true, it may be at the same time really false. This proposition is so absurd that all that is needed for its refutation is its clear statement. Evidently Kant was as well aware of this as any one, and consequently, instead of expressing his opinion clearly, he resorts to his customary trick of confusing things. Nevertheless, one might be inclined to think that Kant, driven, perhaps, by the exigencies of his difficult position to maintain his theory, had persuaded himself that it was possibly true that a logical necessity is not based on a reality, and that, consequently, while his argument was erroneous, his maintenance of it was strictly honest. But alas! for the honor of philosophy, Kant himself will not permit us to believe that his contention here: that logical necessity is not based on reality, was the honest expression of erroneous views

honestly held; for elsewhere Kant shows very plainly that his opinions on this subject were—when it suited him—as sane as those of other philosophers. Arguing that his categories cannot be "subjective dispositions of thought," he stoutly maintains:

"Thus the concept of cause, which asserts, under a presupposed condition, the necessity of an effect, would become false, if it rested only on some subjective necessity implanted in us of connecting certain empirical representations according to the rule of causal relation. I should not be able to say that *the effect is connected with the cause in the object* (that is, by necessity), but only I am so constituted that I cannot think these representations as connected in any other way. This is exactly what the skeptic most desires, for in that case all our knowledge, *resting on the supposed objective validity of our judgments, is nothing but mere illusion.*" (Italics ours.)

Hence we need not go outside of Kant's own statements for his complete and thorough refutation on this point. He believed, like everybody else, that unless the logical expression of our judgments is based on their objective validity, all our knowledge is nothing more than mere illusion. Yet so unscrupulous is Kant in his methods of arguing that, in order to carry his point, he does not hesitate to argue against his convictions and maintain that the logical necessity which links the existence of the contingent to the existence of the necessary being has no objective validity. Now, there is not in the whole range of human knowledge a single judgment that carries with it a logical necessity more absolute and more unconditional than the proposition that—to use Kant's own words—"the contingent exists only under condition of something else (existing) as its cause." The proposition that two straight lines cannot enclose a space; that a straight line is the shortest distance between points; that two and two cannot make five, but four, do not carry with them a stronger apodictic certainty of conclusion than the judgment that we cannot have the existence of the contingent unless we have also the existence of the necessary cause. Thus we see that all that is necessary to refute Kant even in his most stubborn strongholds is to use Kant against himself. Once we have learned the trick of Kant's unscrupulous methods, all that is necessary is to patiently wait, keep our eyes open, and sooner or later he is sure to contradict himself. But what are we to think of Dr. Brownson, who not only accepted Kant whole on this point, but planting himself squarely on Kant's fallacies, proceeded to berate the scholastics? So much, then, for Kant's famous objection that the idea of the Supreme Being is without objective reality.

His second fundamental objection to the proofs for the existence

of God possesses no more weight or dignity than the first—indeed—like it—is nothing more than mere cavil. It need hardly be said that the claim that we can never meet with the Supreme Being in experience rests on an element of profound truth. According to the law of natural reason, we can never have an empirical knowledge of God—such, for instance, as we have of phenomena. This is not only a truth, but a truism. The difference between our knowledge of God and our empirical knowledge of phenomena has always been recognized by philosophers. God cannot be an object of our senses. If He did, He would cease to be God. Our knowledge of phenomena is a knowledge of the senses; our knowledge of God is a knowledge of reason. Consequently, Kant's claim that we can never meet God in experience is to a certain extent valid. But when we have said this we have said all that can be conceded to Kant on this point. For since when have the senses become the criterion of truth? How does the fact that the senses can never give a representation of God prove that God does not exist? By what authority is experience established as the supreme arbiter of life and death—that is, of the existence or non-existence of things? Since when has sense-experience become the throned dictator and snatched the sceptre of knowledge of truth from reason? Kant's argument on this point is nothing more or less than a bold attempt to wrest from reason its proper jurisdiction in the realm of truth and transfer it to sense-experience. But the rational mind is not accustomed to look to the senses for truth in its last analysis, but to reason. Again and again, even within what is recognized as their own realm, have the senses been found misleading, and it has the duty of reason to step in and correct their errors. How, then, been the duty of reason to step in and correct their errors. How, then, can they give the final verdict in matters wholly outside their province? If reason has been compelled so frequently to rescue the senses from their delusions within their own special field, why should we be expected to fling aside reason—which has never deceived us—and call in the senses to interpret truth to us instead? Had any one maintained that they could prove the existence of God by means of the senses or of sense-experience alone, and without recourse to reason at all, there might be some slight pretext for Kant's strange position when he refuses to accept the proofs for the existence of God on the ground that we cannot meet God in experience and our senses can tell us nothing of His existence. By the very terms of the problem God is unattainable by man's senses. What Kant's claim amounts to is—when all is said—what no one ever denies—that we cannot have an empirical knowledge of God. But is the existence of God the only proposition within the whole

field of human knowledge which does not come within reach of the senses and cannot be reached empirically? Evidently Kant seems to think that it is. But this is only one more proof of Kant's shallowness when he was intent on proving true a false proposition. Nevertheless, Kant himself has shown quite as well as any one that there are truths which are utterly unattainable by the senses or by experience, and consequently which cannot be called empirical truths at all. Whole realms of knowledge are ours—wholly independent of experience, as Kant himself stoutly maintains. Our knowledge of first principles—the principle of contradiction, the principle of causality—all of what Kant calls "synthetic judgments *a priori*"—all primary concepts—are knowledge which the mind has reached by other than empirical routes. Why, then, should Kant be so inconsistent as to accept all these and clownishly balk at the acceptance of the existence of God, under the pretext that this knowledge is not empirical, that its object does not come under the senses, and that we can never meet its object in experienre? The knowledge involved in the principle of contradiction or the principle of causality comes to us we know not whence, nor where, nor how—one thing is certain, that it is not empirical—yet the fact is that all our empirical knowledge depends entirely on the knowledge which these principles furnish. We cannot interpret one single fact of experience unless by the aid of these principles and the knowledge which they supply; yet while we know not what their origin, we are certain that they are neither the offspring of experience nor the children of the senses, nor the result of empirical knowledge in any form. Since, then, all our empirical knowledge rests on knowledge that is as far removed from empirical as anything can well be, the action of Kant in singling out the existence of God and excluding it, on the ground that our knowledge of it could never be empirical, was shallow, arbitrary and inconsistent in the highest degree. For we need go no farther than Kant himself—here also—to show the absurdity and inconsistency of his claim. It is provocative of a smile, when we read his contention on this point, to turn to another part of his work and read:

"For where should experience take its certainty, if all the rules which it follows were again and again empirical?"

Or again:

"It is therefore a question which deserves at least closer investigation and cannot be disposed of at first sight, whether there exists a knowledge independent of experience, and even of all impressions of the senses?"

And later he answers this question:

"That there really exists in our knowledge such necessary and,

in the strictest sense, universal and therefore pure judgments *a priori,* is easy to show. If we want a scientific example we have only to look to any of the propositions of mathematics; if we want one from the ordinary sphere of the understanding, such a proposition as that each change must have a cause will answer the purpose."

And he maintains that we have not only knowledge and judgments which are independent of experience and hence not empirical, but that we also have concepts which owe nothing whatever to the senses or experience, but are wholly independent of them. He says:

"Not only in judgments, however, but even in certain concepts, can we show their origin *a priori.* Take away, for example, from the concept of a body, as supplied by experience, everything that is empirical, one by one, such as color, hardness or softness, weight and even impenetrability, and there still remains the space which the body (now entirely vanished) occupied: that you cannot take away. And in the same manner, if you remove from your empirical concept of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which experience has taught you, you cannot take away from it that property by which you conceive it as a substance or inherent in a substance (although such a concept contains more determinations than that of an object in general). Convinced, therefore, by the necessity with which that concept forces itself upon you, you will have to admit that it has its seat in your faculty of knowledge *a priori.*"

Hence we need not go further than Kant himself to learn that we have knowledge that is independent of all experience. All that is required to overthrow his random arguments is the fact that he admits, as he does here, that there is a knowledge wholly independent of experience—a knowledge of concepts and even of judgments. Now, if there be such a knowledge—totally independent of all experience and having not the slightest taint of the empirical in its character—how can Kant consistently argue that he must deny the validity of the proofs for the existence of God based on a logical necessity which is absolute, solely for the reason that this knowledge cannot be met with in experience or that it is not empirical? The bias in the argument is so evident as to discredit the witness completely.

Therefore, the point, ingenious though it is, and though founded on the fact that our relations to God are entirely outside of experience, cannot be seriously regarded as having any weight in the determination of the truth in the matter. For what is the final tribunal of intellectual truth? Is it the senses or is it reason? The entire argument of Kant amounts to this: that while in every other instance we may implicitly trust the conclusions of reason, here we must make an exception and distrust—nay, disbelieve—the abso-

lutely necessary conclusions of reason. This is certainly a singular position to assume. By a logical necessity which is absolute in its conclusions we are compelled to admit the existence of the necessary being as the cause of the contingent, and while, according to Kant himself, this logical necessity must be based on an objective reality, we must deny this objective reality existence—because, forsooth, we never meet with such an existence in experience. In mathematics, in physics, in the whole realm of the natural sciences—wherever and whenever reason announces that her reasons are compelled by a logical necessity, we accept her terms without question; here, however, we are forbidden to do so. Inexorable reason tells us that we must have more than two straight lines if we are to enclose a space; that the angles at the base of an isoceles triangle are equal; that the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the sum of the square of the other two sides, and we never question the verdict. The same inexorable reason informs me with full apodictic certainty that the necessary cause of the contingent must have existence. Why must I accept the logical conclusions in all the former cases and reject it in the latter? The logical necessity is quite as imperative in the latter as in any of the former. Why accept the former and reject the latter? Logical necessity is paramount when it tells us that the three angles of a triangle must be equal to two right angles, when it tells us that Cologne Cathedral must have had an architect—even if we were forced to admit that Satan drew the plans. Why, then, must we doubt its truth when we are told that the universe must have an author or an architect? But, we are told, we cannot meet this reality in any experience. But the truth of our first principles—that is, the reality on which they rest—cannot be met with in experience; why, then, accept these and reject the existence of the cause of all things? This is an inconsistency which Kant does not seem to have noticed at all. He seems to have forgotten completely what he has elsewhere told us, viz., that "all our knowledge rests on the validity of our judgments," and if we call in question this validity, "all our knowledge is nothing but mere illusion." He forgtts also that he shakes the value of all experience to its foundations by such mad, insensate philosophy. For on what does the truth of experience depend? Not on experience. Not on the senses. Not on the empirical at all. Let Kant himself give the answer: "For whence should experience take its certainty if all the rules which it follows were again and again empirical?" Hence the certainty of experience must rest on other certainty independent of experience. But since this is the case, what can redeem from the character of petty cavil of the most wretched kind the claim that we must deny existence to the objective

reality that underlies the absolute logical necessity of a first cause of the contingent, because we do not meet with it in experience and cannot have empirical knowledge of its existence?

Now, Kant in his haste to discredit the proofs for the existence of God did not stop to consider the principles involved in his challenge at all. He overlooked the nature of our *a priori* knowledge, although he fully understood it. Indeed, he admits in the above quotations that it is this *a priori* knowledge which gives efficacy to all our empirical knowledge and that without it we would have not knowledge, but illusion. Consequently, the validity of all our empirical knowledge rests in the long run on knowledge which is wholly independent of experience. He seems to have overlooked the fact that the principle of contradiction and the principle of causality—both of which he admits in all their fullness—are special possessions of the mind which it has not derived from experience and which are totally independent of all experience. Whence, then, do they obtain their efficacy? Not, surely, from experience. After removing all experience we find that these principles remain in all their force and efficacy. It is only by means of them that we can at all interpret experience. Kant, while he understands all this perfectly, unconsciously or with design, completely ignores it and undertakes to proceed as if all empirical knowledge did not depend upon these and that our senses were all-sufficient for the acquisition of knowledge; whereas the fact is that in the melee of the senses and sense-experience it is these principles which must be called in to give experience a meaning, to bring order out of the confusion and to establish truth and knowledge in our gropings among phenomena. We have an example of this in mathematics. The concrete demonstration in a mathematical proposition adds nothing to its truth. Even in geometry, where we seem to depend on the construction of the figure for the extension of our knowledge, the senses or the empirical construction adds not one iota to the truth of the principles of *a priori* knowledge which we apply there; and the constructed figures in geometry do not serve to prove the truth of the principles applied—Kant to the contrary, notwithstanding. They are used for illustration of the truth rather than for proof, the mind being reached at once by means of the sensible figure. The demonstration, however, does not add one single iota of truth to the principles themselves or to the propositions which are proved by means of them. If they did, every new demonstration would add to the weight of the proof. But the fact is that experience or empirical demonstration does not add one jot or tittle to the truth of the principles or to the truth of the propositions that are deduced from them. All mathematical principles and all *a priori* principles

of reason retain the same amount of validity whether we apply them in one instance or in one hundred thousand. There is not one single iota more of certainty added to the proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles after a million applications or illustrations or demonstrations than there belonged to it at first; and we may remove the million demonstrations and the proposition will remain in all its invincible apodictic certainty. It is precisely the same with the principle of causality in the case of the contingent and necessary. It possesses the same validity independent of all experience, as does the proposition that two and two make four. Kant is here wholly—and possibly wilfully—wrong. But the fact is that he does not seem to have gone to the bottom of the question here at all, or brought to the front the principles on which the problem must be solved. It is, then, the truth of the logical necessity of a first cause that is at stake here—the question whether the great principle of causality, which, in its truth, is independent of all experience and without which experience of effects would have no meaning, may be trusted to furnish us with the truth in this particular problem. That is the whole question. Shall we believe, Kant, who insanely insists that experience must confirm the truth of our logical necessity? Shall we wait with him for experience to vouch for the truth of reason in her imperative requirements? Must the testimony of the handmaid be awaited before we accept the testimony of the mistress to whom that handmaid owes character, existence, even, according to Kant, the faculty of knowledge itself? Yet this is what Kant insanely insists upon.

Nor is it strictly true that we do not meet with the Supreme Being in experience. In a certain sense God is outside of all experience, but in another sense He traverses all experience. Throughout every portion of our experience we find traces and footprints of the architect and ruler of the world—to such an extent, indeed, that Kant cannot resist their evidence. When from the irregular perturbation of Uranus Herschel was convinced that there must exist some body outside which was the cause of these disturbances, he had no hesitation in concluding the existence of a body outside, although it had not yet come within the range of his telescopic vision. He was convinced by logical necessity. When the great planet Neptune itself swung into view it added not one iota to the truth of the principle of causality with its logical necessity, which led the astronomer to accept the existence of the planet as a fact. long before it appeared. Its appearance was merely another demonstration of the principle of cause and effect—but was no proof, for the principle needed no proof. But who will deny that there was empirical knowledge of the new planet even before its appear-

ance to the senses in the disturbances of its sister planet? Had Neptune never appeared, the principle of logical necessity or causality would have been just as true, although cavillers might have cried: "Why don't you produce your cause?" The appearance silenced the caviller. Many other analogies might be brought forward to show that it would be the height of absurdity to permit the absence of empirical representation to discount the validity of a logical necessity of reason; such, for instance, as the revelations of the spectroscope with regard to the ingredients in the sun's constitution—all of which we accept without question, although the objective reality can never come into or form a part of our empirical knowledge—at least until the human family will have evolved into the salamander species.

But our limits forbid us to pursue this interesting subject of analogies further, and we must hasten to other points. Meanwhile it is sufficiently clear, even from Kant's own teachings, that it is utterly false, shallow and unreasoning to maintain that because we cannot meet with a thing in experience we must reject it as nonexistent, even when that existence is forced upon us by all the absolute necessity of an incontrovertible logical conclusion of reason. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive the sanity of the intellect that could stand out in defense of such a proposition.

Simon FitzSimons.

Lima, N. Y.

GOD AND MAN.

THERE is a special danger attendant on the maturity of those whose youthful religion was too anthropomorphic, who conceived of God too literally manwise and never cared to correct by the aid of their reason what reason itself should have told them stands in constant need of correction. Had they been as clearly aware of their mental as of their physical growth, no doubt they would have perceived that the surroundings of the one require as continual readjustment as those of the other. But introspection is ordinarily a very fitful mood, and it is in fact only at such seasons that one notes the attainment, for better or for worse, of a new stage of mental development. The cause of this awakening may reach the intellect from the outside through the medium of something heard or read, or it may be that a totally new experience makes a call upon the accumulated experience of the past and finds there only a very inadequate response or none at all; but the time of crisis does come, and it may easily be a time of disaster. And this, which is true of a number of minor matters and is full of danger even in them, is equally true, but vastly more dangerous when the matter is religion—understanding by that term the whole complexus of relations that exist between the Creator and the creature. For here we are in a region where faith takes the place of vision and experiment and where the issues at stake are of such momentous import that all else, where it is not distinctly subsidiary to them, dwindles by comparison into something less than microscopic insignificance.

It was easy as a child to think of God as a person, loving, hating, grieving, rejoicing, punishing, rewarding. To pray was to speak to a friend, to a father; it was to ask pardon of an offended superior, to promise Him amendment, to give Him thanks for a gratified desire, to petition Him for future favors as the reward of "being good." But now it has come upon us that the God to whom we pray can suffer no emotions nor any change; that, consequently, our sins cannot grieve any more than our virtues can please Him; that whatever we have to tell Him He has known from all eternity; that our birth, our life, our death and our final destiny are neither past nor future, but eternally and singly present to Him, and that, consequently, any relation of a personal nature between ourselves and Him can only be a make-believe on our side as it is an impossibility on His.

These difficulties as stated here are, of course, far too harsh and crude, not to say inaccurate, and they have need of much distinction and explanation. Still, it were idle to pretend that in any system

of theology is there to be found an exhaustive explanation of them, or, finally, anything but an admission that there is deep mystery here for whose better appreciation perhaps this or that hypothesis may be recommended. And indeed no Christian, no Theist, of ordinary humility can expect or wish to have his belief denuded of mystery; reduced, that is, to the level of an exact science. But it is probably true to say that the class of persons of whom we are speaking are usually content to acknowledge all this and to continue in the practice of prayer to which they have been accustomed from their childhood. Their great difficulty—which, however, amounts to practically the same thing—is to understand how this God now revealed to them can be either the subject or the object of those affections which, under one aspect or another, are included in the term "love." Praise, reverence and service on the one side—yes, but love! It results that their religion indues those qualities of formalism and aridity which when pushed to extremity have, under another civilization, issued in the joss-stick and the praying-wheel. It ought, then, to be of the greatest use to examine into this matter, and starting from what revelation has taugh us of the nature of the Supreme Being, to search for some answer to the conjugate questions, Can God love me? and Can I love God?

It should be sufficient to say of God simply that He is perfection, and to the rapt intuition of the contemplative, unvexed by the importunity of imagination, intellect and will, that would doubtless suffice. But our minds ordinarily have need of a more detailed definition, one which will offer matter for the exercise of each of these powers, and we shall find it safer and more fruitful to set forth quite soberly what positive knowledge we possess of the Godhead and to work upon that. It is, of course, true that our conclusions as well as our reasoning must inevitably fall far short of the truth. But it is also true that anything more exact, were it possible for us, would be out of harmony with our created and therefore limited nature. It would be an impossible identification of *via* with *terminus,* of faith with vision. With these limits understood, however, it is competent to any reflecting mind to conceive truthfully of God as of a coadunation of perfections really identical one with the other, yet at the same time virtually distinct; to realize, that is, that God *is* perfect truth, perfect goodness, perfect justice, perfect mercy, and that being One, He cannot, as it were, overlap Himself or be less or greater than Himself under one of these aspects than under another—this without at the same time failing to realize that at our end of the scheme the concepts of perfection in truth, or in justice, or in mercy do really stand for distinct and in practice,

perhaps, for conflicting ideas. It is easy to see that the more perfect an object is the greater will be the number of excellencies that can be predicated of it. When we admire anything we instinctively seek in our vocabulary for fresh ways of expressing our conception of its perfection. But though in praising, for instance, the courage of a soldier it would be quite beside the point, and might be quite untrue, to say of him also that he is handsome, refined, talented; there can be no such incongruity nor any pleonasm when God is the object of our admiration. For the unity of God, which is His perfection, means just this, that He is all good, most perfectly and at once, so that in naming any one of His attributes we at the same time affirm all the rest in a like degree and with equal distinctness. Still, the distinction which we must perforce make between the perfections of God is not a purely subjective one on our part; it has this much foundation in fact, that the various concepts of Him that we form do most truly correspond to a reality in Him. He is no less perfect in justice than He is in mercy, and it is as true to say with St. Paul that "it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God" as it is to say with St. John that "God is love."

But what we want above all is a practical, concrete notion of God such as we can reach and preserve without continual strain. We want an idea of the divine nature which without lowering it will yet bring it nearer to our own, since the final object of our study is to be that love between the Creator and the creature which, unless it can be stated in terms commensurable with the natures of both, will remain forever an abstraction and an unreality to us and will have no power to convert us from that dry formalism which robs our religion of its actuality and leads us away from and not towards our true end, that straight union with God which can come of love alone. We want, in short, to find a common term between God and ourselves.

We admit at once, then, that God is infinite, and that, therefore, whatever it is true to say that He is, *that* He must be infinitely. We cannot, naturally, represent infinity to ourselves as something real, and there is nothing helpful to be gained by attempting to do so. It is enough for our purpose to consider infinity as implying complete independence and self-sufficiency such as can only become one who has existed from all eternity and has created all things out of nothing. We need go no further than the truth that the divine nature is all-sufficing for itself and neither does nor can require anything outside of itself; that the Creator cannot possibly have need of the creature, since the contrary would be an implication of terms. This being so, it will follow that every act of the

Divinity must be formally immanent; that is, must begin and end in itself, just as our vital acts of feeling, understanding or willing are immanent, begin and end in ourselves. God, self-sufficient, eternal, infinite, can suffer no change nor acquire any new relation, so that from the side of God the act of creation, for instance, is simply Himself who is eternally in act, unaltered by the fact that from the side of the creature of His hands a new relation to Him has come into existence. We may perhaps find a helpful parallel to this apparently inconceivable position in our own experience. We can understand, for example, that a tree or a landscape undergoes no change at all from the fact that I have made a sketch of it; from the fact, that is, that something has come into existence whose being, as such, consists in a relation (of likeness, namely) to itself. For many reasons the parallel is not accurate, but it is enough for our purpose, which is to emphasize the self-sufficiency and absoluteness of God by realizing as well as we can how it is that He does not go out of Himself even in the act of creation, the most obvious of His visible operations.

But how, then, is this to be translated in terms of that love which we know from revelation, which the Scriptures tell us in so many words, God has for His world and especially for man? What meaning is left to such passages as "I love them that love Me" or "God so loved the world?" Or is the word "love" to be understood here in some transcendental sense, quite other from the meaning which we assign to it among ourselves? We have seen briefly what is the nature of a divine act, and we deduce that as in others so in the act of love God does not and cannot go out of Himself. But it is also true that love implies a reciprocity, a giving and taking on both sides, and it seems to be of its very essence that it should involve a going out from self—self-love is a misappropriation of terms. Either, then, love between God and man is something quite different from love between man and man or we must correct our notion of one or the other.

An answer to these questions will be reached more easily by starting now from another point. Beginning with ourselves, we find it to be a quite obvious truth that we can only love what is good, or at least what we take to be good, and especially good for us. Not the most depraved of mankind can deliberately choose what is bad precisely because it is bad; he cannot disobey his nature, which absolutely forbids the free choice of evil as such. As his conscience, though it may err objectively in its appreciation of the ethical value of an action, is infallible in its command to do what is apprehended as right and not to do what is believed to be wrong, so his nature, though it may mistake not only moral

but material evil for good, can make no mistake in its election of what is apprehended as good. But with this difference, that while a man can turn a deaf ear to his conscience, he cannot resist his nature. The law works with the same force and precision in saint and sinner alike. So that our love, whether it be of brother or sister or parent or spouse or friend, reduces at last to our perception, apprehension and appreciation (perhaps purely selfish) of the good in them, whether under myriad forms and varieties, that good be an objective fact or not.

But we should fall into the vulgar rationalistic error of personifying and deifying the laws of nature if we sought for an explanation of the working of our affections no further than the axiom, "The object of the Will is whatever is good." "Good," whether in itself or in relation to us, is not something absolute, irreducible, elemental, an ingredient compounded in different proportions with the stuff of persons and things in some such way as the "caloric" of earlier physicists mingled in the substance of bodies to raise the temperature of each in varying degrees above its natural zero. It is supposed that we believe in a personal God and that we have admitted that He is infinite perfection; it is therefore no new tax upon our belief to hear that all good, under no matter what aspect, is God; not, of course, in the falsely Pantheistic sense, but, nevertheless, quite truly in so far as all creation is an imitation of the Creator and is most clearly seen to be so when it is realized as good. In no sky or hill or twig or blade of grass does His likeness fail; here and there it is blurred, here and there one man sees it, while another cannot; but as in the beginning when God made all, He "saw that it was good," because it was the work of His will, the reflect of His eternal thought, so now, conversely, we can reach up from the creation of the world to "the invisible things of Him" which are "clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made." Put in a few words, when we love any one or anything we in fact love God—unwittingly, it is likely, and not formally; but in the end no less actually than did those saints who after St. Francis of Assisi have recognized a brotherhood with all nature in the fatherhood of its God. And if it seems to admit of no doubt that human love reduced to its last terms is simply an externation of the natural appetite for the good—ultimately and fundamentally for God—it is clear from His very nature that the love of God, too, can have no other term than Himself, in which expression must be included whatever participates in His nature, that is, whatever is good. And where among created nature is good in its highest form to be found if not in man? For in man alone among the creatures of the earth do those forms of the good which

we distinguish as truth, beauty, purity, strength and the rest become active potencies instead of remaining, as they do among irrational and inanimate creatures, in the state of purely passive qualities. In man alone can the good be ethical, that is, can exist in its most excellent form, and in him alone is it capable of indefinite expansion. It is in man, then, that God finds Himself most vividly expressed, and the necessity which He has of loving Himself wherever He finds Himself constrains Him therefore to love Himself in man. Yet it would no be just to limit the lovableness of man in the eyes of God to those obvious good acts and qualities which we habitually distinguish as such. Everything in him that is not downright evil (and do we know where to rule the dividing line?) is irradiated with divinity, is an image more faithful in this one than in that of those divine perfections which our limited intelligences must represent as numerically distinct. The very personality of a man, that incommunicable note of the individual which attracts or repels us, though it eludes our definition, is "borrowed" from God, to whom alone belongs the attribute of a perfect person. It follows, then, that God's love for us is not a mere love of our goodness in a state of precision, as it were, from ourselves; it is a love of each as such, and is most truly a personal love, though in the end it be in truth love for Himself.

It is another consequence of the infinite perfection of God that He is also perfectly free. The same act which created this world might also have created a different one or none at all. But there is no contradiction in the statement that under some aspects God may be said to be necessitated. He could not be other than just, merciful, holy, omniscient, true, and He cannot do other than love Himself wherever He finds Himself. To everything that, so far as it is good, is an image of Himself, He must extend that infinite, eternal, mutual love of the Father for Himself in the Son and the Son for the Father, that singular, subsistent, sempiternal act of Will which is the Holy Ghost. It is surely not extravagant to draw from this a clearer perception of that indwelling of the Holy Ghost in us of which St. Paul speaks: "Know you not that you are the temple of God and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" In the temple of the soul adorned with charity, lovely in the sight of God, the Father finds the Son and the Son the Father, and there, if we may dare to use the words, knowing that in the presence of the divine mysteries the utmost that we can say is but little less short of the truth than the least, there in the ineffable love of each for each proceeds anew that Spirit of Love, the Third Person, the Holy Ghost. Is it fanciful to think that in each nearer approach of the soul to its end, in each closer approximation to its exemplar,

in every good act accomplished in the state and under the influence of grace there is, as it were, a renewal of that divine procession, a fresh consecration and dedication of that temple? It is not literally true, but there is in it a symbol of the truth, and if in that symbol we find some image and some shadow of the reality that now we cannot reach, to that extent will it suffice us for the truth.

But even if we have convinced ourselves that the natural object of our love is God and that, on the other hand, the love of God for us is comprehensible and real, there still remains a practical difficulty drawn from the very premises from which we have derived our conviction. An Infinite Being can undergo no change; there can be no greater and no less in Him. If there be love between us two, at least on His side that love can neither grow nor wane, and once more we waver between determinism and disbelief. For in what sense can it be said that our good actions please or our bad actions offend an immutable Being? And again, if I am pleasing to Him now, how can I cease to be pleasing to Him a little later, and conversely? A general answer might be that it would be contrary to the justice of an infinitely just God if there were no foundation in truth for the instinctive feeling of unsophisticated man that the good and evil in his life consists in something more than the conformity or not of his actions with an abstract ethical ideal and that the true measure is his attitude towards a Supreme Being who has the right to command and the power to impose sanctions upon His commands. Religion in some form or other is absolutely necessary to the full perfection of human nature and lies buried in the hearts even of those who believe that they have no need of it; yet from no known form of religion is there absent this consciousness of a relation towards a superior Being or group of Beings whom it is in the power of the individual to offend, to please or to propitiate. It is altogether incredible that the common sense of humanity can have erred on such a point and so invincibly.

But we can bring the truth nearer home to ourselves in another way, provided always that we bear in mind the extreme inadequacy of even the most careful language that we can use. It is indeed necessary that we should speak of God manwise unless we are to keep silence altogether; but in the end the best concept of Him that we can form will be as little like the truth as a circle on the blackboard is like the sun. We cannot think of God as angry or pleased with us except as connoting a change in Him; that is, we implicitly place Him in our own category of being. But the truth is that the only change involved in what we call the complacency or the wrath of God is a change in ourselves. There is in God but one single act, operative from eternity; but as it contains

in itself all possible perfection, it is equivalent, as we see it, to a number of distinct acts which we know separately as love, anger, joy and so forth. These different facets, as perhaps we may call them, of the same act are lit up in turn according to the object on which they are directed, and this "lighting up" constitutes the relation in which that object stands towards God. St. Augustine uses the similitude of light to describe, as well as may be, the nature of this relation—very real on our part, an abstraction of our reason when we view it in God. "Just as light," he says, "is painful to the eye when the eye is weak and invigorating to it when it is in health, not on account of any change in the light, but because of the change in the eye."

Or we may find another parallel in the ordinary process by which we acquire knowledge. The laws of nature, which are the object of science, remain ever what they are, unaltered by the fact that any number of persons, or none at all, have attained to a knowledge of them. Yet how vast is the difference in his relation to these truths between an ignorant man and the same man after a successful course of study.

But, let us insist upon it, these comparisons and examples are but rude blundering attempts to bring within the scope of finite intelligences what belongs wholly to the realm of the infinite. In so far as they are faithful representations of the truth, they will preserve us from the fatal extreme of imagining God to be quite remote from us and indifferent to our attitude towards Him; in so far as they fall short of the truth, they will remind us that we are dealing with mystery where faith must supply the place of reason. We understand from them how the root of God's love for us, His presence, namely, in our souls, may vary without any corresponding change in Himself; but yet we cannot understand how that love itself may be said to vary. Here the efforts of our reason must stop. We are come to the barrier that only faith can surmount. Reason and our consciousness tell us that we can truly have love for God, since reason shows Him to us as the sum and substance of all good, and reason and consciousness hourly teach us that what we know or at least take to be good we must love. Reason assures us that God must have love for us, since apart from its deductions from revealed premises it would recoil from the picture of a Supreme Being, calm, impassive, implacable, before the outstretched hands, the withered hopes, the undeserved misery of so many of the creatures whom He had made—made, too, for Himself and after His own likeness. But if we ask how this is, how eternal beatitude can compassionate, infinite wisdom relent, omniscient justice forbear, reason is silent. Any further step it could

take would lead us backward instead of forward. But of that domain where reason, limited and bounded, cannot come, faith is free. Faith, a gift from God, can alone explain Him to us, and it is enough that, having seen as much as reason had to show us, we can say of what remains, I believe.

After all, should we be satisfied with an explanation, complete at every point, of this mystery of the divine love for us? Would not God be less in our eyes just because we could see Him now so distinctly? Would our reverence for Him be so profound, our praise of Him so genuine and so easy, our service of Him so careful, if we could measure His perfection and weigh His love by the standards of this life? We may try to comprehend Him, and it is our happiness to do so; but when we have done our best we have to own that still the mystery remains and the truth, and only faith can understand it. But God is not destroyed because our thoughts of Him are confused and contradictory; rather for that very reason we see Him the more truly as He is. For the God whose attributes and operations are literally explicable in terms of our own is not our God; He is perhaps the first of creatures, but He is in the end limited like ourselves; we need not fear Him, and we are not compelled to love Him. "Let him who cannot understand it," says St. Augustine, "rejoice that he can only wonder. Let him rejoice and be glad rather to find Thee by not finding Thee, than by finding Thee to lose Thee."

R. H. J. Steuart, S. J.

England.

LITERARY INTEREST OF THE BOOK OF JOB.

REAL literature, of whatever age or clime, has two essential marks; first, "the subject must be one that appeals to our common humanity, and, second, this subject must be treated in so perfect a manner that the reading of it gives general pleasure." The Book of Job possesses both of these qualifications in an almost unrivaled degree.

The difficulty of reconciling our faith in God's infinite holiness with the sin-laden world before our eyes, His justice with the prosperity of the many who know Him not and the persecution which is the portion of His chosen servants would be insurmountable were man left to himself. And sorrow, which touches us all so closely, so intimately, what does it mean? Does it not seem paradoxical that man, created for happiness, must drink its very dregs that he may be purified and ennobled? It is with these, life's deepest problems, that the Book of Job deals and to solve which, according to Brother Azarias, is the aim of all literature. The sum of the teaching of the poem is that suffering as well as prosperity is God's gift and that man must trust Him implicitly, however dark the way, for He is infinite power and wisdom and goodness and His ways are unsearchable. Add to this the Gospel's constantly reiterated assurances of His love and we have the solution of the deepest and most vexing of questions as far as it is meant for man to know and understand.

The belief common to the ancients for centuries after the time of Job was that misfortune and disease marked the anger of the gods. Hippocrates was the first Greek to assign a natural cause for sickness. Nor has the misconception of the significance of suffering retreated before the advance of modern learning, where it is unarmed with the sublimely simple lessons of Holy Scripture. For the pessimism which is the philosophic fashion of the age, the darling of Leopardi, Schopenhauer and their following, there is but one refutation. That the human race is crushed and bleeding beneath its load of suffering—its bodily pain, its sharp mental anguish, the pangs of remorse, heaviest of all, the untold, unfathomable heartache of thousands—this is a stern fact; but cries Job, "Our days upon earth are but a shadow"—so why grieve without comfort? "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that I shall arise from the earth on the last day"—so why mourn without hope?

As to the manner in which the drama is presented, to praise it extravagantly were impossible. It is a didactic drama with an epic introduction and conclusion, the prologue and epilogue being written

in prose, the remainder (chapters iii.—xliii.) in poetry. It has been called the Hebrew Tragedy, but the definition is inaccurate, for it closes happily. Though the setting is dramatic, the substance is didactic, and it was intended for study, not for the stage, as some few commentators suggested, but were unable to prove. Because their God was infinite, incomprehensible, immeasurably above man's power to depict, the Hebrews, unlike many of the nations of antiquity, had no theatre and, strictly speaking, no drama. It would have been a desecration to have represented the One who said of Himself, "I am who am," or even the venerable figures of the patriarchs, as the Greeks did Jupiter and Venus and a host of lesser deities and heroes whose strong, ungoverned, human passions furnished the groundwork of their tragedies. Many, enamored of classic models, do not enjoy the poetry of the Bible, objecting that it lacks the regular flow of uniform meter and stanza; yet these things are no more essential to true poetry than rhyme, which was unknown to Homer, Virgil and Horace and which Milton deprecated as "the invention of a barbarous age to set off wretched matter and lame meter, the jingling sound of like endings trivial to all judicious ears and of no true musical quality." Some students think that Hebrew poetry followed no metrical laws, others that it had rhyme without meter. St. Jerome, and surely there is no higher authority, asserts that Job and almost all the poems of the Bible are composed in hexameters and pentameters or other regular meters like those of the classics. Herder is among those who believe that the Hebrews had a complete system of versification, but he thinks that it would be impossible to recover it.

It has been truly said that "though not written for the purpose of pleasing literary critics, still our bountiful Lord has scattered through the Sacred Volume the same profusion of beauty and of grandeur which is so conspicuous in all the works of His omnipotence," and in poetic sublimity, the epic simplicity of its setting and the variety of its characters the Book of Job stands alone even in Holy Scripture. As Stedman has it, "the life drama of the man of Uz towers with no peak near it." Even Carlyle, prone as he was to pick flaws, hushed his noisy railing to speak with humble reverence of the history of Job. "It is one of the grandest things ever written by man," he exclaims. "A noble book! All men's book! Such living likenesses were never since drawn. Sublime sorrow, sublime resignation; as soft and great as the summer midnight, as the world with its seas and stars. There is nothing written, I think, of equal literary merit!" And to multiply quotations: "No writer, not even Jeremias, he alone whose lamentations, according to Bossuet, come up to his feelings, has carried the sad-

ness of the soul to such a pity as the holy Arab. It is true that the imagery borrowed from a southern clime, from the sands of the desert, the solitary palm tree, the sterile mountain, is in singular unison with the language and sentiment of an afflicted soul; but in the melancholy of Job there is something supernatural. The individual man, however wretched, cannot draw forth such sighs from his soul. Job is the emblem of suffering humanity, and the inspired writer has found lamentation sufficient to express all the afflictions incident to the whole human race."

In the "Genius of Christianity" Chateaubriand has also an elaborate comparison between the Bible and Homer, endeavoring to prove that, even as mere literature, the former surpasses man's greatest masterpieces and notably so in Job. "In Homer," he says, "the sublime consists in the magnificence of the words harmonizing with the majesty of thought. In the Bible, on the contrary, the highest sublimity often arises from a vast discordance between the majesty of the idea and the littleness, nay, the triviality, of the word that expresses it. The soul is thus subjected to a terrible shock, for when, exalted by thought, it has soared to the loftiest regions, all on a sudden the expression, instead of supporting it, lets it fall from heaven to earth, precipitating it from the bosom of the divinity into the mire of this world. This species of sublime—the most impetuous of all—is admirably adapted to an immense and awful Being allied at once to the greatest and most trivial objects. Homer has a thousand sublime ways of characterizing a violent death; but the Book of Job has surpassed them all in this single expression: 'The first born of death shall devour his strength.' The first born of death, to imply a most cruel death, is one of those metaphors which are to be found nowhere but in the Bible. We cannot conceive whither the human mind has been in quest of this; all the paths that lead to this passage of the sublime are unexplored and unknown."

Again, speaking of the "Odyssey," Chateaubriand quotes the following passage in which the soothsayer, struck with the sinister omens with which Penelope's suitors are threatened, addresses them this apostrophe:

> O race to death devote! with Stygian shade
> Each destined peer impending fates invade:
> With tears your wan distorted cheeks are drowned;
> With sanguine drops the walls are rubied round;
> Thick swarms the spacious hall with howling ghosts,
> To people Orcus and the burning coasts!
> Nor gives the sun his golden orb to roll,
> But universal night usurps the pole.

"Awful as this sublime may be," is his comment, "still it is inferior in this respect to the vision of Eliphaz in Job: 'In the horror

of a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to hold men, fear seized upon me, and trembling, and all my bones were affrighted; and when a spirit passed before me the hair of my flesh stood up. There stood one whose countenance I knew not, an image before my eyes, and I heard the voice, as it were, of a gentle wind.' Here we have much less blood, less darkness and fewer tears than in Homer, but that unknown countenance and gentle wind are much more awful."

Most famous of all the wonderful passages in the Book of Job is the description of the war horse. Men, capable of judging, declare that as a word-picture it is unsurpassed even in Holy Scripture.

> Wilt thou give strength to the horse, or clothe his neck with neighing?
> Wilt thou lift him up like the locusts? The glory of his nostrils is terror.
> He breaketh up the earth with his hoof, he pranceth boldly, he goeth forward to meet armed men.
> He despiseth fear, he turneth not his back to the sword.
> Above him shall the quiver rattle, the spear and shield shall glitter.
> Chasing and raging he swalloweth the ground, neither doth he make account when the noise of the trumpet soundeth.
> When he heareth the trumpet he saith: Ha, ha: he smelleth the battle afar off, the encouraging of the captains, and the shouting of the army.

As to the passages in which God's power and majesty are described through the works of His creation, nothing has ever approached their simple, awful grandeur. All merely human effort is dwarfed by comparison with them. For example, take the verses:

> Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Tell me if thou hast understanding.
> Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who hath stretched the line upon it?
> Upon what are its bases grounded? or who laid the corner-stone thereof,
> When the morning stars praised me together, and all the sons of God made a joyful melody?

Truly, as Bacon, with his matchless genius for saying all in a single sentence, pointed out as the reason of the marvelous beauty of the poem, "The pencil of the Holy Ghost hath labored more in describing the afflictions of Job than the felicities of Solomon."

Though no poem had ever reached the heights attained by Job, many of the ideas embodied in it had long been the property of humanity. As Brother Azarias says: "Of all the beautiful and elevating thoughts found in all the great works of antiquity, there is not one that has not been crystallized into a fuller and clearer and more rounded expression in the Sacred Books of the Old Testament and the New." Beginning with the "Prisses Papyrus," conceded to be the oldest document in the world and dating from the thirty-fifth century before Christ, we find Pita Hotep, the Egyptian sage, speaking words that were echoed on the dunghill of Arabia. Later an Egyptian prince, calling down maledictions on any one who would destroy the tablet inscribed with the names of his vic-

tories, sums up a list of calamities which he charitably hopes may overtake them. It might have been copied bodily from Job: "May not his offspring survive him! May his servants be broken! May his troops be defeated! May his name and his race perish!"

And in modern times the greatest minds that have wrested with the deep and ever-recurring problem of suffering, just so far as they approach the ideal, do they repeat the message of Job. Dante and Milton transmitted it—each in his own way; in our own day Tennyson in "In Memoriam" groped for it, but, hampered by the philosophic errors of a doubting age, failed to grasp its full meaning. Francis Thompson, having the light of Catholic faith, saw farther. "Must Thou char the wood ere Thou canst limn with it?" he asks, knowing the answer.

When Job lived and by whom his history was written are questions which cannot be conclusively answered. Comparatively easy of solution is the, at first sight, more difficult one: How did pagans like Job and his friends possess so pure a knowledge of the one true God and so firm a faith in the coming of a Redeemer? All the nations of antiquity, being children of Adam and Noe, had the tradition of a Redeemer to come. The Chinese, whose conservatism led them to hold closely to the primitive revelations, knew so exactly the time of the advent of the "Great Star that was to appear in the West" that thirty years after the death of Christ they sent messengers to Him. Vestiges of the tradition are found in the answers of the Roman Sybils, in Virgil and even in ancient national songs; so it would be strange to find that Arabs, such as Job and his friends, being Semites and hence naturally religious, had no knowledge of the Promised One. But in Job they go farther and manifest a humble trust in an all-wise Providence and a realization of man's nothingness in comparison to God which are peculiar to them and the antithesis of pagan pride. This arose from the fact that the Arabs were descended either from Heber, an ancestor of Abraham, or from Ishmael, the son of Abraham, and were consequently, in the first ages of their history, possessed of a simple, patriarchal faith in the one God. Later, through their intercourse with other nations, they became corrupt, and Herodotus says that in his time they worshiped Venus, as did their Assyrian neighbors. These facts would indicate that Job must have lived at the time of Abraham or soon after. And there are other indications that this was the case. He lived to a great age—a hundred and forty years after his wealth was restored; that wealth consisted solely of flocks and herds; and the musical instruments referred to are those mentioned only in Genesis—the organ, harp and timbrel.

As to the authorship of this "sublimest poem of antiquity," some

ascribe it to Job himself, others to Moses, and this theory is supported by the purity of its Hebrew, by the display of what in his day comprised Egyptian learning, and by his long residence in Arabia. The opinion now held by the greater number of Catholic commentators is that it was not written before the time of Solomon. The question remains an open one. Stedman, standing on higher ground than he often attains, suggests that "the shadow of his name was taken lest he should fall by pride."

Needless to add that there is much in the book of Job not easily understood, more, perhaps, incomprehensible. What Hello with his marvelous spiritual insight wrote of the Bible as a whole applies to no part of it more forcibly than to this poem: "Holy Scripture is an abyss which guards within itself marvelous mysteries. One of the most astonishing things in it is its simplicity. If it seemed to be profound its depths would be less terrifying. But this simplicity! Words without adornment, characters without affectation, virtues without pride, crimes without disguise, and behind all this depths that would make an angel dizzy, depths that the eye of the eagle could not pierce."

F. GILMORE.

Columbus, Ohio.

TALLEYRAND'S CONVERSION.

THE story of the life of Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord has long been an enigma to men of ordinary conscientiousness and consistency. That of his death has to many seemed as enigmatical and as hard to understand. The volume now before us, however, dispels much of the mystery which has long enshrouded the closing days and hours of an extraordinary career and makes clear the reality of a conversion and a repentance which have constantly been the subject of the sneers of cynics. Talleyrand was born at Paris in 1754, the oldest of three sons of an ancient and honorable family. In accordance with a custom then common in France, he was confided at an early age to a foster mother of the peasant class and sent to reside at her home. When only three years old he met with an accident therein which resulted in permanent lameness and rendered him incapable of service in the army, in which many of his ancestors had won distinction and wealth. It is not improbable, although we have not found the suggestion offered elsewhere, that the practical experience thus early acquired by Talleyrand of the hardships of the peasant's lot under

the olden order of social existence in France may have had a great deal to do with the creation of those subversive tendencies which afterwards so considerably influenced his political and public actions. At any rate, he was largely the victim of circumstances which he could not control, and he has himself testified to the fact that he could not remember having ever been allowed to spend a day beneath the parental roof. The Talleyrand-Perigords belonged to a fighting race, and they saw no use in wasting care on a cripple who was incapable of perpetuating the proud traditions of the family. Accordingly, they bestowed him on the Church! His uncle was the Archbishop of Rheims, so that there was no difficulty in securing his early admission to the famous Seminary of St. Sulpice. In this renowned centre of ecclesiastical education he soon gave ample proof of the possession of talents far above the average. His capacity for dealing with matters of administration and business was specially marked. It was this, combined with the influence of his uncle, which secured for him almost immediately after his ordination appointment to the office of Agent General for the clergy of France. His services in this position won him nomination to the vacant Bishopric of Autun, and he ruled this see at the time of the birth of the Revolution in 1789.

Talleyrand's career as a revolutionist is a matter of general history and need scarcely be described in detail here. It will suffice to say that he became an open and avowed enemy of all the traditional principles of Catholic France. In common with other foresworn prelates, he denied the supreme authority of the Holy See and accepted the so-caled Constitutional Oath rejecting the Papal headship of the Church within the Republic. It was he who acted as celebrant of the High Mass on the occasion of the famous gathering on the Champ de Mars on the 14th of July, 1790, in commemoration of the first anniversary of the capture of the Bastile. Upwards of two hundred other priests assisted, wearing tricolor robes, instead of their proper vestments. The unfortunate King and Queen and the little Dauphin were present, as well as many of the nobility, in futile effort to propitiate the Revolution which was eventually to destroy them. Four days previously, on the 10th of July, 1790, a meeting had been held of all the Bishops of France, at which it had been resolved by an enormous majority to refuse to recognize the so-called Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which had been condemned by the Pope. Four prelates voted for acceptance, in defiance of the Holy See. They were Talleyrand, Bishop of Autun; the Archbishop of Aix and the Bishops of Lidda, Orleans and Vivier. It may be desirable to explain that the Civil Constitution decreed by the National Assembly conferred the right of appointment of all

Bishops and parish priests on a simple majority of the laity of their respective dioceses or parishes, without any reference to Rome even for approval. The project was, of course, equivalent to an attempt to create a schismatical National Church. It cannot be amiss to quote Alison's description, in his "History of Europe,"[1] of what followed on the 28th of January, 1791. He says: "Cazales in this contest, animated by the greatness of the cause he was defending, rose to the highest pitch of eloquence and pronounced a speech which proved to be prophetic: 'The clergy, in conformity with the principles of their religion, are compelled to refuse the oath. You may expel them from their benefices; but will that destroy their influence over their flocks? Do you doubt that the Bishops, driven from their stations, will excommunicate those who are put in their place? Do you doubt that a large part of the faithful will remain attached to their ancient pastors, to the eternal principles of the Church? There is a schism introduced, the quarrels of religion commence; the people will come to doubt the validity of the sacraments; they will fear to see disappear from the land that sublime religion which, receiving man in the cradle, and following him to the grave, can alone offer him consolations amidst the vicissitudes of life. Thus will commence the division of the people, the multiplication of the victims of the Revolution. You will see the Catholics, over the whole country, following their beloved pastors amidst forests and caverns; you will see them reduced to the misery and desolation which the Protestant clergy experienced on the revocation of the edict of Nantes. Is that a result to be desired of a Revolution which proclaimed peace on earth, good will towards men? Driven from their episcopal palaces, the Bishops will retire to the huts of the cottagers who have sheltered them in their distress. Take from them their golden crosses, and they will find others of wood; and it was by a cross of wood that the whole world was saved!' "

A further quotation from Alison will show how widely sundered Talleyrand already was from the majority of his colleagues in the true episcopacy and clergy of France. We read: "When the fatal day arrived, fixed for the final taking of the oath by the Bishops and dignified clergy in the Assembly, a furious multitude surrounded the hall, exclaiming: 'To the lamp-post! to the lamp-post with all who refuse!' The Abbé Maury raised his powerful voice in the last extremity, but he was interrupted by incessant cries. 'Strike; but hear me!' exclaimed the intrepid champion of the Church; but it was all in vain. 'Swear! swear!' resounded on all sides, and the grayhaired heads of the French Church came forth.

[1] "History of Europe," Vol. II., pp. 222, 223, 224.

The Bishop of Agen was the first called; he had never before spoken in the Assembly, and it was with great difficulty he could obtain a hearing. 'Swear or refuse!' was the universal cry of the galleries. 'I feel no regret at the loss of my preferment; I feel no regret for the loss of my fortune; but I should feel regret, indeed, if I lost your esteem; believe me, then, I cannot take the oath.' M. Fournes was next called. 'I glory,' said he, 'in following my Bishop, as St. Lawrence did his pastor.' Le Cleve was the next called. 'I am a member,' said he, 'of the Apostolic Church.' 'Swear or refuse!' said Rœderer, in a voice almost hoarse with fury. 'This is tyranny indeed!' exclaimed Foucault; 'the emperors who persecuted the Christian martyrs allowed them to pronounce the name of God and testify, in dying, their faith in their religion.' The Bishop of Poictiers then presented himself. 'I am seventy years old,' said he; 'I have passed thirty-five years in my bishopric; I will not dishonor my old age; I cannot take an oath against my conscience.' 'Say yes or no.' 'I prefer, then, living in poverty, and will accept my lot in the spirit of patience.' Only one curé, named Landrin, took the oath; even the hundred and eighteen who had first given victory to the Tiers Etat, by joining their ranks, held back. At length the President said: 'For the last time I call on the Bishops and ecclesiastical functionaries to come forward and take the oath in terms of the decree.' A quarter of an hour of dead silence ensued, during which no one came forward and the meeting adjourned. In all probability Talleyrand was present at this terrible scene, but there was no reason to call upon him to take the oath, because he had already accepted it. Moreover, so far back as August 23, 1789, he had openly declared in the Assembly his complete indifference on the question of religion or morality and proclaimed that 'the only proper course was to allow every man to choose his own.' Again, he had been the first to propose the confiscation of the possessions of the Church for the purposes of the State on the 2d of October, 1789. It was these proofs of his revolutionary orthodoxy which secured his selection as celebrant of the Mass in the Champ de Mars. In June, 1792, he was sent to London, nominally as attaché or secretary to the Minister Plenipotentiary, the Marquis de Chauvelin, sent to England by Dumouriez, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, to secure the neutrality of that country in the impending conflict between France and the Continental Powers. In reality he was the Ambassador, a position for which his natural gifts as a diplomatist, both subtle and unscrupulous, abundantly qualified him. At the same time he was guarding against possible accidents by conveying assurances to Louis XVI. that he was devoted to his interests. The mission to London

was a success and would have remained a permanent one if it had not been for the murder of the King and Queen by the revolutionists. Talleyrand completely cajoled George III., but the horror and indignation created in England by the act of regicide put an end to his diplomatic usefulness. Moreover, the secret of his communications with the murdered monarch had been discovered in Paris, and he was recalled. His marvelous courage is attested by the fact that he returned, faced his accusers, denied the validity of the evidences they had secured and obtained permission to go back to London. This he did, but the English authorities would not allow him to remain, and he was compelled to seek a refuge in America. He settled in Baltimore, where his life was scandalous in the last degree; but, shameful to relate, his courtliness of manner and personal fascination secured him admittance to the best social circles in that city at the time, although he flaunted himself in the chief thoroughfares with his favorite companion—a Negro woman—hanging on his arm. The eccentricity of taste was probably ascribed to his French origin. However the fact may be explained, it remains a fact all the same. He even attempted to secure reception at the White House, but George Washington refused him admission. Following the fall of Robespierre, Talleyrand was enabled to return to France, in September, 1796. Thenceforth his life was a part of the life of France. He was as prompt to recognize the genius of Napoleon as the latter was to recognize his. That he was a patriot always desirous of securing the independence, prosperity and power of his native land is beyond question. That he ever really lost his faith or ceased to be a believing Catholic, despite all his aims, is by no means certain. What is absolutely proven is that, when Napoleon decided to restore the supremacy of religion and entered into negotiations with the Holy See for the reëstablishment of the Church, Talleyrand labored indefatigably to secure reconcilement of the views of the First Consul with those of the Pope and his advisers. The memory of his olden avocation, if not vocation, seems to have stirred his heart and intellect, and all his energies were devoted to securing the settlement which was arrived at and which has only come to an end in our own time.

His action in this respect was, however, only preliminary to what was, perhaps, the greatest fault of Talleyrand's strange career. The ink with which the Concordat was written was barely dry when he determined to marry. The decision must have been the outcome of some strange infatuation. He was a priest, notwithstanding all his moral abberations. His vow of celibacy was irrevocable. He had been consecrated Bishop, and the fact made his original obligation, if possible, still more irrevocable. Nevertheless, he applied to

the Pope for a dispensation to enable him to marry the woman of his choice. This was Madame Grand, the divorced wife of a French official in the service of the Dutch Government and a female of absolutely irretrievable reputation, so flagrant had been her offenses against the marriage vow. It was absolutely impossible for Talleyrand to enter into legitimate alliance with her, her husband being still alive, even if he had never been an ecclesiastic. His case seems to have been that of a victim of delusion. There were plenty of other women of comparative respectability who in that sad time would have linked their fate with his, with or without dispensation, but he deliberately selected as his consort her who seemed the worst of a bad lot. Yet, with all her sins written on her shoulders, poor Madame Grande, like the Penitent Thief and Talleyrand himself, did not die the death of the unforgiven. Mercy she sought and mercy found when the very curtains of death were already shrouding her. We are, however, rather anticipating the regular course of our narrative. This may, nevertheless, be as good a place as any for remarking that while Talleyrand's relations with Madame Grand had been the subject of much scandalous comment and denunciation by extreme Republicans as far back as 1798, the attacks leveled at him were mainly based on the ground that he persisted in maintaining his belief in the Crucified Saviour and in the truths taught by the Catholic Church. The ex-Bishop was a great sinner, but he never lost the faith and never wanted to lose it. He met the scoffs of his infidel lecturers on morals with sneers as bitter as their own. M. de Lacombe tells us that Laréveillère-Lépeaux was one of the most virulent of his critics: "An honest man, but a narrow-minded and impassioned sectary, this apostle of a so-called philosophical religion could not forgive Talleyrand for the epigrams with which he had riddled Theophilanthropy. One day at the Institute, when Laréveillère in enthusiastic terms was vaunting the beauties of the new ceremonies, the ex-Bishop of Autun had had the impertinence to interrupt him: 'I have but one observation to make,' he said gravely. 'In order to found His religion Jesus Christ was crucified and rose from the dead. You should have tried to do as much.'[2] Yet the Talleyrand who thus silenced a blatant unbeliever was the same who consecrated the schismatic so-called Constitutional Bishops at the bidding of the leaders of the National Assembly, functionaries who usurped the sees of the true Bishops of France and who—elected by the sovereign people—rejected the authority of the Vicar of Christ. Whatever stands to the credit of Talleyrand almost seems to deepen the shadow of the guilt of his sins.

[2] "Talleyrand, the Man," p. 125.

During the negotiations betwen the Holy See and the First Consul which resulted in the conclusion of the Concordat Talleyrand constantly endeavored to secure the inclusion in that treaty of some clause which while appearing to be of general application to all the French ecclesiastics who had broken their vow of celibacy might be interpreted as being equally applicable to his case. This, however, was precisely what the Pope, who knew perfectly well the nature of the game Talleyrand was playing, was determined should not be granted, because the status of a Bishop or of a member of a regular order was in some degree different from that of the members of the rank and file of the secular clergy. As early as the 26th of January, 1801, the Abbé Bernier, who was the delegate of the French Government in the preliminary negotiations for a Concordat, had in his notes for the information of the Holy See written as follows:

"The second article of the proposed convention has for its object the status of ecclesiastics who have received holy orders and contracted civil marriage since the Revolution. The Government, desiring peace for all, wishes that a salutary door should be opened to admit them to the Catholic communion, if they themselves desire it, and that the dispositions of the Council of Ancyra in 314 with regard to married deacons should be revived on their behalf if they are ready to live and die as Catholics and to renounce all exercise of holy orders, which they cannot be allowed to resume, even by putting away their wives, without real scandal."

It will be seen from this that the Holy See at the very outset had received assurance of a reasonably satisfactory kind as to what the most extreme demands of the rulers of the Republic would be so far as the so-called Constitutional and married clergy would be. Urged by Talleyrand, however, Bonaparte pressed for the insertion of a clause in the Concordat in the following words:

"Ecclesiastics who have contracted marriage since their ordination, or who by other acts have notoriously renounced the ecclesiastical state, shall be classed as ordinary citizens and be admitted as such to the secular communion."

M. de Lacombe points out that: "Mgr. Spina, the representative of the Holy See, immediately made reservations; he gave it to be understood that the addition 'or who by other acts have notoriously renounced the ecclesiastical state' would not be accepted in Rome; and guessing that Talleyrand was concealed under this formula, he hastened to report it to Cardinal Consalvi."[3] The message was as follows:

"I do not know if the Minister Talleyrand wishes to be included

[3] "Talleyrand, the Man," p. 137.

in this; but I have made it quite clear that no Bishop, nor any one bound by solemn vows, can obtain the Apostolic indulgence."

As M. de Lacombe puts the case: "This was the crux of the problem. On the one hand, Rome, though disposed to make concessions, would not allow secular authority to meddle in a question of ecclesiastical discipline, nor that a case of conscience should become an article of the Concordat. She was ready to absolve, but by a special act, emanating from her spiritual authority alone. On the other hand, her traditions obliged her to make a distinction. Seculars and regulars are not bound by the same vows; the same treatment was not suitable to both. In the days of Mary Tudor the Pope, Julius III., full of benevolence towards the unfaithful priests among the English clergy, was inflexible towards Bishops and religious. This precedent was an example to Pius VII., and he would not swerve from it." No one ought to have known better than Talleyrand what the attitude of the Pontiff must be, but he seems to have cherished the delusion that the Vicar of Christ, influenced by motives of statecraft, would subordinate sacred principles for the satisfaction of himself and Bonaparte. The Holy Father condescended so far as to write a personal letter to the First Consul setting out exactly the lines on which he was resolved to act. In this he said:

"As to the absolution of married priests—excepting religious bound by solemn vows, and Bishops, concerning whom not a single example of such indulgence has been admitted in the Church in the whole course of her existence—and the absolution of those who have separated themselves from the Church in other ways we will provide for it by giving the necessary powers, in order that they may be absolved in accordance with ecclesiastical rule and discipline, assuring you that it will be to us a duty full of sweetness to let them feel the effects of all paternal condescension on our part to its utmost extent; and in this we will even have regard, in so far as is permissible to us, to the present circumstances of the Church in France."

Talleyrand was furious, but he preserved an outward calm. Master of intrigue and diplomatic wile as he was, he set himself to obstruct the negotiations with the Holy See. M. de Lacombe says: "He hindered the preliminaries, raised or exaggerated difficulties, was less supple and adaptable, less fertile in suggestions for overcoming difficulties and ever on the watch to bring upon the 'tapis,' with indefatigable dexterity, the question which touched him so nearly.'[4] Finally he induced Bonaparte to request from the Pope that:

[4] "Talleyrand, the Man," p. 139.

"His Holiness will dispense from the vow of celibacy those ecclesiastics who have contracted marriage since their ordination, upon condition that they shall renounce the exercise of their functions, and will admit to the ranks of lay Catholics those who by other acts have notoriously renounced their condition."

His Holiness took absolutely no notice of the request, and the Concordat was eventually signed on the 15th of July, 1801, without any reference to the unfaithful priests in its provisions. When the formal treaty was complete and duly ratified on both sides, the Sovereign Pontiff issued a Brief on the 15th of August, addressed to the Archbishop of Corinth, in which by a measure of exceptional clemency he absolved all sub-deacons, deacons and priests of the secular clergy who had contracted marriage or renounced their condition; but the pardon did not extend to either ex-religious or Bishops. Mgr. Dupanloup, referring to this episode, has written:

"On one side we see all the efforts of ability and power; on the other ability likewise, but a weakened and threatened power, immutable, however, by the firmness of justice and triumphant by the ascendancy of virtue. It is one of the numerous hidden episodes of that great religious epoch; and I do not hesitate to say that none is more glorious to the Church."[5]

It will be seen that, solely by virtue of his own authority, the Pope—so far as he felt free in conscience to do so—had simply drummed out of the ranks of the French secular clergy a number of men who were a disgrace to their cloth and whose continued discharge of sacerdotal functions would have been only a prolongation of sacrilege and scandal.

Now, there is one point upon which it is well to be clear and precise. The Pope was willing—under the sad and irrevocable human conditions which had arisen—to unfrock and treat as lay Catholics the ordinary secular priests who had fallen away from their vocation. He was even willing to recognize their marriages, but he would grant no dispensation from their original vow of celibacy to those ecclesiastics who had been members of religious orders or received episcopal consecration. Even in the case of the latter he was, however, content, in certain special instances, to allow them to remain in the lay community of the Church if they abandoned unions which were absolutely null and void from the beginning and for the continuance of which no absolution could be given. This concession was a great one, but it was not enough for Talleyrand, and he had the audacity to continue to pester the Holy See with petitions for license to marry Madame Grand. Moreover, he had incurred excommunication of the directly personal kind,

[5] "Talleyrand, the Man," p. 141.

and absolution of his sins was reserved to the Pope. He thought, or pretended to think, that remission to the position of a lay Catholic would involve permission to enjoy all the privileges, matrimonial or otherwise, of the ordinary layman. It is difficult to see how one so astute as he was could possibly have honestly fallen into such an error. Talleyrand, however, had more than ordinarily good grounds for hopefulness. Both Cardinal Caprara, the Papal Legate at Paris, and Cardinal Consalvi,[6] Papal Secretary of State at Rome, were earnestly desirous of facilitating the accomplishment of his views because of the services he had generally rendered in connection with the Concordat. The Pope, however, had other advisers than his diplomatists and politicians in a matter of spiritual importance. To these the case of the ex-Bishop of Autun was referred for consideration. Mgr. di Pietro, a very learned theologian, examined it carefully and reported upon it at considerable length towards the end of February, 1802. In the course of his report he said:

"It does not seem possible to be satisfied with the petition presented by Charles Maurice Talleyrand. It contains not a single expression to show unequivocally that he detests the heretical and schismatical maxims of the civil constitution of the clergy, to which he adhered by taking the civil oath."[7]

Di Pietro further pointed out that Talleyrand, by acting as the consecrator of the constitutional Bishops, had been the real author of the schism. Napoleon, however, was bent on securing the gratification of the desire of his astute Minister for Foreign Affairs, and with his usual adroitness had managed to persuade the Papal Legate at Paris, Cardinal Caprara, that special concession in his favor—if it could be made—would be fraught with considerable advantage to the security of religious interests in France. Even Cardinal Consalvi was inclined to hold the same view. On the 10th of March, 1802, the Pope issued a Brief in which he made it quite clear that the only concession he would make to Talleyrand was that which he would make in the case of any other Bishop whose personal character was so notorious that his continued public discharge of episcopal functions would be scandalous in the last

[6] Cardinal Ercole Consalvi was born at Rome, June 8, 1757, and died in that city January 24, 1824. He was a worthy ecclesiastic, a great statesman and a fearlessly honest administrator of public affairs. Napoleon not only hated, but feared him, because of his unflinching opposition to his designs for the enslavement and humiliation of the Holy See. It was mainly through his exertions, supported as these were by Talleyrand, that the Congress of Vienna decreed the restoration of the Papal States. As Cardinal Secretary of State he reformed numerous abuses, suppressed monopolies, feudal taxes and exclusive rights. He was a liberal patron of science and the fine arts, a scholar and a musician.

[7] "Talleyrand, the Man," p. 145.

degree. The Pontiff was willing that he should finally relinquish the mitre and the crozier he was unworthy to bear and to devote himself henceforth to secular pursuits, but he was determined not to grant him any dispensation from the vows he had sworn, which were most galling to Talleyrand. Furthermore, he urged the imperative need of confession, penitence and penance. In addition, through Cardinal Antonelli, he issued authority to whomsoever Talleyrand might select as his confessor to grant him absolution when he had fulfilled the plain obligations of one in his state. The Papal Brief was a beautiful and touching document. As epitomized by M. de Lacombe, it reads in part as follows:

"'You voluntarily confess that you have fallen into the most grievous errors; you bewail the crimes you have committed; hearkening to wise counsel, you blush and ask pardon of your beloved Father. Oh, holy and blessed shame, never to be sufficiently rejoiced over!' We know that 'prostrate at your Father's knee you confess your faults; that having returned to the fold of the Supreme Shepherd you promise never to be led astray from it again. That you not only take the sacred engagement to be in future entirely subject with filial obedience and docility to the Apostolic Chair, but also to devote all your energy to the advancement and increase of religion and of the Church.' By which 'many sins shall be forgiven you.' We give power to our legate à latere to the First Consul, Jean Baptiste, Cardinal Caprara, 'to release you from the various censures by which you are bound; to restore you, under certain conditions, to the union of the Church; to give you leave, by restoring you to the lay communion, to assume the secular habit and discharge the duties of office in the French Republic.' The Brief further exhorted Talleyrand to repair by word and deed the evil he had done to the Church. 'Love God and His Only Son, love the Church and accept her decisions, love your neighbor, and, above all, love your former sons, those to whom the holy unction had bound you as father and spouse; love all Christians.' The Brief ended with an unexpected comparison: 'The threefold denial of Peter was completely effaced by his threefold confession of love. Take for your imitation the illustrious example of the Prince of the Apostles, and before your brethren, before all those to whom you have been a cause of scandal, before the altar of Christ, exclaim freely and courageously: "Lord, Thou knowest all things, Thou knowest that I love Thee." If you have followed Peter in his errors, follow him also in his penitence; that is to say, his triumph.' In conclusion, the Holy Father extended to Talleyrand his apostolic blessing."

Beautiful, condescending and touching though the Papal letter was, it was very different from what Talleyrand wanted. What he

really desired was a kind of Pontifical license to commit one sin more before settling down as a lay Catholic statesman. In other words, he sought what no Pope could or would grant him. Rather than give him what he craved, the Pontiff would have allowed the Concordat to be torn into shreds, as it has been in our own time by the present impious rulers of the latest French Republic. With the Pope's Brief Cardinal Antonelli transmitted to Cardinal Caprara secret instructions regarding the manner of "absolution of M. de Talleyrand." As M. de Lacombe puts it: "One thing preoccupied him above all—how would the Brief be received? Did he to whom it was addressed repent in all the sincerity of his heart? Did he wish to recover grace before God by confession and penance? Or did he simply wish to extricate himself from a false position, be reconciled with the Church, absolved from censure and excommunication, and released from sacerdotal duties? In the first case, if the conversion was deep and sincere, the Legate would transmit to Talleyrand the written Brief, not for himself only, but for the public. "When," added Antonelli, "he has appreciated and relished the exhortations of the Holy Father, so full of gentleness, and his sweet invitation to do penance, the letter of the Penitentiary may be given to him. . . . Naturally he is not to be restricted in the choice of a confessor to his liking, to whom he will make a good confession." With the sacramental absolution he will receive also absolution from the censures and excommunication. A penance will be enjoined him. But if Talleyrand should refuse to take the decisive step and kneel in the confessional, "and this," said Antonelli, "would be a source of unspeakable sorrow to the paternal heart of His Holiness," it will be necessary to exact from him a written declaration. In this Talleyrand was to make oath to be "the very obedient son of the Roman Catholic Church," to adhere to her judgments, and to abjure the errors in which he had formerly lived. Besides this, he must submit to the prayers and supplications prescribed by the ritual, and would then be released "at the external tribunal" from the censures and excommunication. "He would be left free, when God should touch his heart, to have recourse to a confessor and receive absolution in the sacrament of penance." The Cardinal Legate, however, was better acquainted with the character and purposes of the ex-Bishop of Autun than were either the Pope or his advisers, and—if M. de Lacombe is correct—he accepted the grave responsibility described "in a note in the archives of the Vatican" in the following words:

"The Cardinal Legate did not present the Brief to the Minister Talleyrand, having heard from some of his friends that it would

Thus it was that, to again quote M. de Lacombe's words: "Talleycertainly have displeased him."

rand made a third and supreme effort to restate the question to which Rome could only return a 'non possumus' and an equally inflexible 'non licet.'"

It must be remembered that, later on, Talleyrand repeatedly declared that he had no knowledge of the conditions set out in the Pope's Brief or Antonelli's instructions. This statement appears to be justified to some extent, at all events, by the Vatican memorandum just quoted. It is, however, quite certain that he knew he had failed to obtain what he most urgently sought, and this assertion is fully sustained by the unquestionable fact that on the 27th of May, 1802, a special messenger conveying dispatches to Rome set out from Paris. This was Major Lefèvre, of the Gendarmerie. According to M. de Lacombe, "he seemed in a great hurry, galloping at full speed and changing horses at the stages without stopping." The missive he was bearing to the Vatican was a formal demand from the First Consul for a decree of secularization of his Foreign Minister, backed by a series of wholly fallacious arguments, professedly based on historic precedents. These precedents had no real existence, and the fact that they were gravely relied on by Talleyrand shows that he was either wholly unscrupulous or extremely ignorant. The document ran as follows:

"It is a thing befitting the dignity of the French Government and useful to the discipline of the Church to grant a Brief of secularization to Citizen Talleyrand.

"That Minister has rendered great services to the Church and State. He has publicly and irrevocably renounced the functions and dignities of the priesthood. He wishes this renunciation to be ratified by a formal admission from the supreme head of religion; and he deserves this special favor.

"From the political point of view, now that France is once more a Catholic nation, it is not fitting that a Minister who has a principal place in the confidence of the Government should be a subject of uncertainty and controversy on account of his former condition.

"With regard to the efforts he has made to reconcile the Church and the Government, he must be enabled to enjoy, by the free expression of the gratitude of all the friends of religion, the reward of the zeal he has shown for its reëstablishment.

"These weighty considerations must immediately touch the benevolence and justice of the Holy Father.

"We will say nothing about the formalities required in such a case. His Holiness will choose the most proper and complete. As for examples in the past, the Holy Father will find many in history.

"In the seventeenth century, under Innocent X., Camille Pamphili,

Cardinal and nephew of the Sovereign Pontiff, was secularized and died a layman.

"In the fifteenth century Cæsar Borgia, Archbishop of Valencia, became Duke of Valentinois, married a princess of the house of Albret, and died a layman.

"Ferdinand de Gonzague, first an ecclesiastic and then Duke of Mantua; Maurice of Savoy, who was married in 1642, after receiving holy orders; the two Cardinals of Bourbon, uncle and nephew, both Archbishops of Lyons, died laymen, after abdicating their ecclesiastical dignities, with the consent of the Holy See.

"Henry of Portugal, Archbishop of Lisbon, and successor to the crown of Sebastian in 1588, died a king and a layman.

"Francis of Lorraine, who succeeded his brother, Charles IV., in 1634, and who afterwards became the father of Leopold, passed from the sacerdotal state to that of layman and remained faithful to the Church.

"All these examples are taken from times when the Holy See enjoyed full authority. The use which the predecessors of Pius VII. then made of it had for motive expediency and the good of the Church. These motives exist to-day, and it is doubtful if at any of these times the same request was ever founded upon such strong considerations."

This document was, in its way, a diabolically clever concoction, but it will be observed how few of the cases quoted by Talleyrand were really parallel to his own. The Pope was willing, under the peculiar conditions of his case, to allow him to cease the discharge of clerical or episcopal functions. If Talleyrand had not asked for this dispensation, His Holiness would have been compelled to inflict on him before the face of the world the disgrace of formal inhibition. That there had been other instances in the long history of the Church, wherein similar alternatives had had to be faced, was nothing to the point at all. What would have been would have been production of one in which the Holy See had permitted the marriage of a Bishop. The pleas advanced by Talleyrand were backed up by the First Consul in what was almost a threatening letter to the Pope, while the French Ambassador to the Holy See was instructed to press for immediate acquiescence with all the authority attaching to his position as representative of the recently reconciled Republic. The Pope, however, was not to be intimidated. He referred the whole matter to competent investigators. As M. de Lacombe says: "No dogma was at stake." It was solely a question of the maintenance or relaxation of immemorial discipline in case of a solitary Bishop, and this one who was palpably incapacitated from the discharge of episcopal duties, without the crea-

tion of a new scandal. In the words of the writer just quoted, the Pope, "to his greater honor, treated the petition of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic as that of any one else." The standard of morals safeguarded by the Church does not vary with the rank or convenience of its members. The most careful examination was made of the alleged precedents relied on by Talleyrand, and they were clearly shown to be non-existent. It is best to quote again from M. de Lacombe. He says:

"The archivist of the Vatican, Mgr. Marini, refuted point by point, with learned notes written even on the margin of the request of the French Government, all the alleged precedents of married Bishops. To facts alleged, the learned Roman replied with facts proved. Before their marriage neither Camille Pamphili nor Cæsar Borgia had ever received episcopal consecration, nor even sacerdotal ordination; Ferdinand de Gonzague, Duke of Mantua, was only a lay Cardinal. His resignation of membership of the Sacred College was sufficient to release him. Maurice of Savoy was not even in minor orders. The Cardinals of Bourbon who renounced the purple never returned to the lay condition and were never married. As to the two Cassimirs, Kings of Poland, it was very doubtful that the first had ever received a dispensation from his vows as a Benedictine; in any case he was not a Bishop; the second, the Jesuit, was only bound by simple vows. Francis of Lorraine had never received any holy orders. The case of the Cardinal Henry of Portugal, Archbishop of Lisbon, who succeeded his nephew, King Sebastian, in 1578, was still more decisive; in spite of the wishes of his people he could never obtain leave to efface the episcopal unction and contract marriage. Carried away by his polemical ardor and sure of his ground, Mgr. Marini forestalled objections. He did not content himself with tearing to pieces the examples sent from Paris; he brought to light three more old petitions which lay forgotten among his archives and crushed them victoriously with the weight of his learning. His report ended with these words: "Never has any dispensation from celibacy been granted to any one whatever who had previously been invested with the episcopal character."

The confutation of the pleas advanced by Talleyrand was complete. No doubt, in the long history of the Church instances can be found of bad Bishops and bad priests, as well as very many more of laymen; but these have existed not by the formal license of the Church, but in her despite. Mgr. di Pietro clenched the arguments of Marini, writing more as a theologian than a historian. He said:

"The celibacy of priests dates from the early days of Christianity.

No written tradition imposed it at first; but according to the teachings of St. Jerome in one of his epistles, the Apostles were virgins, or if they were married, they separated from their wives. In the fourth century the Council of Carthage, taking them as models, imposed continence upon the ministers of religion. Ever since the Latin Church has firmly maintained the celibacy of the clergy. The Eastern Church, it is true, on account of the weakness of her clergy, softened this discipline and authorized priests, deacons and sub-deacons to retain their wives when they were married before their ordination, but afterwards they were not allowed to contract marriage upon any pretext whatever. Moreover, even in the Eastern Church, a Bishop must be a virgin or widower, or at least he must put away his wife without any hope of resuming conjugal relationship. Whenever for the reëstablishment of the Catholic Church in any country the Holy See has condescended to a measure of exceptional benevolence, it was restricted to making valid the marriages, hitherto accounted null, of priests, deacons and sub-deacons; at no time and in no country has the marriage of Bishops ever been admitted. Such was the conduct of Julius III. towards England in 1554, and such was the conduct last year towards France of the Pontiff now actually reigning."

M. de Lacombe, having quoted the precise words of Mgr. di Pietro up to this, now proceeds to partly quote and partly epitomize the final conclusions of that learned theologian. He writes as follows:

"Having got so far in his demonstration, Di Pietro interrupts it as follows: 'It will be objected that the law of continence imposed on all Bishops of the Eastern and Western Church is founded on the very valid reason that it is not fitting that men occupied in dispensing the most sacred ministeries of our religion should at the same time be called upon to discharge conjugal duties. . . . That this reason does not apply in the present case, which deals with a Bishop who has renounced all episcopal functions and is reduced to the lay communion. . . .' No matter! Di Pietro hastens to reply; the episcopal character can never be effaced; the Fathers have said: 'The Pontificate is the crown of priesthood, the summit of sacerdocy;' having climbed so high, a man cannot descend. The history of the Church proves that she has never wavered on this point; for eighteen centuries, in spite of ardent prayers, in spite of imperative motives, she has never once consented to the marriage of a Bishop. The conclusion of Mgr. di Pietro was the same as that of Mgr. Marini: 'There is no ground for granting the solicited dispensation.'"

It is scarcely possible to do better by way of commentary on this

than quote the description given by M. de Lacombe of the action taken by the Pope when he received the report. He says: "Pius VII., who had, as has been said, the soul of a saint, and as he proved himself, the heart of a hero, never hesitated in the face of this double opinion so strongly supported, given him by Marini and Di Pietro. Whatever might be the consequences to himself, he would not license the marriage of Talleyrand. The principle should be safe in his hands. The Pope had ordered Mgr. di Pietro to prepare the Brief, and the usual writer of the Pontifical acts, aided by Spina, Consalvi and others, had surpassed himself. Never had the beautiful Latin phrases been so skillfully used, never were such tact and pliancy displayed. Not a word at which Talleyrand could take umbrage, and yet everything was said; his complete submission to the Holy See; his obligation to serve religion and the Church; he was restored to the lay communion, with right to wear the dress of a layman and discharge the high offices of state. Of marriage there was not a word." The Pope, however, was determined that no excuse for either misconception or misrepresentation should be found in this fact, and, accordingly, he wrote a personal letter to the First Consul, in which he fully explained the position of affairs. In this he said:

"We would have been ready to satisfy your Minister in his desire to contract marriage if this were not contrary to the laws of the Church. There is not a single example in eighteen centuries of license to marry being granted to a consecrated Bishop. You will see from the notes in the margin of the document you sent to us, and which we return, that there were errors of fact in all the alleged precedents. Your wisdom will prove to you that we could not do more than we have done. The tenor of the Brief which we send to Monsieur de Talleyrand will show him how much the interest you take in him and the services he has rendered for the reëstablishment of religion in France have weighed with us."[8]

Moreover, Cardinal Consalvi also wrote directly to Talleyrand as follows:

"I make no doubt but that your Excellency will find in the wording of the Brief which I send to-day what you meant when you wrote to me that there were certain formulas which would increase the favor granted by His Holiness, and others, which would destroy its value. Your Excellency will see that the Brief meets your views in a manner which cannot fail to be agreeable. Your Excellency has too much knowledge of the matter to make it necessary for me to point out that His Holiness has carried delicacy and consideration in the formula to the highest possible degree."

[8] This letter was dated 30th June, 1802. De Lacombe, p. 169.

Consalvi went on, in words almost identical with those used by the Pope in his letter to Napoleon, to explain to Talleyrand how impossible it was for the Pope to grant him permission to marry. All these documents were carried to Paris by the same officer, Major Lefèvre, who had borne Talleyrand's petition and the First Consul's letter in support thereof to Rome. The envoy appears to have made both journeys on horseback. When he reached the French capital, in the middle of July, Talleyrand, with Madame Grand, had left it for Bourbon l'Archambault, where the former went annually to undergo the "cure." Napoleon sent a brief note to his Minister informing him of the tenor of the Papal Brief, but Caprara, the Nuncio, had to send him Cardinal Consalvi's letter. He should also have sent the Brief, but the poor man was simply frightened out of his wits, and, instead, wrote a letter of his own full of slavish blandishments. Talleyrand was not a person to be humbugged by such endearments, and he promptly demanded the Brief itself, which Caprara, most reluctantly, had eventually to transmit, accompanied, however, by still another adulatory communication from himself, which the ex-Bishop of Autun most probably cast into the wastepaper basket it was so eminently fitted to adorn.

Every one who knows anything of the history of the Concordat between the Holy See and France will be aware that by a gross breach of faith Napoleon, without the consent of the Pope, tacked on to that treaty certain so-called organic articles, the validity of which was promptly repudiated by His Holiness. These articles were utilized for the first time for the benefit of Talleyrand. On the 19th of August, 1802, the meeting of the Council of State was held in Paris. At this assembly Portalis, who had been placed in charge of all matters relating to public worship, rose and called attention to the first of the articles in question, which he read in the following words:

"No Bull, Brief, Rescript, decree, order, provision, signature serving as a provision, nor other dispatch from the Court of Rome, even those concerning a private individual, shall be received, published, printed, nor otherwise put into execution, without the authorization of the Government."

Then he proceeded to read in the original Latin the Brief concerning Talleyrand, and proposed its registration. Various members of the Council protested, no doubt quite honestly, that they did not understand the document and that it should be translated. The President, Cambacérès, however, insisted that it should be forthwith registered, declaring that the First Consul demanded this. In the course of a vehement and dictatorial speech he said: "I cannot

conceive how you can oppose the registration and promulgation of a Brief from the Pope restoring a Bishop to the lay communion. It is surely the only way to prevent the Court of Rome from encroaching on the temporal authority in France." All opposition subsided, and the Brief was registered. The words used by Cambacérès indicated pretty clearly the nature of the game that was about to be played. The next day the three Consuls met, dominated as usual by Napoleon. The result was the formulation of a decree in the following words:

"The Consuls of the Republic having seen the Brief of Pope Pius VII., given at St. Peter's in Rome on the 29th of June, 1802—upon the report of the Councillor of State charged with all matters pertaining to public worship—after consultation with the Council of State, decree:

"The Brief of Pope Pius VII. given at St. Peter's in Rome on the 29th of June, 1802, by which Citizen Charles Maurice Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, is restored to secular life and to the lay communion, shall have full and entire effect."

The clear purpose was to mislead public opinion, to misrepresent the purport of the Brief and to create the idea that Talleyrand was free to marry. As soon as the text of the Consular decree became known in Rome there was consternation in the Papal councils. The perfidy which was being practiced was appalling, both in sinfulness and subtlety. All that could be done was done to counteract the treachery. Cardinal Consalvi at once forwarded dispatches to the Nuncios at the various European courts, and he directed Caprara to make the actual facts known in Paris. An official statement of the true circumstances was published in the chief Italian papers, and the Papal Secretary of State even drew up a paragraph which he instructed Cardinal Caprara to have inserted in the journals of Paris. This was as follows:

"In virtue of a Pontifical Brief, the Cardinal Legate has reconciled Citizen Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Church; he has restored him to the lay communion, but without releasing him from the vow which binds him since his ordination."

There were more reasons than one why this announcement could not be published, but the most essential of all was that there had been no "reconcilement" of Talleyrand to the Church. Despite this fact, Cardinal Caprara tried to get the paragraph published, but no editor was courageous enough to print it in face of the rigid State censorship which existed. At this moment Madame Grand's real husband, M. Grand, was actually in Paris, whither he had come presumably to levy blackmail. His divorced wife, acting in the name of Talleyrand, applied to the Dutch Government for an

appointment for him in some Dutch colony. This was at once given, and he was sent to the Cape of Good Hope, then still a possession of Holland. On the 9th of September, 1802, a formal contract of marriage between Talleyrand and Madame Grand was executed at the villa of the former at Neuilly. The witnesses were Napoleon and Josephine, the other two Consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun; the Secretary of State, Maret; Archambault and Boson de Perigord, Talleyrand's brothers, and two notaries, Fleury and Lecerf. On the following day a civil marriage was registered in the mairie of the Tenth Arrondissement of Paris, in the presence of a host of distinguished witnesses, and it has been alleged by more than one writer that the crowning scandal was enacted of a religious ceremony, performed by a priest of character akin to Talleyrand's own at Epinay. The marriage register of the church at Epinay during 1802 has disappeared, however, and there is no evidence existing to show that any such monstrous sacrilege was perpetrated. The ex-Bishop of Autun had now, apparently, done everything within his power to make certain his spiritual ruin and final revolt against the Church of which, despite himself, he remained a consecrated minister.

William F. Dennehy.

Dublin, Ireland.

REUNION OF THE CHURCHES.

Letter of Our Most Holy Lord Pius X., by Divine Providence Pope.

TO THE ARCHBISHOPS, DELEGATES APOSTOLIC OF BYZANTIUM IN GREECE, EGYPT, MESOPOTAMIA, PERSIA, SYRIA AND EASTERN INDIA.

Venerable Brethren, Health and Apostolic Benediction.

IT WOULD be hard to say how much has been done by holy men from the closing years of the ninth century, when the nations of the East began to be snatched from the unity of the Catholic Church, in order that our separated brethren might be restored to her bosom. Beyond all others the Supreme Pontiffs, our predecessors, in fulfillment of their duty of protecting the faith and ecclesiastical unity, left nothing undone, by fatherly exhortations, public embassies and solemn councils, to remove this most fatal dissidence which brought bitter grief to the West, but to the East grave loss. The witnesses of this, to mention but a few among many, are Gregory IX., Innocent IV., Clement IV., Gregory X., Eugenius IV., Gregory XIII. and Benedict XIV.[1]

But no one is unaware of the great zeal with which more recently our predecessor of happy memory, Leo XIII., invited the nations of the East to associate themselves again with the Roman Church.

"As for ourselves," he said, "to say the truth, we must confess that the very remembrance of the ancient glory and incomparable merits of which the East can boast are to us inexpressibly sweet. There, in fact, were the cradle of human redemption and the first fruits of Christianity. From thence, as streams of some royal river, were diffused over the West the riches of the inestimable blessings derived to us from the Gospel of Jesus Christ. . . . While we ponder on these things, venerable brethren, in our mind we desire and long for nothing so much as to effect the restoration to all the East of the virtue and grandeur of the past. And the more so because the signs which, in the development of human events, appear there from time to time give reason to hope that the Orientals, moved by Divine grace, may return to reconciliation with the Church of Rome, from whose bosom they have been for so many years separated."[2]

[1] Const. "Nuper ad Nos," March 16, 1743, prescribes a new profession of faith for Orientals.

[2] Allocution "si fuit in re" of December 13, 1880, to their Eminences the Cardinals at the Vatican. "Acta," Vol. II., p. 179. *Cf.* also Ep. Ap., "Praeclara Gratulationis," of June 20, 1894, "Acta," Vol. XIV., p. 195.

Nor, indeed, are we, as you are well aware, venerable brethren, less desirous that the day so ardently prayed for by so many holy men may quickly dawn on which the wall which has so long divided two peoples may be destroyed to its foundations, and that these, being enfolded in one embrace of faith and charity, the peace so long besought may at length flourish, and that there may be one fold and one shepherd. (John x., 16.)

Whilst these were our thoughts there came to us a cause for grief from a certain article published in the new review, *Roma e l'Oriente*, entitled "Thoughts on the Question of the Union of the Churches." For, indeed, this article is full of so many errors, not only theological, but historical, that a greater collection could scarcely be pressed into so small a number of pages.

And, certainly no less rashly than falsely, approach is made in the article to the position that the dogma of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son in no way flows from the words of the Gospel or is proved by the belief of the ancient fathers. With equal imprudence doubt is expressed whether the sacred dogmas of Purgatory and the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary were held by the holy men of the first centuries. Again, when the article comes to deal with the constitution of the Church, we have, first, a renewal of the error long ago condemned by our predecessor, Innocent X.,[3] by which St. Paul is regarded as altogether equal as a brother with St. Peter. Secondly, and no less erroneously, it is suggested that in the first centuries the Catholic Church was not ruled by a single head—that is, a monarchy—and that the primacy of the Roman Church was supported by no valid arguments. Nor does the article leave untouched the Catholic doctrine of the Most Holy Eucharist, for it is stoutly advanced that the view is admissible which holds among the Greeks that the words of consecration do not produce their effect unless the prayer called the *"Epiclesis"* shall have first been offered, though it is known that the Church has no power at all to touch the substance of the sacraments. Equally inadmissible is the view that confirmation given by any priest may be regarded as valid.[4]

Even from this summary of the errors contained in this article you will easily understand, venerable brethren, the very grave offense that has been done to all who read it, and how greatly we ourselves have been astounded that Catholic teaching is so wantonly perverted by open words, and that many historical points on the causes of the Oriental schism are all too rashly distorted from the

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[3] Decr. Congr. Gen. S. E. et U. In quis, January 24, 1647.

[4] *Cf.* Benedict XVI., Constit. "Etsi Pastoralis" for the Italo-Greeks, May 26, 1742.

truth. In the first place, it is falsely laid to the charge of the holy Popes Nicholas I. and Leo IX. that a great part of the responsibility for the trouble was due to the pride and ambition of the one and to the harsh rebukes of the other—as if the apostolic energy of the former in the defense of most sacred rights can be attributed to pride, or the persistency of the latter in coercing the wicked can be called cruelty. The principles of history also are trampled underfoot when those holy expeditions called the Crusaders are traduced as piratical enterprises, or, more seriously still, when the Roman Pontiffs are blamed as though the zeal with which they ought to call the Oriental nations to union with the Roman Church is to be attributed to a lust for power and not to an apostolic solicitude for the feeding of the flock of Christ.

Great, too, was our amazement at the assertion in the same article that the Greeks at Florence were forced by the Latins to subscribe to unity, and that the same people were induced by false arguments to receive the dogma of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son as well as from the Father. The article even goes so far as, in defiance of the facts of history, to question whether the general councils which were held after the secession of the Greeks, from the eighth to that of the Vatican, are to be regarded as really ecumenical, whence a rule of a sort of hybrid unity is propounded that only that is henceforth to be acknowledged by either Church as legitimate which was their common heritage before the disruption, complete silence being observed on all else as superfluous and spurious additions.

We have thought that these things should be pointed out to you, venerable brethren, not only that you may know that the propositions and theories are rejected by us as false, rash and foreign to Catholic faith, but also that, as far as may be in your power, you may endeavor to drive away so dire a pestilence from the people entrusted to your watchful care by exhorting all to stand fast in the accepted teachings and never listen to any other, even though an angel from heaven should preach it. (Galatians i., 8.) At the same time, too, we earnestly pray you to impress upon them that we have no more ardent desire than that all men of good will may unweariedly exert all their strength that the unity longed for may be more speedily obtained, so that those sheep whom divisions hold apart may be united in one profession of Catholic faith under one supreme pastor. And this will more easily be brought about if fervent prayers are multiplied to the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete, who is "not the God of dissension, but of peace." (I. Cor. xiv., 33.) So will it befall that the prayer of Christ which He offered with groans before undergoing the worst of torments shall be fulfilled,

"that they all may be one, as Thou, Father, in Me and I in Thee; that they also may be one in Us." (John xvii., 21.)

Lastly, let all be sure that work with this object will be in vain unless first, and above all, they hold the true and whole Catholic faith as it has been handed down and consecrated in Holy Scripture, the tradition of the fathers, the consent of the Church, general councils and the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs. Let, then, all those who strive to defend the cause of unity go forth; let them go forth wearing the helmet of faith, holding to the anchor of hope, and inflamed with the fire of charity, to work unceasingly in this most heavenly enterprise; and God, the author and lover of peace, in whose power are the times and the moments (Acts i., 7), will hasten the day when the nations of the East shall return to Catholic unity and, united to the Apostolic See, after casting away their errors, shall enter the port of everlasting salvation.

This letter, venerable brethren, you will cause to be published after being diligently translated into the vernacular of the country entrusted to you. And whilst we rejoice to inform you that the beloved author of this article, which was written by him inconsiderately indeed, but with good faith, has in our presence sincerely and from his heart given his adhesion to the doctrines set forth in this letter, and has declared his readiness to teach, reject and condemn to the end of his life all that is taught, rejected and condemned by the Holy Apostolic See, we most lovingly in the Lord impart the Apostolic Benediction as an earnest of heavenly gifts and as a witness of our benevolence.

Given at St. Peter's, Rome, on the 26th day of December, in the year 1910, and in the eighth of our pontificate.

PIUS PP. X.

In Memoriam

MOST REV. PATRICK JOHN RYAN, D. D.,

DIED FEBRUARY 11, 1911.

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW records with deep sorrow the death of its directing editor, Archbishop Ryan. His interest in the QUARTERLY began with its publication in 1876. He saw in it from the beginning a powerful instrument for good in the spread of truth and the correction of error. He was contemporary with the group of great intellectual churchmen who were its chief contributors in its early days and who gave to it a reputation that was as wide as the English language.

When he was appointed to the See of Philadelphia in 1884 he was brought into closer touch with the publication, and with its editor, Right Rev. James A. Corcoran, D. D. His appreciation of the QUARTERLY at that time, his sympathy with its owners and publishers, Messrs. Hardy and Mahony, and his unbounded admiration for its great editorial head contributed very much to its success.

When Archbishop Ryan assumed editorial direction, on the death of Monsignor Corcoran in 1890, he did so with diffidence, indeed, as to his fitness, but with full confidence as to the ability of the QUARTERLY to continue to live up to the high standard to which its founders had raised it. In his salutatory which appeared in July, 1890, he says: "The aims of THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW and the mode of attaining them were admirably set forth in the first salutatory, January, 1876, by its first editor, the late Monsignor Corcoran. . . . On the lines mapped out by this great pioneer the new management proposes to work." He never departed from those lines. To the study and discussion of those subjects which came within the scope of the REVIEW, and which embraced theology, philosophy, history, science, literature and politics—using the latter term in its original and proper meaning—he brought those distinguished qualities which made him a successful director. His strong faith, uncompromising orthodoxy, far-seeing prudence and untiring zeal lent a value to his editorial direction that is hard to measure, while his kindness, patience and sympathy with his associates encouraged them and moved them to constant endeavor.

The associate editors and readers of the QUARTERLY have lost a true friend and able director.

May he rest in peace.

In Memoriam

RIGHT REV. MONSIGNOR JAMES F. LOUGHLIN, D. D.,

DIED MARCH 17, 1911.

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW has been doubly orphaned in the death of Archbishop Ryan and Monsignor Loughlin. In the former it possessed an unusually wise director and in the latter an exceptionally learned editor. It is very remarkable that they both took up the work of the REVIEW in the same year—1890—and both laid it down in the same year—1911. For twenty years they were associated together in the publication of this work, which was very dear to them. As the Archbishop excelled in his particular field, so Monsignor Loughlin shone in his. He had a wonderful equipment for editorial work. He had great natural ability, which was fully developed in the best educational institutions at home and abroad; he made every one of his talents double itself according to the Scripture standard, and permitted none of them to lie idle; he acquired a store of knowledge that was marvelous in its extent and variety, and he formed habits of study that were almost suicidal. When his mind began to pursue a subject he forgot everything, even rest, sleep and nourishment, until he found it and mastered it.

His knowledge of languages was very remarkable and very valuable, for it embraced, besides Latin and Greek, French, Italian, German and Spanish, with some knowledge of Polish. He had a special love for Church history and excelled greatly in that study. With such an equipment his services as editor of the QUARTERLY were invaluable.

He thought so quickly and analyzed a subject so readily that he seemed to act almost by intuition; and yet he was most kind and indulgent with persons of lesser ability. His beautiful simplicity of character, together with his cheerful and obliging disposition, made him approachable and lovable at all times. THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW has suffered a heavy loss in the death of its genial, able, sterling editor.

May he rest in peace.

Book Reviews

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC WHO'S WHO. Comiled and edited by *Georgina Pell Curtis.* 8vo., pp. 710. St. Louis: B. Herder.

This first issue of "The American Catholic Who's Who" has been much talked of, long promised and finally completed. There can be no question of its usefulness, and on the whole it is excellently well done. The first issue is the most difficult and, therefore, generally the least perfect. Indeed it might be said that the only way to perfect a work of this kind is to bring it out in imperfect form. The criticisms passed upon it will do most to perfect it. The editor has probably heard already, or she will hear very soon, from many prominent Catholics throughout the country, or from their friends, who ought to have a place in the book and are not found within its pages. She will also hear from the enemies of some who are in it and should not be there. It is impossible to complete a list of this kind which will please all persons or on which all will agree. We do not intend to touch on either of these points. We rather wish to call the author's attention to one or two other things.

And first, while it is very desirable and indeed necessary to let each subject submit his or her own story, it by no means follows that these stories are to be printed as submitted. There is evidence that this has been done in some instances. The result is an unreasonable amount of space given to comparatively unimportant persons and to trifling details that are of no interest to any one except the subject and of no historical value whatever. For instance, it is hardly worthy of note that a man sees the Pope or dines with a duke or goes to Europe every year. Much less that he receives a nomination for political office from a minority party so hopelessly out of the running that no man of standing will take it. Secondly, beware of the advertiser. There is a class of persons in every community who crave notoriety and are so hungry for advancement or gain that they use everything and everybody for advertising purposes. They are a variation of the type that writes or carves its name in high places—physically high. That class should be suppressed. Third, stick faithfully to the rules laid down in the beginning as to the classes of persons to be admitted to the book. Exceptions will multiply so fast as to destroy the rule. Fourth, while inviting suggestions of names, sift them well, because with men as with other things that which is worth having is rarer and harder to find than that which is worthless. Finally, get a very

strong glass, a long pair of editor's scissors and cultivate a hard-heartedness almost equal to adamant. Scrutinize, clip, reduce, until only persons worthy of note are admitted and only things worthy of comment are printed. Then the book can be reduced in bulk, while increased in subjects, and it will command the respect and compel the patronage of all thinking people.

CHRISTIAN MYSTERIES. A New Series of Sermons. By *Right Rev. Jeremias Bonomelli, D. D.*, Bishop of Cremona. Translated by Right Rev. Thomas S. Byrne, D. D., Bishop of Nashville. Four volumes, 12mo., cloth. $5.00, net, for the set.

Those who have read "Homilies for the Whole Year," by the same author and translator, will welcome the announcement of another four-volume set, entitled "Christian Mysteries." This new work contains discourses easily adapted for sermons on the mysteries of our holy religion. The depth of thought, wealth of erudition and grace of expression that characterize all the other works of the distinguished author have impressed themselves on this work also; and Bishop Byrne has turned the treatises into English with his accustomed brilliancy of style.

The author, after describing in his preface how he has collected the material for these discourses, continues:

"Here I have gathered together all these rough drafts, thrown them into orderly arrangement and developed them as best I could, and now I present them to the reader in the form of discourses.

"The reader may find two points interesting in these discourses; first, the study I have given to bring out clearly the rational part of the mysteries, illustrating them by similitudes and comparisons that make the conception of them more accessible; and next, the care I have taken to set forth the Catholic doctrine in the clearest and most precise language, avoiding all that display of imagery and rhetoric which clouds and obscures the simplest ideas. We priests, sent to preach the Gospel, should have ever before our minds the example of Jesus Christ, the Teacher of teachers, whose ministers we are. He announced the most exalted truths and the most profound mysteries in simple and popular language and in short sentences. In the words of Jesus Christ, the idea is as transparent as if His words were luminous crystal; there is not a word too many, nor a word too few, and children could understand Him. And when necessary He had recourse to parables, and He did not Himself disdain to explain them, which He did with a clearness that will ever be the amazement of the world. Let Him be our model. And, finally, let us keep in mind these words of St. Paul: "But in the Church I had rather speak five words with my understanding (that

is, so as be understood), that I may instruct others also, than ten thousand words in an (unknown) tongue.' "

THE HISTORY OF THE POPES FROM THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES. Drawn from the secret archives of the Vatican and other original sources. From the German of *Dr. Ludwig Pastor.* Vol. X., 8vo., pp. 525. Clement, VII., 1523-1534. St. Louis: B. Herder.

Pastor's great work grows apace. Always intensely interesting and no less valuable, because of the important chapters of Church history which it opens, the exceptional sources which it taps and the extraordinary historical acumen, power and courage of the author, the present volume yields to none in this respect. It is devoted entirely to the eventful reign of Clement VII., with the history of the Anglican Schism and the German Reformation. The author's references to original sources on these subjects and the other events that crowded the reign of this Pontiff make this volume especially valuable, because no chapters of Church history have been more frequently written by hostile and incompetent hands, and none call more loudly for the pen of the master. The book is an imperative necessity for the true seeker after historical truth and should be in the library of every earnest student and every educational institution.

MISSAL FOR THE LAITY. In Latin and English. To which is added a collection of usual public prayers. Printed on India paper, 16mo., 1,800 pages. New York: Benziger Brothers. Price, $1.85 to $4.00.

We are pleased to announce the publication of a new edition of the Roman Missal in Latin and English. The following points commend this Missal for the laity to the favorable consideration of English-speaking Catholics: This is the only complete Missal in the English language; the Latin text is given side by side with the English, not only of the Introit and some other few parts of the Mass (as in other "Missals for the Laity"), but all the parts of the Mass, so that the faithful can follow the priest word for word; all Masses are given, even those rarely celebrated; a few words outlining the life of the saint or tracing the history of the solemnity precede the Mass of each day in the year; special rubrics are carefully explained; the translation is new, and idiomatic, easy English is aimed at; an appendix gives the usual litanies, devotions and prayers which the faithful are likely to require at Mass; the book contains approximately 1,800 pages, nearly twice the matter contained in other "Missals for the Laity;" it is, however, less bulky than most others, because a thin India paper is used; this paper, though thin, is opaque, so that the print does not show through;

it is strong and will not tear or crack as ordinary paper does; the type is clear, adapted to meet the circumstances of poor light experienced in some churches and chapels; it is attractively and substantially bound in black embossed cloth; altogether its mechanical make-up is ideal; the low price at which it is offered speaks for itself; in a word, it deserves to be the standard Missal for English-speaking Catholics.

RITUALE ROMANUM. 16mo. Neo Eboraci: Fred. Pustet.

It is hard to believe until one has examined it that this small book, no larger than the "Excerpta" of a few years ago, contains the whole ritual. Formerly the ritual was a large, cumbersome book, seldom seen outside of the sacristy or the library. In its present form it is small, compact, legible, attractive and can be carried in the pocket as easily and conveniently as the smallest compendium. It is most useful for every priest.

THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA. An International Work of Reference on the Constitution, Doctrine, Discipline and History of the Catholic Church. In fifteen volumes. Vol. IX., Lapr—Mass. Vol. X., Mass—Newman.

If any one were to ask what is the best book and the latest on the Constitution of the Church, one might safely answer, the Catholic Encyclopedia. If he were to further ask for the best book on Church doctrine, the answer might still be the Catholic Encyclopedia. If he were then to inquire for the best work on Church discipline, the answer might be the same, and, finally, if he were seeking the best on Church history, the answer need not be changed. By this we do not mean to say that the Catholic Encyclopedia is a collection of exhaustive treatises on all these subjects, but we do declare without fear of contradiction that its collection of papers on these and kindred subjects are so well and ably written by the best authorities and so perfectly edited as to be unusually informing, always satisfying and in many cases practically exhaustive, because ninety-nine times out of a hundred they will give all the information on a subject which a reader needs. This has been the experience of all who have consulted the Encyclopedia, as it has been the experience of the writer of this review. It has been proved by every one of the ten volumes that have come from the press and it is proved by the two volumes before us. We have heard a good deal in recent years about the best hundred books and smallest possible book shelf, but for the Catholic at the present time who wishes to get the largest amount of useful, reliable, necessary information in the smallest possible compass we recommend without hesitation the Catholic Encyclopedia. It is undoubtedly the very best work for the library of every individual, but its import-

ance cannot be exaggerated for the library of the family which has boys and girls at school or college and young men and young women in contact with the world. For all these correct information concerning the constitution, doctrine, discipline and history of the Catholic Church is imperative, and here it is in its best, concisest and most attractive form.

L'HISTOIRE DES RELIGIONS ET LA FOI CHRETIENNE. A propos de l'Orpheus de M. Salomon Reinach, par *J. Bricout*, directeur de la Revue du Clergé français. 1 vol. in 16 de la collection Science et Religion, Nos. 571-572. Prix, 1 fr. 20. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

Amongst the difficulties of belief which embarrass our contemporaries in the road of faith, Brunetière lays special stress upon that which is too often occasioned by the history of religions. And indeed the favorite vantage ground chosen by the enemies of Catholicism for making their attacks upon our faith is that of the comparative study of the various beliefs and systems of worship. Hence arises the necessity more strongly than ever before to prove that the Church has nothing to fear, but rather has much to hope from these new courses of study. To make a frank avowal of the problems, to point out their solution with precision and clearness is the object aimed at and attained successfully in this pamphlet by the distinguished director of the Revue du Clergé français.

It was written as an offset against the Orpheus of M. Salomon Reinach. As this production resumes and condenses all the objections raised by the science of comparative religions, a lasting and widespread service was effected by exposing its treacherous schemes and by refuting its pernicious errors.

QUE DEVIENT L'AME APRES LA MORT? Par *Mgr. Schneider*, evêque de Paderborn, 1 vol. in 16 de la collection Science et Religion, No. 559. Prix, 0 fr. 60. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

The eminent writer sums up all that theological science teaches us on the destiny of the human soul beyond the grave. After firmly establishing against the materialists the fact of the persistence of consciousness after death he refutes a certain number of erroneous opinions, the sleep of souls, the migration of souls, the dreams of a millennium. If our mortal eye cannot penetrate into the mysterious region in which the accounts of the moral world are settled, at least we can affirm, upon the strength of what faith, tradition and reason teach us, that there is a personal survival in souls, that after death the just enjoy the reward due to their merits; that they remember us and call us to join their company, and that the last judgment will fully satisfy the yearning felt by the departed souls to be reunited with their spiritualized body.

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PERIODICAL

THIS BOOK MAY NOT BE
TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM

DOES NOT CIRCULATE